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4Structiire and Function of the Idealizing Process, with
Implications for the Empirical Nature of
Religious Idealism
I* Introduction
A. Purpose and Scope of the Dissertation
This dissertation proposes to make an analytical
and functional study of the idealizing process in its various
forms. This examination is significant in itself, and the
inquiry is fundamental for an attempt to determine the nature
and validity of the religious consciousness. It is the
pivotal investigation upon which our philosophy of religion
will depend.
The point of view and the method of procedure are
empirical, in the generous sense of the term. For my present
purpose, I accept William Jameses delineation of the problem
of philosophy in Lecture I. of "Pragmatism.” (William James,
"Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.")
I am not a pragmatist; I disagree in radical fashion
with much of James's epistemological theory and philosophy of
religion. Nevertheless I wish to record that William James
has influenced the development of my thought more than any
other philosopher (unless it be Immanuel Kant), and that I
have found many of James's suggestions and interpretations
to be the most illuminating and the most fruitful for the
present inquiry.
rlvir edS Id r(oiJo=-ixr^ tuB e'UjiafJ*xi3
'lo vnr^liin ^rjia ‘lOl aiV-i JxHoi^ToI
X • • I .iw‘ ;lr'.i:XeJI
fid i i oifbo rrX: ' I * I'
'*,
• rtfjtJ&i'i’&aBtd ocCX lo odooa tf^Jc ^DO^y/rf , A
LA^d^ njB ©:Tf5.-,L oj adJ;0'io*iq[ nolXjaii^'-iaiX alXT
ax/oi'ix'v -jJi ni anoooiq ^ 9iL>}' lo vr-i/js XxnoXiwt:..''i
trCX /.aft tliaaii n* o J: « XX.Qr.X': *':ce' i-td- .
e*ii/jracf ‘riJ’ erixc.'re.iwJS) Cv"' n/i
t’ilJ' at' JT , •. ’'v.iiTfjiiCioMaoo ajJ0i:;ilX©*i “WiX *io ^tiXXIxiV ^A^•A3
niOJL^iXo'x ‘xo \;dqoaolj;riq *iao iloXdw noqxs nciXxjrjXJ'.fevrri Cjscfoviq
.Xrtoqed i.Clw
o‘i/j oTi/XeoO'iq iO l>od‘ •.'! ricf.^ Jbna 'wolv lo Jrri: *
* ?
XaeiiOi-T oanea et;o'idXt(;'3 o.?- .:.’
nefc'-. 'fu odi 're ' I' a' aors^J, 'laliaV Xqo t ^3^.d::^J.c
,a©f i'X leuiXIiV;) . j " lo .1 OTU^oeX rrt vrf'.-qaoiii-:'' io
( rtjfniiiT Xo f>10 onto3 toX e^afC i/aS A ti.’atXtxjirP'rT**
fioiiiaaX iXsoiXaT nt eo'ftieciJb I ; Xaii^agaTi a ^ocr ;.a I
Xe trtqoBoXMq £'ra v'roed^t Irol:^oipc;eiGi:qe : Xcj rtetan
r.T£XXXXV.’ :*’-OOd'' fiaX.v I aooIg*£.-t'i«Vi..T .r:oX;Ul 3'i




( iii/A Xauimn tl e»cf iX va-iZeux) '• Iq' eoX Mq 't^rrjo
a'roXvtaJy';q'^/*aa.£ X". r. et ' a ^^njsT, lo ^jRasr iif: ; ’i f^vail
Ofl^ X Ct; ' : ji'i j ir.£i od^ in'r'L 3rti.riii'iii2r/Xi ^ oj’
5Hence the approach to the problem, and the funda-
rnente.! conception of the nature of the problem, are largely
in harmony with Jameses analysis of "the present dilemma in
philosophy." (Op. cit., p. 3) In the first place, I believe
tliat conventional philosophy has not recognized the far-reach-
ing significance of James’s statement that, "The history of
philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of
human temperaments," and that the professional philosopher,
v;hen philosophizing, usually endeavors, "to sink the fact
of his tempi)giament . . • . • Yet his temperament really gives
him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective
premises." (Op. cit., p. 6, 7)
This position is admirably developed by James in
this Lecture. I refer to it merely to illustrate the point
of view and scope of this dissertation. Taking James’s
analysis of the dilemma of philosophy seriously, it is
necessary to emphasize the primary value of an empirical
I do not assert that psychological description is
self-sufficient, or that it is independent of logical de-
duction. Description and interpretation coopere.te and inter-
blend. As a matter of fact, logic is a separate and independ-
ent type of inquiry, with its own problems, principles and
validity. However, "independence" is always relative. I
believe that empiricism^i^ successfully contends for the
primacy of the psychological description of the idealizing
process (as a preliminary inquiry for the philosophy of
religion), and rightly challenges the vaulting ambition of
(f-
'
-jzirtvi'i edS iKrs tSe'Id’o'XfT ©rfi rIo-30T:qqj3 odi ©one!! ' ' '
’Cioj^irLAl t'lO'I'iO'for la O'liJf&a orLJt *to noxiqeofron
xi't!r»e£xX' •taeKy'sq ofiJ'” lo -i 'rr^Ixsrt-s a’eeneT» y^aoift't&si liz
X 3/1^ '•I ( <5 .O' ^,&to .qO) ^flqoapl ir(q
-:ionoi-T:,3^ oflJ i;e5 xro?ooo'x ^)“Of^ ar*il '{frc2;f>QOli;r(q, Ijanoi^neva'Jo
t.-
*
*Xo .'•lOJ'oic! erlT” ,iairf<t J-irofiraieia a^aocL'.QG lo ^oajBoXlXnsia siti
*io rCaxiIo ni-^i'iec ^ lo J^iu in0^::a i3 oJ al ao I XrCq
.
<'i©tiq’>eoXxr£q I^ftoiaae'xOTtq orli cfisrlcl f>nj3 ” ^a^tnr^jtaa'xoqnieJ' rixynw/i
io.ut erlJ- .ikiia oj-’* .3'xovi335n6 iIIauqu .snislrfqoaoljciiq itojIw
\
'jfXBe'i otd d’ai J-nofui^iqnioi aXrl qo
oviXoaf.cTo o*Tont ajbi to '^cjjs iijaiXt aalcf 'le.^o's^a ^ nrX.X
(V t5 .q ,.llo .qO) ".aoaXao*iq
nX aonixTt. “^cf J3eqoX078X> *{X<.v’.'jXsiBj3 aX *fQ.to Xaoq aXilT
^nioq- 0i£d- e txi'iiai/XIi: oX ’^re^scr JX ocf 'joloi I .O'xuiooJ ax.:f^
a ’ aecneT^ SnX^f^T .rroXJ'BX'ioaaXfi aX.'ij' 1:0 oqooa Shb woXv lo
Qi nqXauoX^oQ AjrfqoaoXXiiq “Xo jiffcnoIXjb eiiX "to aXe’^XanB
• > X,if>X‘i ! ia lo ©i/Xcr/ •.’JuariX'iq odd QsXaxsiX'irtio od* Yiaaaooen
. aao^o^c^ ^rfXxXXad|:£ o:X^
aX iioXXqXrLoeeft iBoigoXo.XD’^iQq .tToaoB Xon oi) I
.
-r,Jb CB0X30X lo Sciobneqebni nl XX XBfiX "O tXn^XoXt^t/ii-tXea
-noXixX I>aB eXBieqooo rtoXXBXo'iq'ieXnX bits rioXXfiXioaoa . toXXouI)
-Bj'raqeJbrti Jbn4 oXBiBqon « aX oX;^oX ^XojjX: "10 *x3XX;jrt b aA .Mold
aeXqXoctXiq ^aineXcfo'iq zfjro aXX rfXXw ^^^-iXi/paX lo aq^^X Xae
I . 5vXXaXaa a*?jB^/£6 aX ''aonaXjrfoqoXjrri
”
^'revo’./oJi .-^XXiDXXav
o/lX 10j am&dnoo \*XIi;qaaapoirr; ^^/laXolTXqaG X^rlX avotlvd
j^i.-2X Cj2ei>X oXX qo rtol tqXT:oaGfc XBoXsoXorlo^^eq eiXX to 'io^araiiq
qo >criqoaoXXrIq orfX *ioq qqXxrorrX v'rBrti'TXXQ'iq o^) aaooo'iq
lo itoI^icEcixi :^CiJ:^£t/av ^dS sogfroIX-iifiC ;xtc \ (noinXX©*!








6a certain type of rationalistic metaphysics in its proud, and
too exclusive, use of deductive logic in the building of re-
ligious systems, and may question the validity of a more
critical idealism with its far-reaching ontological inferences
based on an organic logic of coherence. This position is taken
in the interests of logic, and recognizes the cooperative
processes of induction and deduction in all valid, creative
thinking
•
The extreme rationalist considers the empiricist an
incompetent, "out of key with the world’s cbiaracter." (Op.
cit., p. 7) However, the empirical method may be able to
validate itself as being in key with the character of the world
as given, and with the fundamental conditions and characteris-
tics of experience. To the empiricist, concrete facts as they
exist, or as they are in process of happening, are of primary
significance. To the rationalist, universals, concepts, prin-
ciples, abstractions, are of paramount value.
To be sure, each type of thinker recognizes both facts
and principles. Nevertheless, as James holds, the difference
in point -of -viev/ is fundamental and far-reaching. I do not
wish to over-stress this issue; I merely assert the importance
of the distinction between the "rs^tionalist temper" and the
"empiricist temper" for the purpose of this inquiry.
I believe that James’s analysis and estimate are
sound when he states that rationalism tends to be monistic,
optimistic and dogmatic. By dogmatic, I mean having the tend-
ency to proceed confidently without due regard for the natural
limitations of human knowledge. Doing business with wholes
and universals, rationalism rather easily arrives at splendid
b£t^^ ^buozq Qit Boi:Q^rf^«Joi£n oiJai:Xafioid‘*5 ‘i 'id aq^i ni^i'iod’ a
“•3*1 to aa^f)IJti;tf arW nl oisoX avxJ-oa&oi) to em^ tevlBwXoxo ood-
emu J3 to ofC<t nolduex/p \:i3cr £<Ti^ ^otfieila-^a a^oXsil
seonomtftx L&olzolo^no actX rfd'iw ciKil^oijX ijaoIJ'iio
n©2»-8J ai rxoiilaoq aMT . eorrortoiloo to ol^oX oift«3*to ns no d©a«cf
evid^w^mqooo ert^ s9sin;goo9 *i bus ,oX3oX to a^deomdriX erfct ai
evijso^so tMXav IXs aX aoXd’oabeb baij aoX^oi/Jbai to aeaQeooiq
.
yaliLnlilt
fi-e c^GXoX'rlqae ©rid aiebXaaoo dailaaold^a ocieidxo oilT
'^.qO) ”, lodoxiaarfo a’bl'iow aid rldXw qoi to d;;©” idaedeqxaooax
od eld© ed -^©ci bOAidota iBoiaXqoze ©xld «'ievewoH (? .q *,dXo
blaow odi to ’leio^mdo add rldiw al 3aXe<f a© tleeJi: odBbXX©’/
>5
•
“sXaedo^aBTio Jba© aaoldXfiiioo IsJrr&naLruf’l end ddiv/ to© ^novl^ as
jt'
Yarid e© eio©t edoaoaoo ^daioliiome ©dd oT .©oaelmqxe to aoid
^'i^ciiaq to at© ,3ai:aeqq©ri to aaoooaq ai ens ’'^add a© ao ^deixe
-aiaq ^adqeonoo ,al©aaevlat,* ^daXIfiaold©*! odd oT - ©oa^oXtlasla
. euXav dftiJom©a©q to ea© taaoido^adad©
,
8eIqXo
edo©t ddod aosXagooea ao^iaXdd to oq-^d d 04ie_i 0ma ed oT
©oae-iettib edd ,aI)Xod aecT©X a© tOaoXadd'xeveyi .aeXqloaiaq to©
doa oJb I
.
^nXdo^oa-aat to© I©daeni©f>ccjt ai .‘roxv-to-daloq nX
ooa©daoqDcrX edd daeaa© ^Xoaeci I jex/aaX aXdd aaeado-mvo od daXw
arid to© ”aoqaed daXItodXdsa” edd deoT^dacf rfoXdotiXdaXb add to
.li^iXapaX aidd to eaoqmq ar£d mt ”ieqf-40d daXoX'xXqae ”
0*1© ©dtoXdao to© aXB^jXm© a’aofcxsTr d©dd oveXXod I
^ tOMSatnon ocf od aX>n©d aiaXX©aoXd©t dtod B©d©dR ©d nedw totfxoa
“toed odd ;^Xv©d n©eci I ^c>Xd©{n30f> vi . Oddatocyob Xsxt© oXdaXciXdqo
X^md^n ©iid *iot di/oddX\T y:idn0bxto[Oo beaoo'jq od •iorie
7;, .. aelodw rfdXx aaeAiXaird snloQ . OsbeXwoxp^ nsrvjd to areoXd©dXaXI
bXtoelqa d© aevdi'i© ijXXa©© 'iodd©*x c:®XX©rioid©i tSl©uT;o'^bd;x to©
7and imposing idealisms • ’’Absolutism has a certain sweep and
dash about it," (op. cit., p. 19) v/hich give it an air of
fascination and impressiveness. These may prove to be super-
ficial qualities which fade on examination.
James brings two che^rges against the absolutistic
philosophy: first, that it depends too largely and uncritical-
ly upon abstractions, ignoring or distorting facts, or 8.t
least drawing inferences which the facts do not warrant;
second, the abstractions arrived at are sterile, after
achieving them with so much difficulty, one can explain .
nothing by them, nor do anything v/ith them; they are infertile
doctrines . For the pantheist and for the rationalistic
God lives on remote heights of abstraction. The
absolute mind is a conception remote 8.nd practically vacuous.
"You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion
of it." (Op. cit., p. 19)
The \7orld of the rationalist is "simple, clean and
noble. . • • • Its architecture is classic. Principles of
reason trace its outlines, logical necessities cement its
parts. Purity and dignity are what it most expresses. It
is a kind of marble temple shining on a hill." (Op. cit.,
p. 21, 22) I believe that James is correct v/hen he urges
that this type of philosophy is no explanation of our con-
crete universe. "It is another thing altogether: a substitute
for it, a remedy, a v/ay of escape." (Op. cit., p. 22)
To the empiricist, this undue refinement appea^rs as
"a monument of artificiality." (Op. cit., p. 25) "Intellect-
ua^list philosophies exquisitely satisfy that craving for a
^
-vki l aexJXi Colid’A"
>
»
ffflowa : -l JXi . aaaiJ"jVo^i• . -i r
:
br*.ii
:« dojcrtn* (5{ .<T , . ^ic .c{o) 4^ /oi#
-neqii- :'rf o/O'ict OQQ/iT . =3aen[9Yio!?.9'iqii!i: rtoii^iTio^e^
.
'to.t^a.-tj'i no Qbsil: doirf'v. aei: ji:Xai/p
ot tRi: Jq-fojscffl . ddu QO^niiric oift gertsL
-luc^l jtnora/ £n.'; yXdt^ijtjX alvfoqoJb *i .tcnll t'^dqoaoXidq
is: no to ^yiiTongi ,.-ia;o'i'to^T:^3d'i5 atoq^j
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nxoXqxe :tso eno i ’C^Xi/o1x1X5 tioim oq rflX\r inodl ^lyoljdo,3
eXict-neXTl on© T^adi jfTo.ii o5 non ,noilu ^.nldXOrf
arix to! X;)nij 1 i/rrld-noT art! Toq ..aorrlTtoo?::
odl’ . «oXw ojsTladro la oXn-^lad ©Io'tot no .t&vIX 5cX
\ riijo:;o!tv ^^lLeoiior7y ui^ oloaeT rtoliqoonoo X) ai xATlai oinioacf^
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' Gtl I‘i3i;:w0 QalX'laaQoan Xaol^jol iO&tlliJSc 'wa.iST
'*
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refined object of contemplation v/hich is so pov/erful/appetite
of the mind.'* (Op. cit., p. 22) These philosophies do not
satisfy the robuster hunger of the empiricist. "Truly there
is something a little ghastly in the satisfaction with which
a pure but unreal system v/ill fill a rationalist mind." (Op.
cit., p. 23) It breeds the sort of guileless intellectualism
and naive optimism which permit a Bradley to dismiss the
tragic hurt of evil v/ith this sort of flourish (a little
ghastly to the empiricist's more candid and courageous vieYf):
"The Absolute is the richer for every discord and for all the
diversity which it em.braces." (F. H. Bradley, "Appearance
and Reality, p. 204. Quoted by James, op. cit., p. 30)
Of course there are 8.11 sorts of permutations of
views, but I believe that I have correctly and justly stated
the prevailing contrast betv;een the empiricist and the
rationalist viev/s . With the bland innocence of the intellect-
ualistic type of philosophy I am wholly dissatisfied. This
is enough to indicate, if not to justify, the empirical
method of this paper
.
Also I have intended to indicate my dependence
upon James's defence of empiricism, altho I have arrived
at my view-point along other lines as well. I shall proceed
to develop my thesis in the main independently of James.
Then in Part III. I shall undertake a critical appraisal of
his philosophy of religion. For this I have two reasons:
(1) It is the best way logically, and the most personal and
pleasing way, to develop the implications of my thesis.
(2) Having taken my stand with James's empirical point of
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9viev/, I find his philosophy of religion a challenge. Much
of it I believe to be sound; at many points I find it
seriously defective. Hence the investigation in Part III,
becomes an organic part of the v/hole
.
V/hat do you find, asks James, in the philosophic
offering? "You find an empirical philosophy that is not
religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not
empirical enoijigh." (Op. cit., p. 15) In undertaking to make
good the deficiency, James violates his own principles (I be-
»lieve), and proves disloyal to the empirical method. My
thesis seeks to give the true answer to our problem with
consistent loyalty to the principle of empiricism and to
the principle of logical deduction.
The ramifications of the thesis might be infinite.
Rigorously I have endeavored to leave out of the discussion
all phases of the question not necessary to the development
of the the ory
.
B . Reviev/ of the Work of Other Investigators
1 . General perspective of ouj? theme in the history
of thought
Our inquiry has the entire history of philosophy
for its background, for thought has always been concerned
with the ultimate problem of critical reflection: the nature
of the universe of reality in the light of human ideal long-
ings . Socrates was engaged in a life-long quest to discover,
thru introspection and by rigorous cross-questioning, true
universals . Plato regarded particular objects as imperfect
copies of eternal patterns; he sought to discover the essen-
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tial forms of things, a hierarchy of beauty, and so to
possess eternal and changeless Being. Aristotle was interest
ed in the true function of man, *and found in entelechy the
inner principle of life and development.
Amid the disillusionment of a decadent age, Stoic
and Epicurean attempted to salvage some significant insight
from the wreck of culture. In the centuries that followed,
eclectic religious movements sought in fantastic forms of
experience to locate a transcendent God above the flux of
things. Augustine, wavering between v/orId-denial and world-
affirmation, attempted to lay the foundations and to lift
the pinnacles of the City of God.
A Dominican monk, "doctor angelicus," gave the
world his monumental "Summa" of natural and revealed theol-
ogy. V/ith the decline of Scholasticism, we see the flourish-
ing of mysticism and the rise of critical systems. Francis
Bacon, interested in the advancement of learning, offered
the world a Novum Organum. Descartes discoursed on method,
and distinguished between "res extensa" and "res cogitans."
Spinoza meditated upon life under the aspect of eternity,
gloried in the intellectual love of God, who is one, infinite
self-determined
.
Meany/hile Locke wrote "An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding," refuted the doctrine of innate ideas, dis-
tinguished between sensation and reflection, and defined
knowledge as the perception of the connection of our ideas.
He adopted Descartes* metaphysics. Nevertheless, with his
empirical ethics, and above all with his elaborate analysis
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of the knoT/ing process, he definitely recognized the signific-
ance of subjective prepared the way for the modern
empirical estimate of our problem of knowledge. He provided a
psychological approach to philosophy.
is
Berkeley declared, ‘'Esse percipi Hume con-
tinued the inquiry into human natujre, distinguishing betv;een
outward and inward impressions, and finding that all objects
of reason are either relations of ideas (self-evident) or
matters of fact (problematic). He developed the empirical
method in radical fashion; thus the mind became a flux of
perceptions, and causation was analyzed into habitual expecta-
tion. Hume was interested in the natural origin of religion.
Recognizing the limitations of knowledge, he held that ration-
al theology v^as impossible . In general his anti-intellectual-
ism v;as important, and he developed the genetic point of view
and the voluntaristic conception.
On the continent Leibniz v^orked out his Monadology,
a curious blending of Democritus' atoms, Aristotle's entele-
chies and Plato's ideas. The Leibniz-V/olffian school attempt-
ed to reconcile empiricism and rational/^^. The mystics
emphasized intuition, and gave the world a beautiful pietism.
Kant felt all these, and other, influences, pondered
the problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a prio-
ri, and brought forth his Cpernican thought, that the under-
standing prescribes its laws to nature, and held that the
ideas of the soul, the world and God are regulative, not con-
stitutive. The ding-an-sich became a limiting concept. After
the transcendental dialectics, Kant gave us his ethics of good
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will and the kingdom of ends. On the basis of the categori-
cal imperative he Y/’orked out a new rationalism. Idealism
was developed at the hands of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.
Hegel’s method v/e shall discuss at some length a little
later
.
This brief sketch is sufficient for our purpose,
TYhich was to give a rough suggestion of the perspective of
oujf theme in the history of thought
.
2. Recent investigations in our specific problem
of values
The specific question contemplated in this disserta-
tion is distinctly a modern one; it is, in fact, a recent and
contemporary problem. It has been approached from many direc-
tions. Philosophers of nee^rly all schools have been concerned
with the nature and fate of values . In fact the interest of
philosophy has largely shifted from ontological and cosmolog-
ical problems to axiological theories: ethics, esthetics, the
philosophy of history and of civilization, and the philosophy
of religion. The metaphysical interest remains, and will
remain; but the characteristic approach to the ultimate
questions, today, is thru axiological studies.
It will be necessary to sketch some of these devel-
opments only briefly. Many have investigated the general
problem of values . Many have built up elaborate systems of
spiritualism or idealism. Many have reached naturalistic,
pragmatic or realistic conclusions. Few have v/orked away
patiently at the business of psychological analysis and
synthesis with a view to determining inductively the implica-
tions of the idealizing process for the nature and the validity
r-cil.** -M . r" \:occ ^ ijjo 6e:t%0"rr nl ‘:-vi>fB'r^3qcr.i Xeo
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of the religious consciousness. William James came near to
attempting this type of investigs^tion; but he forsook the
empirical method, as v;e shall see.
In the early half of the nineteenth century Auguste
Comte presented a critical type of naturalism, in distinc-
tion from the ontological naturalism of Spencer and of
Haeckel. (Compare R. B. Perry, "Philosophy of the Recent
Past," p. 43.). Comte believed that the source and measure
of philosophic knov/ledge is experience. To know is to
formulate laws which conform to experience. He deprecated
assertions concerning a reality beyond experience. In his
earlier writings he stressed the empirical-objective prin-
ciple, namely that laws merely reproduce constant connections
among facts. He presented his familiar law of "les trois
4tats" : the theological or fictive, the metaphysical or
abstract, the scientific or positive. In all this, Comte
was on the right track. Likev/ise his classification of the
sciences is significant and helpful.
In spite of the necessity for modifying Comte’s
theory at many points, his main contention is sound, a fact
which rationalistic metaphysics does not recognize. It is
apt to find flaws in Comte’s argument, and then leap to un-
justifiable conclusions. The charge is that the intellectual-
istic philosophy goes far beyond that which the facts warrant
(discrediting genuine religious idealism to this extent),
that it tends to exaggerate favorable considerations and to
minimize unfavorable arguments, that it applies a remorse-
less logic to positivism (v/hich is admirable) while it be-
comes neAvely lenient in the logical requirements made of
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Aside from minor shortcomings, Conte failed in that
he developed his theory into a sociology, and a philosophy
based on sociology, without a psychological background and
approach; that is, he did not take account of the subjective,
experienced nature of values
. Comte left psychology out of
his classification altogether. In fact he had an extreme
distrust of the claims of psychology to be a science, for
he rejected the introspective method. This is not surprizing,
perhaps, because his contemporaries, the " idealogues , ” sadly
abused the method.
Nevertheless, Comte was prevented from developing
his theory as fruitfully as he might have done; he took
refuge in the av/kv/ard and superficial "religion of humanity."
However, all things considered, this (as an attempt) was
admirable, rather than contemptible. Subjective interests
had their revenge in the end. As a matter of fact Comte
had always believed that a stable society waited for the
adoption of a stable system of ideas, and thru the inspira-
tion of a common ideal. Now in his later writings, the logic
of the heart took precedence, and he thought of the human v;ill
(governed by love) as dictating its essential reality to
nature. This is only a tendency, but is an unmistakable
tendency. It is the natural outcome of Comte’s deep-lying
idealism, whose subjective nature had been suppressed. The
error has its pathetic quality.
If this is a fair statement, Comte does not merit
scorn for his modest method of inquiry. Nor is it fair to
say that he held that knov/ ledge is confined to the realm of
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sense experience . Ee e^ttempted to v/ork out a sound method
had
for studying the complex phenomena of society, and/ a pro-
found enthusiasm for social ideals. He anticipated "emergent
evolution" in teaching that nature, altho continuous, rises
successively to new levels of existence where new and differ-
ent la7/s obtain.
John Stuart Mill accepted Comte’s empiricism, his
cl8.ssification of the sciences, and much of his social theory.
Kill continued the British tradition in analyzing the data of
experience, rather than in tracing a philosophy of history.
He vi&B more psychological and more logical than v;as Comte.
Also he was influenced by the romantic movement led by
Coleridge. Hence he sought to do justice to the individual
and the social view-points in his appre^isal of value. In
his ethics he tried to free utilitarianism from its sordid-
ness by modifying its selfish hedonism and by recognizing a
hierarchy of values. His views on religion are eorev/hat
fragmentary, but are true to hie empirical principle. He
held that faith in God is not demonstrable, but is an in-
vigorating hope . He suggested that we may trust in God as
a moral Partner, rather than as the Absolute, or the Infin-
ite Being. Kill’s important work on the problem of induc-
tion was bound to affect religious thought in more ways
than one
.
Albert Lange began with a strict interpretation of
Kant, stressing the subjective or volitions.! factor in
knowledge. Thus he departed from Comte’s earlier and more
typical empirical position. He recognized the ideal realm
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created by the inventive imagination. Ideals are to be
judged v/ith regard to their value as legitimate expressions
of our nature. Thus Lange connected vfith the later develop-
ment of the philosophy of value.
Emile Durkheim took for his point of departure the
concept of society, which (once constituted) has a unique
character. The fundam.ental concepts of science are "collec-
tive representations." He emphasized the elemental nature
of social obligation, and on this basis built his social
theory of religion. L^vy-Bruhl is one of the principal
representa,tives of this contemporary current of thought in
France
.
'Rudolph Lotze developed a speculative metaphysics,
which he based ultimately on faith in reason and on judg-
ments of value. This culminated in a significant movement
in the philosophy of religion in which Ritschl was the most
important figure. Maine de Biran attempted to base his
religious faith on immediate self-consciousness, but found
it necessary to invoke "belief" as a faculty which is able
to apprehend the absolute.
Charles Renouvier with his "phenomenism" connected
vfith Hume and Kant. The real stuff of reality is experience.
In order to escape the relativity of science, he defended the
postulates of belief, which satisfy the total demands of
personality. But phenomena are real, and the larger universe
is revealed in them, and is verified by them.
Wilhelm Windelband was influenced by Lotze ’s doctrine
of "Geltung." Truth is the satisfaction of the fundamental
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needs and demands of the subject, not the particular individ-
ual, but the "logisches Bewusstsein uberhaupt." Ethical and
esthetic values, rising above logical values, have transcen-
denta.l implications . Now the ideals in the " NormaIbewusst-
sein” are unfulfilled. Religion is the insistent demand for
their realization in the perfect or "holy”, so that the
opposition betv/een value and reality may be overcome.
In spite of the rationalism of V/indelband, the
empirical temper and the pragmatic evaluations are signifi-
cant. In contrast with the English idealists. Green, Bradley
and Bosanquet, Josiah Royoe's philosophy usually retained an
empirical flavor. He was influenced largely by Lotze . Even
more decidedly the pupil of Lotze, Borden P, Bowne, in spite
of his spiritualistic metaphysics, recognized the limits of
speculative reason: beyond these limits, "we have to fall back
on belief based on the necessities or the intimations of the
practical life." (Borden P. Bowne, "Metaphysics," p. 427)
He was fond of calling his doctrine of personalism his
"transcendental empiricism."
Heinrich Rickert developed Windelband’s thought by
reducing more thoroly the "Sein" to the "Sollen." His view
was based on the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. He
tried to reconcile "VsTert" and "Wirklichkeit" in "immanent
employed
Sinn." Wilhelm Dilthey/the psychological and historical
methods, distinguishing between "Erkennen" and "Verstehen,"
and turned to a philosophy of history.
Rudolph Eucken developed this thought away from
• Naturalism, altho he recognized that truth must meet the
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requirements of the v/hole life. Georg Simmel developed the
empirical intimations in Dilthey’s theory. Simmel undertook
to describe the actual growth of ideals in response to specific
needs. He stressed relativity, and interpreted truth in terms
of life -process which can not be included imder any fixed
system of categories. Here, and in Eucken's teaching that
life is essentially action and struggle, we ha.ve a transition
away from Kantian orthodoxy tov/ard thought movements neo-
vitalistic and pragms.tic .
The thought of Croce is noted for its closeness to
history, and for its inclusive interest in the manifestations
of the spirit in art and in nature . He deprecates the pseudo-
concepts of science as artifices and fictions. Giovanni
Gentile is fond of identifying reality with the actual historic
processes of thought. Modernism in the Catholic Church taught
that the truths of faith v/ere to be apprehended only by faith,
since they were inner, subjective valuations, expressions of
the soul's needs. The formulas of these ideals are symbolic.
This viev/ was denounced by the Church, which reaffirmed a
Scholastic rationalism, or neo-rationalism.
Henri Bergson discovered metaphysical reality to exist
in the natural life and intuitive consciousness. William James
foiind reality in "experience.” His philosophy vms largely de-
termined by his psychological theory where he stressed the
selective activity of consciousness and the continuity or
connectedness of experience. From these he developed his
pragmatism and his "radical empiricism." His appraisal of the
moral and the esthetic demands led to his doctrine of "the will
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to believe.” His philosophy of religion we shall discuss
at length later. John Dewey has developed an "instrumental-
ism” as a social philosophy which contemplates the continual
reconstruction of ends for the liberalizing, of the group life.
He rejects metaphysics, and holds that the function of religion
is to furnish an imaginative background to scientific and
social theory. The business of philosophy is to undertake
the reconciliation "of the attitudes of practical science
and of contemplative esthetic appreciation." (John Dev;ey,
"Reconstruction in Philosophy," p. 127) However, in "Human
Nature and Conduct," he goes beyond this purely naturalistic
hypothesis in referring to religion as "marking the freedom
and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole."
In the presence of religion, "we put off mortality and live in
the universal." Idealization includes "a sense of these en-
compassing contimj^ies with their infinite reach." (P. 550-
552) In England, F. C. S. Schiller had offered his "Humanism."
5
In Germany, Hans Vaihinger wrote his "Philosophie de^ Als Ob,"
v/hich represents the concepts of science, jurisprudence and
religion as fiotive but efficacious.
In the neo-realistic movement, we find Alexius Meinong
v/orking out his "Gegenstandstheorie , " v/ith its application to a
theory of value, according to which values have a sort of non-
existent objectivity. Von Ehrenfels has given us his "System
der V/erttheorie , " and Edmund Husserl has formulated his
" PhUnomenologie ." Bertrand Russell’s realistic analysis leads
him to individiialism, pessimism, and "The Free Man’s Worship."
Neo-realists differ widely in their philosophy of value.
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Santayana somev/hat resembles Meinong, and holds that value
concerns "essences” rather than physica.! or mental existences.
G. E. Moore believes that value is a quality attaching to
objects. S. Alexander inclines to the view that value is
psychological and subjective; however, on the basis of the
principle of emergence, he has presented an original theology.
Hugo Mlinsterberg, in his rationalistic and optimistic
"Philosophic der Werthe," presented a brilliant defence of
eternal values. R. Otto, in "Das Heilige," has urged the
unique character of the holy. Following Meinong and Von
Ehrenfels, and influenced by Windelband and Rickert, V/. M.
Urban has given the \7orld an ambitious study of values,
"Valuation: Its Nature and Lav/s." This painstaking inquiry
has given a new direction to the study of ideals, and can not
be ignored by any present-day student of value
.
V/. R. Sorley*s "Moral Values and the Idea of God"
I have taken as a typical metaphysical, idealistic interpre-
tation of values, and v/ill discuss the book at some length
in the next section.
Psychology has been av/akened to a new interest in
the emotions and the ideal phase of experience. James Mark
Baldwin, in his "Social and Ethical Interpretations" and his
"Theory of Mental Development," gave assistance and inspiration
to this enterprise. Since Darv/in's "Expression of Emotions in
Animal and Man" and Ribot's "Psychology of Emotions,** much has
been done in the study of the feelings, mood, temperament,
sentiments, and consequently in the working out of a sounder
psychology of idealization. Experiments in volitional
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phenomena, and able research in the psychology of the think-
ing process, ha.ve contributed to the same end. Most psy-
chologies today include in their theory a more or less ex-
tended study of some aspects of the valuational process.
Making their significant contributions are numerous
other types of research: scientific ethical theories, genetic
studies in logic, recent inquiries in the rich field of
esthetics (such as Flaccus's "The Spirit and Substance of
Art"), critical surveys of the intellectual background of the
age (such as Randall’s "The Making of the Modern Mind," a
splendid example of the new philosophy of history), also the
new science and art of history, and recent, illuminating
literary criticism.
Beginning with James, Starbuck, Coe and Leuba, the
psychology of religion has presented a rich and fruitful
investigation of idealization. Many special studies have
been made. Special studies in child, adolescent, social and
abnormal psychology have contributed, as well as the working
out of theoretical and practical educational problems, in-
cluding recent theories in the philosophy of education.
Many important, altho one-sided, movements in psychology
(such as Freudianism) have thrown much light on dark problems.
Researches in anthropology and the history of religion have
been exceedingly valuable; likev/ise other evolutionary studies,
such as L. T. Hobhouse’s "Morals in Evolution." Philosophies
of religion have centered more or less self-consciously in the
concept of value; for example, one of Edgar S. Brightman’s
books has for its title, "Religious Values."
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This completes our survey of the investigations in
the field of our thesis. Oiu? problem is pretty definitely
conceived. Nevertheless it has so many approaches, ramifica-
tions and implications, that we have taken the only practicable
way of siammarizing the manifold inquiries which have been made,
with their variety of solutions.
II. Katuire and Implications of the Idealizing Process
A . The Problem
1. The experiential character of ides^lization
Gilbert Murray has said (quoted by M. C. Otto, in
"Things and Ideals," p. 50) that the larger portion of a
man’s life "is rigidly confined in the round of things that
happen from hour to hour. It is exposed for circumstances
to beat upon, its stream of consciousness channeled and
directed by the events and environments of the moment."
We are concerned with the description and evaluation
of that other (quantitatively) minor portion which is not
rigidly confined in the round of things that merely liappen.
Vie are to study the increment of growth in conscious ex-
perience, as process and product. The ideal is embodied in
the increment of growth. The ideal is a construction in
imagination of a phase of experience whose meanings are not
fully realized.
This novel idea, this imaginative and reflective
construction, is discoverable in the actual stream of ex-
perience. It is a definite type of experience. It can be
observed, analyzed more or less successfully, and the lav/s of
its development can be traced. We must apply the empirical
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method as rigidly as possible, and the method of inferential
reasoning as carefully as may be.
By novelty is meant not merely unfamiliar, unex-
pected or different experience, but rather experience which
has new pattern-meanings . These meanings are taken to be
intelligible and valid. Analysis must determine the nature
of their intelligibility; reflection must assess their
validity. In the idealizing process vie have old meaning,
tested and enjoyed, and novel meaning. It will be our
problem to determine the relation of assured valuation to
deepening insight, and to estimate the significance of the
projecting of ideals in the light of their ultimate validity.
Ideals, as determinable phases of the stream of
consciousness, must be^argely comprehended in empirical terms.
However, it is the very nature of ideals to refer beyond the
immediate context, beyond accredited items, to an experience
in the making. A logical procedure will take account of both
aspects of idealization. Of course reflection on experience
becomes an organic part of the total experience.
Sympathetic study of biography and history may lead
to the impressive belief that man may be understood best from
the point of view of those upward leanings which culminate in
religious experience. But this facile impression must be
examined with painstaking care. It is difficult to separate
myth and magic from wholesome idealization. Whatever cosmic
truth religion may hold, it is primarily religious experience.
Hence description of the complicated processes involved must
go a long way in the direction of explaining the meaning of
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religious idealization. Whatever outlying significance ideals
may have, they must be understood in terms of their function-
ing as instruments of adjustment.
There is a certain familiarity and conventionality
about the religious consciousness v^hich often prove deceptive;
there is an easy fluency in referring to its characteristic
concepts which is often misleading. The customary language
of piety, for our purpose, would confuse the issue. The
religious consciousness is persistently and naively objective.
V/e are compelled to distrust this ready objectivity, if v/e are
to be true to our declared method of inquiry.
I believe that it is fair to say that, in the long
history of thought, the common distrust and disdain of the
experienced nature of values is a glaring characteristic.
In "The Sense of Beauty," George Santayana observes that the
comparative failure of esthetic speculation has been due to
the subjectivity of the phenomena with which it deals . He
continues
:
"Man has a prejudice against himself: anything
which is a product of his mind seems to him to be lanreal
or comparatively insignificant. We are satisfied only
when we fancy ourselves surrounded by objects and laws
independent of our nature /Many/ psychologi/sts
have neglected the exclusively subjective and human de-
partment of imagination and emotion. .... /Certain/
philosophers seem to feel that unless m.oral and esthetic
judgments are expressions of objective truth, and not
merely expressions of human nature, they stand condemned
of hopeless triviality. A judgment is not trivial, how-
ever, because it rests on hums.n feelings. On the con-
trary, triviality consists in abstraction from human
interests; only those judgments and opinions are truly
insignificant which v;ander beyond the reach of verifica-
tion, and have no function in the ordering and enriching
of life." ("The Sense of Beauty," p. 3, 4)
In this passage, Santayana may disparage the real problem of
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objective reference. The quotation is made with the sole
purpose of recording a significant judgment in regard to the
comp9.rative neglect of the subjective aspect of valuational
experience
•
2. Criticism of Hegel's method in his "Philosophy
of History"
The nature of our problem, and some of the principal
bearings of our thesis, may be indicated by a critical estimate
of the procedure of Hegel in his "Philosophy of History." No
contemporary inquiry into the meaning and validity of idealiza-
tion could well proceed until it had taken account of, and had
come to terms with, the greatest of Idealists.
Hegel's general philosophy is so opposed to our
point of view that its consideration v/ould not be so helpful
as a survey of the "Philosophy of History," which is a brilliant
study of the actual evolution of idealization in history. This
commends the work to us at this point because of our thesis
just presented concerning the experiential character of
idealization.
One might draw the contrast between a radically
empirical-materialistic (e.g., "the economic") philosophy of
history and an extreme absolute-idealistic theory, v/ith the
implication that the latter presents an Absolute Spirit un-
folding itself, in full consciousness and v/ith absolute pre-
cision, in the complex processes of history, and that the
process is wholly rational (and therefore rationally traceable),
the details in the development being of no inherent signific-
ance . This contrast might be made, but it would not justly
«ton ai- 's:n? . ^o:to-\.o’lo'i 3 Vj£cJ-oo£^^o
9fCJ o'i, -^'T ^i‘.-"i nl' .tiiSr/
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represent that betv/een the mechanistic method and the
Hegelian point of view and method.
Hegel's philosophy of history differs radically from
one popular understanding of it in two respects. In the first
place, Hegel has a genuine and large regard for the empirical
facts of history. This regard may not be so persistent or so
inclusive as we might wish. Nevertheless it is a real interest
and evaluation, which determine his approach (at least in
part), an aspect of his theory and many a pregnant suggestion.
His regard for facts is indicated in his ovm pre-
liminary statement. It is insisted that the philosophy of
history is, in general, the thoughtful consideration of
«-(P. 51)
history
.y It is evident ths^t such consideration (in so far)
would be empty without the content of actual historic process-
es. More specifically does he state that the only idea that
philosophy brings v/ith it to the contemplation of history is
the simple conception of Reason, that Reason is the sovereign
of the world, that the history of the world therefore presents
us with a rational process. ^'(Page 52)
It might be objected that this conception, if
"simple,” is rather stupendous. However, we are concerned
nov;- merely with pointing out the fact that Hegel definitely
(officially) adopts the empirical point of view as far as the
consideration of the facts of history is concerned. Moreover
he insists that we must not introduce a priori inventions, but
54)
must proceed inductively .y' It is quite possible that he does
not always proceed in this fashion. But at least we should
give him full credit for recognizing the advisability, nay—
References are to Hegel's Philosophy of History (transla-
tion by J. Sibree), published by P.F .Collier, New York, 1911.
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the necessity, of thus reasoning, and of honestly intending
so to do.
We shall have to maintain that Hegel frequently does
give history an artificial cast, cavalierly twisting facts
and distorting movements, in order to fit his material into
the dialectic and speculative process. Hence, first, v/e
should give full emphasis to the "concrete*' nature of his
interest, as understood and intended hy him. Hegel does
maintain that the development of Spirit is his principal
concern. But he insists that the term "World" includes both
physical and psychico.l natuj^e, and tha^t, on^ the stage of
universal history. Spirit displays itself in its most
concrete reality. (Op. cit., p. 53, 54)
It is our problem, then, to understand the meaning
of this statement. We must note that Hegel distinguishes two
phases of the thought that Reason rules in the v/orld*s history.
One is Ana^ras * doctrine of Nous. This refers to a Reason
implicit in phenomena, not to a self-conscious Spirit. To be
sure, this concept of Nature as an embodim.ent of Reason does
not appear strange. Socrates adopted the doctrine, but re-
gretted its abstract (external) form in Anaxagoras. (P. 55-57)
Now there is a very important difference between ae an
(P.56,57)
abstract principle and its determinate application./ That it
should constantly be borne in mind, Hegel frequently reminds
us. Socrates sought to comprehend the union of the Concrete
(P. 57)
v/ith the Universal./ The belief in particular Providences is
hostile to this attempt. We must find the manifestation of
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(Op. cit., p. 56-58)
Spirit concretely realizii^g itself./ In the history of the
world, the individuals that we have to do with are peoples;
the totalities are states. Eegel believes that he is ;]ustified
in expecting to see that v/hich was intended by eternal Wisdom
actu8.11y accomplished in History, as well as in Nature. (P.58-60)
Hegel definitely’’ begins by determining the abstract
(P. 61-65)
characteristics of Spirit./ This does not appear very hopeful
for an empirical treatment. But he finds the essence of Spirit
to be freedom, and this concept, of all others, v/ould seem to
(P. 64)
lend itself to a very real, empirical survey of life./ (It may
be that this concept of freedom siiggests more than Hegel him-
self realizes. We shall return to this point).
Hegel asserts that all the qualities of Spirit exist
only thru freedom, which is the sole truth of Spirit. Further-
more, he states that Spirit is self-contained existence; this
status is freedom. It is consciousness of its own being; for
Spirit knows itself. This v^ould not tend to substantiate our
favorable prelimine^ry survey of Hegel’s empirical interest.
But he goes on to make us believe (almost) that his colossal
thesis v^ill not dim his perception of the most literal of
facts. For he declares most positively his interest in con-
crete processes . Hence universal history is the exhibition of
Spirit in the process of working out the lmov;ledge of that which
it is potentially. (Op. cit., P. 65)
Again he emphasizes the distinction between an
implicit principle and its application in the actual phenomena
of life. The Philosophy of History is nothing other than
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consciousness of Freedom, which v/e have been told is the
central movement of the Universe. (Op. cit., p. 67-69, 71,72)
Vie may feel that we are being betrayed by an alleged
historical method into the entertaining of a mere abstract
conceptual judgment, a vague metaphysical theory. Is the fin-al
cause of the v/orld the consciousness of its own freedom on the
part of Spirit? Is the nature of God the Idea of Freedom?
What of it, we may be tempted to ask. V/hat has this to do with
history; wh-at means does Spirit employ in order to realize its
Idea? Then we find th-at Hegel has anticipated us. He himself
has recorded that this is "the re xt question." And he replies
that this conducts us directly and inevitably to the phenomena
of history itself. (Op. cit., p. 65)
Rickert sees Hegel as pragmatist and philosopher of
life. Can we agree with this judgment? At least we may0 note
that Hegel offers an illustration reeking v/ith pragmatic color:
we see - and therefore confess - that the passions of men have
made of History a slaughter-bench. To what purpose is all this
sacrifice? His reply is tliat the nature or idea of Spirit is
here actualized. For it emerges into existence only as individ'
uals seek their ovm satisfaction in the issue. Hegel insists
that nothing great in the v/orld has been accomplished v/ithout
passion. So the Idea, and the passions of men, are the warp
and woof of universal history. (Op. cit., p. 65-69)
Altho Hegel is enamored of the idea that freedom is
the activity of the absolute Idea, he is certainly not obsessed
by it. That this enthusiasm does not become monoideism, that
his philosophy does not remain altogether abstract (as many
Qdi al JbXoi . £«iM ©vM cjw if61fS^ onoctmjo toen^ao
(SV,XT <09-’CS .q <.^i:o .qO) 3d4 *3:0 J?m>;5T3:von iBtin^o
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students of Hegel are too sure that it does) is due in le.rge
part to his ethical interest, Hegel is concerned with the
development of character. This preoccupation goes far toward
keeping his attention on concrete realities and experiences.
He maintains that a state is well constituted v/^hen the private
interests of its citizens are one v^ith the common interest of
the state. Surely this is an empirical generalization. (P. 70)
Nor v/ould we care to insist that the thought, that
at first the Idea is implicit, takes us too far afield in the
conceptual realm. For the idea is v/orked out objectively,
even as it is maintained that in freedom the universal prin-
ciple is translated into objectivity. The grades of this con-
sciousness (which suggest the divisions of history) are broadly
and suggestively true: Eastern nations ("One is free"), the
Greek and Roman world ("Some are free"), the German nations
("All are free"). Vie shall recur to this point. (Op.oit., p.64)
It is easy to dwell too much on Hegel's abstrs.ct
e B Donti-g. -3rl-y
)
• statements concerning Spirit, He does
say that Spirit has its center in itself: it exists in and with
(P. 62, 72)
itself./ But we must not forget ths.t Hegel is perpetually turn-
ing to the actual course of history: his interest is in individ-
uals, in concrete Imppenings, in the clash of pragmatic forces,
in significant movements and in the lifting of fair ideals which
have lighted humanity's way to triumph and approved happiness.
By studying Hegel's interpretation of history we are
brought to see momentous collisions between existing laws and
rights on the one hand, and adverse contingencies on the other.
Here is an essential ph8.se in the development of the creating
1
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Idea, of Truth striving and urging tov/a,rd itself. If this is
not empirical in stand-point, it is certainly so in direction
of gaze. (Op. cit., p. 71) (Note also p. 75-76.)
Moreover Hegel is concerned with the place and import-
ance of heroes, World-historic8.1 Individuals, in whose aims the
above-mentioned principle lies. They have derived their
purposes and their vocation from the T/orld Spirit. They are
the clear-sighted ones. Their deeds are the best of that
time. They know the requirements of their age, what is ripe
for development. They act for themselves, but the Spirit is
realized in them. As the agents of the World Spirit, their
lives are full of labor and trouble; and their followers help
to realize the absolute principle. Thus the Idea pays the
penalty of determinate existence, not from itself, but from
the passions and sufferings of individuals. (V/ith but slight
change in phraseology, this passage would parallel the eloquence
of James Mark Baldwin in his "Social and Ethical Interpretations,"
as he discourses concerning heroes.) (Op. cit., p. 76-79)
Are historical individualities wholly the tools of the
Absolute Spirit, in Hegel's thought, or is there a genuine self-
determination? It is impossible to give a completely satis-
factory answer to this question. Certainly the nature of the
dialectic would imply a determined process, in detail as well
as in wider-swinging movements. Nevertheless, a. true freedom,
self-determination, often appears to be a^ssigned to the
individual. Certainly morality and religion are not sub-
ordinated to a mechanical process, however imposing. It is
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means to an end. They are objects of their own existence, for
they share in the universal purpose. Man*s true part, ethics
(P. 81)
and religion, are elevated above all alien necessity and chance./
Nevertheless, this necessity (altho never alien) might prove to
be of an absolute-spiritual ne.ture, which would effectively
rule out individual determination in any rightful meaning of
the term. Often enough this appears to be the situation.
Let us consider further. V/hat form does the perfect
embodiment of Spirit assume? What is the material in v/hich
the Ideal of reason is v;rought out? Reason attains positive
existence in human knowledge and volition. But the subjective
will has also a substantial life. This essential reality is
the union of the subjective with the rational Will: it is the
moral whole, the State. In it the individual possesses and
enjoys his freedom. Law, More-lity and Government alone are
reality
the positive/ and the completion of freedom. (Op. cit., p. 85-86)
The State is the divine Idea as it exists on earth.
In it the object of history appears in definite shape; for it
is here that freedom obtains objectivity. Hence, in his survey
of the history of the world, Hegel deems as worthy of considera-
tion only those peoples that have formed states. A view con-
trary to the foregoing maintains that man is free by nature,
but limits that freedom by the state. Hegel rejects this
theory, finding it contrary to facts; for the state of nature
is characterized by injustice and violence. The limitation by
the state is the limitation of brute emotions. Society and the
State are the necessary conditions of freedom. Even the
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This seems to deprecate the fact of genuine freedom
on the part of the individual. And the impression is increas-
ed in his treatment of the form of government. For if it is
held that the majority should control, the subjective aspect
alone is being regarded. In this case, the minority are not
respected, and freedom is not atts^ined. It is impossible to
secure the consent of every individual. Hence in monarchy
proper a constitution secures the maximum of individual freedom
to the people and the minimum of autocratic power to the rulers.
This constitution is intimately connected with all the other
spiritual forces involved. In general, the form of government
is not a matter of choice, but is that form v/hich is adapted
to the spirit of the people. (Op. cit., p. 91 - 94)
Hov^ever, the question is a very complex one. For nov/
v/e must recognize tliat Hegel characteristically speaks of the
Spirit’s becoming conscious of its own freedom in the union of
the objective and the subjective in the human spirit; at the
same time the Idea of the Spirit is the State in the external
m.anifestation of human will and its freedom. Hence Spirit
requires the cooperation of spirits, and is able to realize
its sublime potentiality in their freedom. (Op* cit., p. 93-99)
Thus we are brought to a. consideration of the second
respect in which Hegel’s philosophy of history differs from a
popular understanding of it . The Absolute Spirit does not
exist perfect, pre-formed and apart, using men as the mere
tools of his artificial self-expression; hence his activity
is not coldly rational, that is, predictable by the operation
of abstract reasoning. (Op. cit., p. 85-87, 99, 128)
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Josiah Royce has written: "The Absolute of Hegel is
no Absolute on parade, no God that hides himself behind clouds
and darkness, nor yet a Supreme Being v/ho keeps himself care-
fully clean and untroubled in the recesses of an inaccessible
infinity. No, he is a Man of War. The dust and the blood of
ages of humanity’s spiritual life are upon him; he comes before
us pierced and wounded, but triumphant, the God who has conquered
contradictions, and who is simply the total spiritual conscious-
ness that expresses, embraces, unifies and enjoys the whole
wealth of our human loyalty, endurance and passion." ("The
Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 216) This has particular
reference to the "Phenomenology;" but the interpretation is
beautifully true of the "Philosophy of History."
From this point of viev/, we might conclude that the
entire ground is cut from underneath the problem of individual
freedom; or we might look for a re-establishment, on personal-
istic grounds, of a cooperation involving the free expression
of Self and selves. V/hich of these we do actually have, it is
impossible to say with complete confidence. I strongly incline
to the belief that Hegel’s central thesis rules out genuine
self-determination, but that irrational, or indeterminate,
factors are introduced, or suggested, in many places, and that
they might be incorporated without doing violence to Hegel’s
essentially spiritual interpretation of history and of the
world. (This would, of course, radically modify his concep-
tion of Spirit.).
Altho dialectical thought expresses the innermost
essence of Absolute Reason, the logical-dialectic process lies
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implicit (to a degree) in the universal Mind. The latter does
not exist, self-conscious and realized, before the creation of
the universe, but becomes fully self-conscious in the thought
(P. 85-S7)
and life of human beings.y/ The full comprehension of this
teaching of Hegel’s •will profo'undly modify our •understanding
of his theory of history. It will prevent hasty conclusions,
and hard and fast distinctions. It will, perhaps, tend to
discredit traditional, over-s-ure conceptions of freedom (with
all their superficial and futile correlaries ) , as we are led
to viev/ the vast integration of the cosmic process. This
cosmopolitan sweep, with the consequent liberalizing of our
thinking, make up (I believe) a large part of the abiding value
of Hegel, and remain one of the chief contributions of his
philosophy of history. The appreciative reader of Hegel
is progressively emancipated from the limitations of the
provincial mind, and is freed from some of the sentimental
prejudices of the parochial heart. (Op. oit., p. 104-108)
One phase of this viev/ is seen in Hegel’s statement
that, among the forms of this conscious •union (of the subject-
ive and the objective in the human spirit), religion occupies
a lofty place. The individual in devotion lays aside his
individual interest. Self puts av;ay the limited and particular.
Feeling passes into reflection, and a form of v/orship results.
A second form of this •union is art . This advances farther into
the realm of the actual and sensuous tlian does religion. The
third form is philosophy; for the true is the object of the
thinking faculty. This is the v/isest and freest and most
inclusive form. (Op. oit,, p. 99)
^ -
^ .
.•500,6 onT . IJODisvificf eil^ **tl ( 06i3'd6 ~o od') cMr>±Xc[niJi
'lo rrolSx^v'io o-:i 9'iOttQ' ^bosJiIe^'X bctA a'-j'oXoartoc- 116^.5 ,J3ixe iort










; --ni.Z.’tjnj : •'!' :. ' htfo -/Ifw^/o'tooq Il^r s’Xo lo 3rfXrlo/iej o




XL^tat ,acf ^CXltT *S . ^ajsl 6n.s tivarf bffs




J' ” * BoX a'r^.e’.v t?j6 * ( HO alX.+f/l hrt>; L^loXlrraqi/a XIj3
y ^ . oedoo'r<j oXraooo erf^ lo rroi^vB^c^stiii ^gjbv odd- wsxv oi
'
'UJO lo 3crX”xI^*iod'iX ^rioixpaaitoo od.J rCXit? ^qaewo «i3j XXo*ior3eoD \'
0t;I>3V grxXBicfB 9ri,t lo Inaq e^ix'C s (ov'XIecf I) qir odjaa
H^!. ' ^Xd lo anoitj'Xf'.fx'iirtoo lalxio odX lo or?o filjoaoi fxx.a ^Xe^oH lo
..^ l0'‘ 3H lo nol'^STi tSalo3'iq^-2 edT .\;^oJ3X^£ lo viiqosoX hiq
.
orU Ic axtoXJiXlnXX edl racol I)eliiqXonj:i'is ^Xeviaaa^-qo'iq 'xX
X'Hxtr^ou'iinaa aril lo oraoe so*il Loo'll ox Lnx; ^Lnlri laxorrivoiq -
v^30X-^-0X «cr |.lXo . I'l/iod Ijs/iioote-j od^ lo aooXXx/’.'j-'iq
P
7 1 a‘Io;'.oH rti .loea gx iffslv ai.i^ /io oa-rdq onO
•
~7t;>of;cff/a odl lo) croixfi/ c: olaartoo stsfS lo a^anol o.Io ,1x51X1
00X05/000 .iol xX6"r .(lX*:lq0 'tTScu/zC edl al eviloot^o
ai.i :Lxs3 >:r ^Jovei.-' nx XarxLlTiixxd ©ilT .oojsXq ^lloX a
. 'Xnrx'bXy^aq Jbr;£? Lallr. cX .^fil -^xs’rjij Ow; 'q IX . lao^Oldl iDuLlvlLal
. ilXjaa-TT qi:rtO”?ow lo xirrol b Lire. olrrX aoaasq gniioo'^I
ol:. : 'lOfil'TPl anoiizvbB nl fT . l-t*: aX rtoZxxtf nitfl lo n^xol Jbfioooe A.
.. . . 'M.MlIo't saoL rT;3ri . 0£foa0f?Ba iift£ ixijxloii- oril lo aiXe©*! ©di




^afkz r-(Ti» la'VO'ti L.?.a ta-'al ? odl ii . '!;:pxil sitXdaXdl






We may nov/ return to the problem of the status of
empirice>l facts in Hegel’s treatment of history. It is un-
doubtedly true that he invokes the Absolute, the Idea, the
Universal Spirit, too easily, too intimately, too authoritat-
ively. And he does so at the expense of actualities, ignor-
ing (too often) concrete fe.cts, deprecating individual exist-
ents, and too smoothly passing over irrationalities.
This is illustrated in his reply to the complaint
that Ideals are destroyed by cold actuality. He admits that
these Ideals sometimes are mere fancies, which can not be the
model for universal reality. He then asserts that, apart from
this consideration, we may indeed have notldng to do with the
(P. 83)
individual empirically regarded./ It is a too easy optimism
v/hich maintains that, when v;e take notice of Reason pervading
the whole, we knov/ that the real world is as it ought to be!
In the pure light of the divine Idea, the phantom of an in-
CP. 84)
coherent world vanishes./ The forms of religious and moral
purposes may be subject to the svmy of chance j in their
essences they are infinite and eternal. The claims of the
(P. 85)
World-Spirit rise above all special claims./ If they do, we
I
may retort, then they rise into too thin an atmosphere. The
judgment is merely conceptus.1, and possesses not the required
empirical contact. The assignment to this theory of the
adjective "concrete” is mere verbalism; it does not command
respectful attention.
Hegel’s total theory is a strange mosaic: with much
that is magnificent he mingles much thsd is utterly fe-tuous
.















. -car Bt ^ , ^uilTlct idv ?*‘i:i^3»a iir LiioLtlq^^.
*
'
' flia drf^f 9;i& ^ii^^st 9fni \ibeddtfObj ;•; , >
•




'rocjal t oa aedi^ «arf M4* * i
-T
''
'. Pj' H' /P^*'-'" '“ ' '
r*( -
r$-^pLB ' $iiiShivloM :^hSSXQv''i/l'^^i^^pi5%^-^^'^’l0C10Q (it© JlO'TOOl)*' .
-K.Wilir^,=^aoi:ia^Tfl^^6vo gjf^ ’i^ilioocta ooc^ itraa ,3l£t®





fe“‘ twf*T Jba {ino ifoiflTT bionr bTe a5>cxXi^o& ala^I; aa^Mf^C






' \ ' S ' Tl"-^^\.
'
': «rf4. gS^Xl? '>5 OtW 3rtir>^ besfctfjf-i^ aTr












/. .. • • .. -.
^p'Tfip







• • . fi
iftswo IJt «a til M-tgiy Xaa'i tsrfl wore* &^t ^aloiiw e»f£t ti
' '
'--v- . r .:"
-rtX ezB lo^»Ba»tfraa%v aj^fO eiUvX^^tif
Jb-; ' •'
'
^r/‘ 7../ ‘ ’' ^ V ". '"" •-'''5^












•X,«n'x«^e ^ina €kMniti::t ei/^ rarfJ' aboaoaG®
I!* n 4 {^''•^) • *-> ^
,oXj \.mi9La Xj&ioeqs IXa 9Voqa ->aiT: tC'iicfa-bX'soff





i^'miT . 0^Q{f^aoi».^3 na nhiti goi oJtfi 9eiT ,4*i<>i^f>T;.- ’'Ciua
«<v
i>^r0/p^ 0*'^^ 10ft^^t:»eawa<r3riC LfWV ’4Xg't«)Sf .iX ;JxjeiirsJ5i;t ' •:
^ttS^'-'i^- %r[!oeiiS ajL[t* ai .»
.i'i>
jir-aftl .^gBlccog Xaoi^i^aa /
J-Oni aobff ii ’‘eigoarioo**





fc*y* ^ .*?:. V-,
«a-'
„fioXJ)txe:t4ja Ix/lvtoaqagi
* JQ '• * •
ijyiir :bi3W'v a 'j'laaiW Xa^ol a * Xoj^oa /^t
T 2|!Ef'>tf
'J® ^
atiX^Jto 9f{ lrt« »i t; ;fan1
37
the only real is the concrete Wh.ole • But this does not Justify
a cavalier treatment of data, as he himself insists, on occasion.
the
Too often his employment ofy'ooncept, "concrete,” is nothing more
than a verbal flourish.
The fallacy of futile abstraction is carried into the
detailed explanations of history. For instance, Hegel admits
that there are many periods in history when the development
of Spirit appears to be intermitted. Then there are long-
continued processes of grov/th. He maintains that the retro-
cessions are to be regarded as external contingencies: it is a
relative matter; the development is all in all. Universal
History exhibits the gradation in the development of freedom.
Thereupon every grade, within itself, is compelled to exhibit
a process of formation, constituting thus the links in a
dialectic of transition. (Op. cit., p. 106-107)
In v/'orking out every dialectic of transition, Hegel
is cles^rly far more interested in the dialectic than he is in
the rich pattern of facts; in truth, he rather despises the
facts as such. The intermediate tracings, therefore, tend
to become artificial and ui-'raal; his thought is abstract, not
concrete. ("The particular is for the most part of too trifling
value as compared with the general." P. 80)
It seems not to occur to Hegel that historical move-
ments are far too complex to be put into the form of a
dialectic. The latter is t7;o-dimensional ; with the speculative
movement, it is three-dimensional. X'lhile history itself is
poly-dimensional. Superficially, historical movements may
appear to have the pendulum sv/ing . Roughly speaking, they
often do; and practical lessons may be deduced therefrom.
, oJv‘ir-too ocft 3i Ziiei '’:tiio
m
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However, taken as a constitutive principle, the dialectic-
metaphysics is wofully insufficient to account for the facts.
For history is infinitely varied and variegated. It ramifies,
and spreads, and evolves. It springs from multitudinous
sources. It reaches out in countless directions. Moreover,
it has many abortions, many forgotten births, ten thousand
irrational tragedies. At least, Hegel’s conceptualisms do
not illumine the seeming tragedies, nor resolve the apparent
irrationality. (Cf., "The Idea advances to an infinite antithe-
sis." P. 72)
The status of the empirical data in Hegel's thought,
and the validity of his method, may be summed up as follows:
(a) In that which I have called Hegel's intermediate
tracings (the links in the dialectic of transition), the
empirical has no adequa-te place. Actualities are distorted,
not intentionally, but because the entire view-point is
unreal. Movements are misinterpreted because the principles
of historic appreciation are hard, wooden, inadequate. The
fimdamental difficulty is that Hegel is interested primarily
in metaphysical speculation, not in determining the experienc-
ed nature of idealization.
(b) In his larger horizon-sv^eepings, when he forgets
the somewhat futile dialectic, Hegel is largely and impressive-
ly true. He offers mighty visions. He makes worthy suggestions
in regard to some of the major movements of history, even if his
conclusions are mechanical and inadequate as they stand in their
self-sufficiency. For example, the three stages in the develop-
ment of political (and individual) freedom have a certain
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that they are "the ground-work principles of the general
process.” (Op. cit., p. 64)
But the vision in Hegel can be seen only by the
sympathetic imagination, and by it only in flashes. For it
is nearly lost in sterile conceptualisms. Often we meet an
imposing generalization which turns out to be a cosmic ab-
straction, having little vital connection v/ith the idealizing
process of actual experience. (Cf., "The Union of Universal
Abstract Existence with the Individual." P. 71)
An illustration is found in Hegel *s statement that
universal history is the development of Spirit in time, as
nature is the unfolding of the Idea in space. We are told
that, in a casual glance over the past, vie see a vast picture
of changes and transactions. But while death is the issue of
life, life is the issue of death. Spirit consumes its own
existence, and each successive phase shows the exaltation of
Spirit. ¥/e are to think of Idea as manifesting 8.nd perfecting
its powers in every possible direction. The essence of Spirit
is activity: it makes itself its ovm deed, and contemplates
itself. Hence nations are v^hat their deeds are. And Spirit
gains a comprehension of itself in the universal element in
(P. 125-8)
history, which the Spirit creates./ If this is the soul of the
philosophy of history (as Hegel asserts), we have to do v/ith a
pallid soul. Except for a certain vague reminder of ideals in
real life (thru similarity of terminology), this representation
is barren speculation. At least it appears to be such to the
empirical-minded thinker. If it appears otherwise to the
intellectualistio type, there is no argument: we have two
radically different conceptions of the nature of idealization
k-
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and of reality. To the empiricist, the Hegelian abstractions
are not so much erroneous as irrelevant and trivial, when
offered as interpretations of the actual idealizing process
in history and human life.
(c) When Hegel is toying deliciously v^ith the
fascinating details of history, and is not worrying v;ith the
rather fatuously conceived links of transition, he is incisive
in criticism, resourceful in imagination and delightfully
X rilStQ#XXO © S
suggestive . The Philosophy of History is replete with wiecK
They are its chief charm, as the occasional vision of the
horizons is its great inspiration. Hence v/e may say that
in the "mean" he is not golden, and in the extremes the truth
of Hegel lies!
I have endeavored to este^blish the basic lines of my
problem in this survey of the thought of a great idealist. I
have tried to make the most of his empirical recognitions, and
have condemned his ultra-rationalistic speculation. In both
phases of the discussion I hope that my problem is set forth.
I deemed this the beet method of placing it against its proper
background
•
It may be added that the unfavorable criticism of
Hegel must be made since he can not answer this penetrating
query: Hov/ can the Universal Reason (ultimate reality) be
Absolute Spirit and at the same time be developing Spirit, as
yet only partially self-conscious? How can it be Spirit-com-
pleted and also Spirit-at-war-with-itself ? This question is
unanswerable, or at least unanswered. Therefore the history-
dialectic is largely vitiated. For the spirit of the dialectic
ano •' oyG'Tu fi %'Ai te oil.r ol* V* lo orcjs
i'c^/v ^Xslvit^ jjhq .tr£--:vjXo*ini ai/o* to-tte liotiTj oo ion e'ta
»^?5O0C"n nrf t.^iX er'J- ^c sa IjO'iex'io'
.
-‘irX ftqr^t'ri fsna ^,'iQ^ahi at
‘.-.^.T AtlsY vf^otoiXQb Sil 'Terr./ (o)
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assumes, and its ^method destroys the assumption of, Absolute
Spirit, It is the conviction of this paper that the whole
enterprise is misconceived and impossible, and that the true
undertaking is to be found in terms of a genuine empirical
evalioation.
Hegel makes the attempt to resolve the antinomy when
he maintains that the Spirit makes itself actually what it
always was potentially: it is only that which it attains by
its ov/n efforts. The realization of the Idea is mediated in
consciousness, which is at first sunk in its merely natural
life. Thus Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome
itself as its most formidable obstacle. This involves not
merely development, but the attainment of a goal. This is
Spirit Completed, that is. Freedom, The grades that Spirit
seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths
of its present, (Op, cit,, p, 133-4)
This will not meet the case, however. Critically
viewed, the Philosophy of History crumbles at the start with
this sort of Spirit-biography, And therefore, as so often
has happened in the long progress of thoiaght, the great thinker
fails in his forlorn hope (to him an undertaking so splendid
and assured), and yet wins many an incidental victory more
daring than his intention, more enduring than his dream,
A few sentences from a most significant treatise on
Hegel* s method are pertinent. Ernst Troeltsoh, in ”Der Histor-
ismus,” heartily approves the dynamic character of the "Hegel-
schen Dialektik:” "Sie ist die erste Theorie der historischen
Dynamik." (Page 241. See foot-note on following page.) Troeltsoh
eii/IorJcTA ,'i:o -?T<^±.tqGtL;L*ajo ef{d' a^ro'r^'eel) tOMtfii/aaB
eiOf% orii aiirld- 1o too otii Qt &1 . ^J:n:tq3
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indorses Hegel's interest in oonorete happenings. “Er sah
inf olgedessen im individuellen und empirischen historisohen
Geschehen die realen und lebendigen GegensS,tze
,
in denen alles
wirkliche Geschehen erw8,chst." 245)
But Troeltsch holds that Hegel often forgets his
concrete facts, and that his abstract method goes too far in
the direction of rationalization. "Damit ist in Wahrheit eine
Reihe konkreter ujid realer historischer Problems von der
Dialektik her mit dem Eindruck rationaler Notwondigkeit und
Folgerichtigkeit gelbst." (-"-P. 269)
"Hegel macht den Versuch, die Dialektik des Eistor-
ischen imd des Daseins "Ciberhaupt zu rationalisieren, die
Geschichte zu logisieren. Und zwar geschieht das in einer
doppelten Richtung: zunS,chst erkenntnis-theoretisch und
pantheistisch-identit^ts-philosophisch durch die Verv/andelung
aller Realit^tin Geist und dann im weiteren Verfolg der Er-
kenntnis theorie metaphysisch-logisch durch den im Dreitakt
verkleideten Monismus Oder durch die hinter die dialektische
V/iderspruchslogik dar-n doch gestellte Identit&tslehre . Each
beiden Seiten ergeben sich unertr^gliche Gewaltsamkeiten und
Verengungen, insbesondere eine ganz unhaltbare Rationalisierung
der Dialektik." (*P. 275)
"Von dieser Erkenntnistheorie rtihrt nun aber der 'liber-
mSssig einseitige und iibernS-ssig spiritualistische Charakter
dieser ganzen Geschichtsauffas sung her. Man braucht nur die
Tendenz des Geistes in seine Hand zu bekommen, um damit die
* "Der Historismus und seine Problems (Gesammelte Schriften
III.)," by Ernst Troeltsch. Tiibingen, Verlag von J. C. B.
Mohr, 1922.
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ganze von iJun hervorgebrachte und in ihin konzentrierte Wirk-
lichkeit zu erfassen.” (Op. cit., p. 274)
”Noch schliimer aber wirkt die Umbiegung dieser
monietisch-spiritualistischen Erkenntnistiieorie in eine
Metapliysik, die nichts anderes ist als die Identitdtslehre
Spinozas, beweglich gemacht imd den konla?eten Leben angenS,hert
diirch die Lehre von einer in dieser Identit^t von Geist und
ITatur enthaltenen Selbstentgegensetzung und ewigen Selbst-
vernittlung, innerhalb welcher letzteren die historische
Vernunft der Menschen auf unserem Planeten ein bestimntes
I'oment ist. , , So v/ird die ganze grossartige Gestalten-
ffille Hegels zu Schemen." (P. 274) "Die Menschen erscheinen
dann in der Tat als Marionetten, die einem Schauspiel dienen,
von dem sie selber nichts wissen.” (275)
"Er wollte ein absolutes, rationell begrtlmdetes
Wertsystem, das nur eben auch die Eigent^imlichkeit hatte, die
historischen Individus.lit&ten in logischer Folge, Verkniipfung
und Vollendung aus sich heraus zu setzen." (Op. cit., p. 130)
"Der Widerspruch zwischen der rationalen Idee und der
individuell-konkreten Geschichte bleibt daher auch bei Eegel
trotz der denkbar innigsten Ineinanderziehung bestehen." (P.131)
"Eine wirkliche Schwierigkeit bietet dagegen die
beriihmte Definition der V/eldgeschiohte als des 'Fortschritts
im Bewusstsein der Freiheit,* eine Definition, die mehr
gepriesen als in Urtext gelesen wird. Es ist nicht zu leugnen;
sie ist diH’ch und durch zweideutig." (Op. cit., p. 263)
"So gibt es Kiiinstlichkeiten tt.ber Klinstlichkeiten,
Gewaltsankeit liber Gewaltsankeit . Und zun Ueberfluss konnt
.''tti ffX tor evtloa-ifeS'ioV'XOfl oiriJi fio'?
(^V2 .7 t« iio .^0 ) I/s
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dazu noch das Schv/anken zwischen der rein logischen Zeit-
losigkeit des Prozesses auf der einen Seite nnd der
konkreten Zeitlichkeit der Endlichen Erscheinnng dieses
Prozesses auT der andern Seite, v/orin oft die ganze Chron-
ologie zugrundegeht Oder doch v/enigstens in Unordnung
koimnt." (Op, cit., p. 276)
3. Examination of Sorley’s assumptions, and approach
to the problem, in his ’’Moral Values and the Idea
of God”
The discussion in this section is not offered as a
systematic critique of this book, but is concerned solely
with the postulates and the view-point of Sorley, in so far
as they affect the fundamental conception and procedure of
this dissertation. I pass over the logical structure of his
arguments because I am concerned only with the validity of
his assumptions and v«rith the significance of his approach
to the problem of religion.
This narrows our interest, and ;)ustifies a treatment
v/hich may appear impressionistic. This is frankly an empirical
estimate of Sorley *s point-of -view, and is presented for the
one purpose of affording our thesis a larger modern setting,
and of defining the nature of the problem as conceived in this
undertaking.
We may gain not only additional perspective for our
theme, but also a provisional solution of our problem, by a
survey of this significant and valuable contemporary study of
• "
"JieS zifidost^oS. 'ssl) :fi9;L-ii;r.v,doa uiSi?' doort t/sxsf>
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idealization, W. R. Sorley*s "Moral Values and the Idea of
God."
First I shall attempt the discussion of a problem
fundamental to the general appraisal of Sorley’s method. He
postpones the interpretation of reality based on epistemology
and metaphysics in favor of a primary theory of moral values.
He seek^s to determine the bearing of these values on our view
of reality. According to the traditional method, ethical in-
quiry (he asserts) not only has been postponed, but has been
left largely extraneous to the system of thought. (Ch.I . ,p .1-2 ,20
)
I am particularly interested in his declared purpose
because I have long felt that theology usually begins at the
wrong end: it constructs the idea of God, and then employs it
as a huge hammer to pound the desired system into shape, and
to weld it into rigid permanence. Whereas it vvould appear
that the thinker should reach the idea of ultimate reality
somewhat farther along in his critical and constructive work.
Hence the method indicated by Sorley is valid and v/holesome
as far as the conception of God is concerned.
Nevertheless, from another (the human) point of view,
the thinker is bound to make terms with metaphysics at the
beginning of the inquiry. This fact the author does not clearly
recognize (in its bearing on the status of idealization); as the
result, the position of the entire book is weakened. With his
purpose set forth, Sorley comes early to the (almost) crucial
question for philosophy: ¥/hat are the legitimate demands that
(Ch. IV.,VI.,VIII.)
values make on the uiniverse of reality?^' This however depends
upon a prior, the truly critical, question: Wh8.t are values;
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what sort of reality do they thenselves possess? This is the
fundamental query. It is deserving of particular attention
because it is so fond of appearing in disguise.
To this question there are two opposed answers: (a)
and their
Values are prettyy interesting, and winseme-. But trhere loveli-
ness is pathetic, for they are ^d^henomena; "in the long non"
they are appearances only. For they are subject to material
(physiological) conditions. V/hen these charq^e/ in a particular
fashion, values disappear: they simply puff out like lighted
candles in the breeze. (b) Values are pant of the real stuff
of the universe; hence their right to solid existence is in-
alienable .
Sorley does give the former ansv/er brief notice
(P.47^, 501)
in a later place./ He does not give it adequa^te preliminary
consideration. It is broadly true that he assumes that there
is only one solution to the riddle of the universe. He takes
for granted that ideals have a genuine irreducible being, and
(P. 78-79)
proceeds proudly on this assumption./ The categorical imperative
(P. 95-97)
is held to prove itself as a thing of cosmic significance./ This
begs the whole question. The battle is already won, or needs
not to be fought, if this assumption is to be allowed.
Now Sorley *s too easy supposition, in the last analysis,
may be correct; but it is not axiomatic. Hence ought not one,
in this critical age of science and with the background of
thought, to be quite self-conscious in taking a position like
this of Sorley 's? The experiencer of values may occupy a strong
position when he trusts in those ideals that have been validated
(somehow) even in the vicissitudes of life. He v/ho is living
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his true life, who knows its worth and the "deep power of joy"
that is its inspiration, may remain untroubled, serenely trust-
presence and
ing in the "abiding/persuasion" of his highest ideals as their
deepest and all-sufficient warrant. But such a one has dared
to make a choice. One should make that choice without
illusions, and accepting no indulgence.
Because I believe that this is the ultimate crisis
of philosophic thought, I maintain that Sorley does not
bravely face the critical issue . The subtle suggestion is
found thru the book that brilliant maneuvering will obviate
the necessity. It is not so obviated. The chasm is there, and
fine phrases do not make a bridge. The chasm is crossed by an
assumption, a leap. Thereafter, nice logic becomes a plausible
instrument . But the formalities of reasoning make a poor
offering when one is faced by the elementary problem of life
in its naked, uncompromising, terrible intensity.
Thruout the book the tacit assumption is made that
values have such a substantial, enduring existence that their
connections with reality are conclusive; their demands can not
be gainsaid. They are supposed to have a coordinate status
with the causal series which science studies; or rather, they
enjoy a primary being which makes them determinative of
(E • i P • 132f .
)
reality. Essentially, their demands are final. / OiJir hopes
do allure us toward this happy conclusion. But Sorley is too
naive in his assurance of their constitutive quality . He is
rather oblivious of thoijght’s perilous venture.
Even if he recognized more candidly the nature of
our quest, his confidence in the abiding being of values is a
<1" lo ‘laijoq qooh* oili evrc-aii orf?t acr^'^ aixl
-:y^.>j':S ,ra£oijo't.frtL/ rtia-^oi ^.t' ai
;.T-'3 oonaao'iq •
3i5 G^.-eM Lif *5-0 •»rscins£/ent>q\3ffi:.nicfB ' rsi 3a
i
6ffO e :l3C;a ?..;• .’- Ji'jusw Jrtsioiil'SJJS-^lJS fcaa ^e©.J6eJ&
«L-orl3^i:w ooxotic e^Tjse bXjrrfs orrC .eoiorio ^ oI
, isoir&^Lis^bal on 3fiicfq9GGa ,ar<ole;/IIi:
i
a.-ci^o si atrCi ^ar'j' avellod 1 9s<L;«od€
iot -cqS-ioQ J'JbTlv rrta^nJi^ I » cfti^yoilc}- oldqoaol triq lo
Rt no '- Cr^cfiiu eiii ,et;aei .Caoid’ino sili
; e .Xii ^iT^ 'r sVijwcjy:: :Jas^XXT'j Aood orLi iinrf." aix/o*l
^
..' ' •G'tu.IJ ..-. :.'U><'(© ad'l' a j:v:{iD oa Jort ai . •^J’iiaEGca:'' 7rIJ
vr/c rff e.t cmz:ic £•*.“ . Cuiar. “Gii n't aee^'nlq enil
ofcfia'^ttiq a ijc'i.*v:/ec ox’^/'I >aijn ^'ro > l^-.onsnn!’- . .^eX a ttroiXq::i;>8ac
lO’XT Q to aotiXIiiiinoi erf* . :'.;• v/n-TarJi
6'iil 'to rraXrfonq ’^‘xr!*n'3<f.'bl6 O'iJ’ t ^ eX eric rtod^ .triiie tto
. /.Kr.itc' Jiti . r.'rX'i'ioi
,
V lrtirkroT^3 0:-ti> 'ti>t>.X-3rt i<X
•J ^tf.t oi>^‘. T al rtoi J^rr ^«5 «3 vtoa* >(oo<J d’.tjOi/^cfr
uaneifsi -'13 ^ iicira evsrl ee;/I.e7
Jo/t rac nI>f!rviuoL 'Xitiiii ;'o'’rXaiiXoriC'0 ons v.liXrse'i rJitlr QfjoiJ-oSt'nco
^?xi. :,':r ':ooo a 'vaif -v^ i&ejOqq.-.:» ana y«5u* .btJsoai&2
',: > IJ
./1 01 TO ‘.eeitiiie - ^ j .icLir ii-jlnva Xatiuso ©fXd fiJXw
. i0‘ '. t«f:r:..'i ..Je/. cri*- ,'. nasC'.ii- rIoX.•:^• 3fiXocf y'r.'.>r.’X»rq .a
c:©«,;5a oir"'
.
. - li'l fraa^}t •s2^:S.*
,
tX/iiarrutiu?. . . Jilise'i
c-./ a; V oX .r/v. ‘. ..arroo it i*-'i sirt* j&iAswoX ox; o'i;rXI^, oft
« JL . ‘ ; X J ’jffrc 'xiOifJ *c 'trx»ij3't?jeajt5 airf rti ovl^rr
.**^jj:t'rr'V Htxa£f- of^ « ’ ;;i;v>0'l3 to Quj'OXyild'o 'io;ia'f»i
' t ylftXi'rtaio otrv^ ac. t.’;
•'
-r - .... - .
fi 2? c^'fXoCf 0;L7 .nr ^orrefti irroo o . ^aoer/p 'jcr?;
48
little too robust. The demand of the categorical imperative
may appear to be quite stalwart when observed by itself. But
there are other thronging challengers in the tragic field.
Moral values 8.re so frail, and our ideals so fragile, when
confrented by the colossal threat of the seeming materiality
of things, especially in the frustration of accident, of
injustice, of disease, of death. And the Problem of Sordid-
ness is more ominous than the Problem of Pain; it is the most
sinister aspect of Evil. Moreover, psychological analysis and
social theory do not regard conscience and the categorical
imperative as the simple and conclusive essences that they
appear to be to the naive moral consciousness and the un-
scientific mind.
Certainly Sorley considers disastrous alternatives.
But one feels that such consideration is incidental. It comes
(E.g., p. 501)
"after the fact."/ The conclusion is established really not
on the basis of a criticism of unfavorable possibilities,
except in formal fashion. The conclusion is established on
the basis of the enormous claims of values in their ovm right.
Sorley dismisses naturalistic theories much too
cavalierly. Doubtless they seem quite impossible to him.
His readers, however, might find his own reasoning more con-
vincing if the writer himself were not so convinced. Sorley
states: "Naturalistic theories were barely mentioned in my
argument owing to their inability even to explain law in
nature and the facts of psychical existence, as well as because
they are obliged to deny the objectivity of moral and other
values." (Page 502) Barely to have mentioned these theories
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is a damaging confession, and the reason given does not im-
prove the situation. They are worthy of first consideration.
For it is quite possible to hold, rationally and critically,
that lav; can not, and need not, be explained, that the facts
involved are to be accepted and described (which is explanation
enough), that the spiritualistic theory is no true explanation,
but rather a formal hypothesis which tlirows no genuine light
on the situation, and involves assumptions more difficult to
accept than the more elementary statement of the problem
recognized by naturalism.
Moreover, the social, historic objectivity of values
is not denied by naturalistic theories. Perhaps a further
objectivity ought to be denied, or at least seriously challeng-
ed. Certainly there appears to be an impressive and insistent
(absolute?) quality in the moral imperative. But the interpre-
tation of the felt obligation is as important as its recogni-
tion. The progress of thought is continuously indicating tliat
assumed irreducibles are capable of analysis or of further
assignment. Thus this feeling of objectivity might be due
to instinctive reactions, this claim to continuous reality to
biological adjustments, this sense of absoluteness to social
pressure, to the authority of long habit. They may function
as pragmatic illusions, all the more successfully because
admiration is innocently synoptic in nature, resisting the
probing process of criticism. These possibilities are airily
dismissed. This blandness is the basic weakness of the book.
I could not object to the final dismissal of hy^heses found
wanting. I do protest against the scornful gesture.
The defect is radical. After the tour de force, the
•’I
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subsequent skillful and earnest argument is singularly un-
convincing, for it has taken on an inevitable atmosphere of
remoteness. As a matter of fact, we are primarily biological,
psycho-physica.! organisms. This aspect of life having been
summarily dismissed, the price of unreality must be paid. The
reasoning becomes too formal to justify such tremendous con-
clusions concerning reality . In the end, sinced experienced
reality has been dispa-raged, the situation is ironic.
Having considered the underlying issue, we may take
a closer view of the book. It is an excellent example of
Rationalism. Certain axioma.tic elements are accepted; then
momentous conclusions are rigorously deduced therefrom. Per-
haps the volume is rather too massive in its total impression,
owing to an overly elaborate consideration of some questions
(the ansv/ers to which are pre-determined by the point of view
taken and the assumptions made). It appears somev/hat arbitrary
in its treatment of certain philosophical positions, for
instance, that of pantheism. The author may be a little
self-assured in his analysis and disposal of some problems
of renovmed elusiveness (the problem of freedom, for example).
Sorley insists that value resides in the concrete
existent. If value "belongs to the individual, not to the
law or general concept," in just v/hat sense does the "standard"
which "implies as its ground an ideal of goodness" (p. 498-499)
possess concrete reality? As far as experience goes, this
standard is merely a general concept. The author's argument
is clear. Altho intrinsic values belong to persons only, the














’iA o'''a;£'.i«io'- ^ dX •xo'i ^•'y'nionlvaoo
^
od:.'\^S.o.Io ^^qJi'l 'iqt Jr . iiorteXOPtei
r'oM ,v..Uv-ft:i lo . fi4-qia.e?n-0 X^Jt:e\;<f(r~ '’S
».':i.;iq 'tc' '3oi"q ^dj . •^>*isXcri9XX>
-d'OO’ a/miirf.^rivJ'rt do;. -! \;'U ’t "•i:
^











•-'i'f.qxa hjL-;^..in' ^5fti '
.







. ur.o%j. 5.C arj ;• no:-^ i?d-f£










: .'.•qdqcooli e*!.'-! ojtf^<->rczXjt ^Xs^ioO i'V'- ''
.f ’{lcsj.C"iCy^X'f anoiaf/XoaOa .woit«o.,-or.t
7 ^.
K-oLin^cr-ilEiL rul 'ivfcug^ oox ai ef£X 3q>afi
; d ' id'r.o;^V iO •.:/ i .tf’,ioL.f;<^,no'' o.tjB'iocrijI.e "^I*iav'-> rtJR ol^jrti'v/o
U
K^t-C
ifcj i ar-"i ijEo.L'^vr o.t u'ia'ryffc'iJa eitJ'}
•^^©frr.e a.Tu-'dqq^i il tqqmjiiQi\ ar{^t />rs*j nojixiJ
•vYt ri-
-.in road xrt r ;ii.. 4'xeo JriowXjse'i j nji a t
aXvt.tiX >' /iS-: oflT . '[to ^«0;*tJBJarrJl:
Gnt)X*fO‘i<]|' saa*;^ 3 i.i^3oqf2i;t} XiCiJB B tri nJt XuuJ'sa.ft—'iXO'i
( t‘Xq.t<^>XG 'xo'i ^iioteoal lo ni€f.rronq qiiX) BBorjQvi:ej:/X& Xetiv/oa'qa to
©toq:orioo arLt ai s:oXJ;tt©i oaXwsv aJexQ/fJt ^elTcoB
be£4 o>t iOTf ,lB£/Z>ivl-r:>nfi aiii oi f'-iaolod'” ml-ar 'U . it; txo
'•ij
’
'.{i tioo5 ohli^b i<irivr
-laiyf,, rti '* , /’ oo/t<'0 to v»xjX
•:• ('c v-t- ^ ^
.
•) ”ui;arftoo^
't'-- rfzj terc ts aoXXqori xIoLIvy
"di ,aa-03 aoisoia.onT:^:t» ‘ja; 'x.sl aA aiutortoo uootiaocx






f!o^v\,. tYXac « -wsaoq oi aad^-v oxerritini Oili.XA' .toalo oi




. 'i ‘•.'^ •
49-0
the Supreme Mind as the ground of all reality. It is a
question hov/ much feeling of reality Sorley is able to make
us put into this inference. It is highly abstract and formal
in cliaracter. Even if formally plausible, it would seem to
be disloyal to the earlier contention that value resides in the
concrete existent, unless the logical implication is held to
be persuasive.
The author clearly discriminates betv/een the two
aspects of reality: the realm of causation and the moral order
or realm of ends. He insists - and rightly - that the laws
determining value are not of the same order as the laws de-
termining the causal or other connections of things and
(P. 189)
persons./ Again, v/ith clear perception, he states that the
value which we ascribe to material things is never value in
(P. 498)
the strict sense, but only a means to value./ How, then, can
he assert so confidently that it is legitimate to assume the
objectivity of knowledge and consequently at the same time
the objectivity of morality? (Op. cit., p. 190f.)
As an essential stage in the development of his
thesis, this assertion does not seem to have the clear
warrant that he assumes. To be sure, intrinsic values are a
part of the sum total of reality. Does this furnish a
sufficient basis for the declaration (upon which the argument
(P . 499
)
depends) that/" the grounds for denying the objectivity of
morality are equally groimds for denying the objectivity of
(Cf. qp.cit.,1 p. 93f., 182f.) ^ . -n -r,knowledge"^/ Decidedly not; the flimsy argument is all the
more astonishing since Sorley himself has insisted on the
lack of congruity betv/een the natural order and the moral
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order. "Even their phenomenal appearances diverge." (P. 501)
The obscurity is increased by a subtle and unobserved
difference in the use of the word, objectivity, in the two
phrases. Knowledge is the recognition of connections and
things in the causal order. But moral va^lues do not exist
in this realm; they reside only in persons. The "objectivity
of morality" is a different sort of objectivity; it has its





"Objectivity" has different connotations and references
in the two cases. The impression is inevitable that the author
is advancing his argument by a sort of (unintentional) word-
juggling. It is to be feared that he has the habit of begin-
ning with clear, concrete distinctions, and of ending in
abstract obscurities.
In addition to the fallacies in reasoning, the typical
procedure is much too intellectualistic
.
(By this term I mean
ultra-rationalistic : having an undue confidence in the ability
of the mind to proceed in architectonic fashion.) . I recognize
that this impression is due to a personal attitude and method
of approach. One might say that it is a matter of philosophic
taste. Sorley's conclusions are too abstract, rationalistic,
non-empirical, to yield - v/ith a reality-feeling - the concrete
Universal, as they are supposed to do.
The Moral Judgment does appear to possess an inherent
claim and (in some sense) authoritative character. On this
foundation Sorley builds in truly architectural style. The
resultant structure has its quality of formal impressiveness.
Granting certain postulates, the logic has a precise and
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ceremonious cogency - for concepts. But values - in their
concrete, living nature - seem to have been left behind in
the process. In the end, I do not get a picture of reality,
a description of life as it is.
I have sympathy for that mood which makes the ideal
postulates. At times I feel the logical pressure. But I do
not find the main development of the thesis enlightening.
For me the chief value of the book lies in the treatment of
particular topics and in the criticism of various viev/s . For
the most part, these are keen, tolerant, generous in their
appreciation, and helpful in their large, ideal suggestiveness.
They issue in reconstructive interpretation. Discussions which
I have found especially worth while are: the scale and the
system of values; the function of things, and degrees in
capacity, in realizing values; the conservation and the increase
of values; synopsis and the unity of reality; consideration of
the ontological argument; criticism of monism; the problem of
freedom; philosophical ideas and religious experience; the
limits of morality.
The book abounds in shrewd observations and illuminating
thoughts. For instance, it is a fine thesis that values may be
not yet fully realized, and therefore that it is not allowable
to adjudge (finally) the reality of values by a cross-section.
For it is the nature of persons to be **realizers of value.”
The love of value is prophetic, and the attainment of truth
an active process.
In the light of the fore-going, I would like to suggest
a rather searching criticism, not with particular reference to
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Sorley, but v/ith regard to the typical rationalistic treatment
of values. Frequently vie have a faulty analysis and a faulty
logic .
(a) Faulty analysis. For the scientific student,
"values” are not pre-existent (divine or human) entities; they
are not principles v/hich determine experience. They are results,
created in the push and pull of experience; they are pre^gmatic
and provisional formulations in the complicated adjustment
process. Vitally is their character determined by the volumin-
ous strains of actual experience . I do not mean to suggest that
they are passive; produced in the strife of many fsectors, ideals
function in the progress of experience.
Therefore vie may state that, strictly speaking, there
are no such things as values, tha.t is, no self-contained
entities which may be blandly manipulated for the formal
demonstration of a value-viev; of the universe. "Value" is a
convenient term used to indicate the fact that experience has
a valuations.! aspect. Values are not molecules or crystals;
they are not tags to be detached from experience and applied to
"objective reality." They are cognitive and emotional valua-
tions of a thoroly organic kind. Their nature is violated by
the casual and too assured analysis of the rationalistic
system-builder
.
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connections with onx perceptual, objective world.
In viev/ of the criticism in this, and the preceding,
sections, we are justified in holding that the is tic -minded
students are apt to be amazin-gly lenient with the dubious logic
of rationalism. We can not avoid the conviction that, if they
were not influenced by their v/ishes, they v/ould be more rigor-
ous in their demands. In these two sections, v/e have had
more than one occasion to note the pathetic eagerness with
which the intellectualist
,
at the slightest excuse, escapes
(probably unconsciously) from the rigorous methods of inductive
and deductive reasoning, and ignores v/ith superb composure the
dema^ of empiricism for a faithful allegiance to facts.
Not being discrete things, nor sepe-rable spiritual
essences, "values" are to be dealt v/ith much more circum-
spectly than they are treated usually at the hands of rational-
istic theists.
4. The Meaning of Religion
It is the thought of this paper that religion must be
considered primarily and essentially as an experience. Even so,
there are so many conceptions of the natur-e of religion, that
one is compelled to be a bit arbitrary. Again, religions
certainly differ widely in the measure of their soundness and
working
beauty. I offer this/definition of genuine religion: Religion
is a pervasive sentiment, including appreciation of the highest
(recognized) values, loyalty toward adventurous ideals, both
appreciation and loyalty made more tender and wietfui and strong
by the attitude of reverent wonder toward the surrounding and
inclusive mystery of the imiverse. (This is presented frankly
as a selective definition for the purpose of indicating the
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It is the thesis of this paper that religion thus
conceived, and only thus conceived, is validated by the
critical, empirical study of the idealizing process.
For our purpose, it is not necessary to enter upon
an extended discussion of the instinctive bases of the religious
consciousness. It is commonly recognized that (altho there is
no religious ins.tinct) religious experience roots in many
instinctive tendencies. (V/e are not concerned v;ith the vexed
question of the status of instincts; we are not implying the
existence of discrete "instincts." It is enough to recognize
inherited biological tendencies, however amorphous and dependent
on habit-f ormation)
.
In philosophical discussions of religion, there is
frequently much confusion in regard to the instinctive nature
of moral and religious idealization. For instance, H. V/. Conn,
in "Social Heredity and Social Evolution," Chapter X., has this
valuable and largely just statement (condensed):
The moral nature of man furnishes the founda-
tion for civilized society. This moral nature is found
in a new instinct, the ethical instinct, only the barest
rudiments of which exist among the animals . Morality is
not based on reason or intelligence. It reverses natural
selection, and preserves the unjfit . Will this process
result in the degeneration of mankind? To a certain
extent it must degrade the physical nature. But altr^^^J^
elevates society, for ethics alone makes society possible.
Civilization is not just a substitution of
altruism for egoism., but the result of a constant struggle
between the two principles. In this struggle egoism
seems to have the usual victory; but the real triumph is
always won by altruism. For the operation of its law
makes possible every advance of the race. This is true
because hui'ian evolution is social, not organic; and
ethics places society above the individual. Again,
civilization v/aited for the successful accomplishment
of organization. The last is preserved (if not produced)
only by altruism.
Religion has held an important place in this
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progress. For religion strengthens the deinand for the
sacrifice of the individual, and furnishes the founda-
tion of governnent . Altho religious authority, if un-
checked, Yfill result in stagnation, "broadly speaking
religion means organization, and irreligion disintegra-
tion. Religion and civilization have gone hand in hand.
I present this condensed statement partly because it
supplies a constructive interpretation which we shall build on
in what follows . But it is necessary to make the follov/ing
points in criticism;
(a) Self-preservation is carelessly spoken of as an
instinct. Self-preservation is a result which normally follows
from the operation of several appetites and instincts, such as
hunger and thirst, the sexual impulse, the instinct of flight,
of combat, etc. Self-preservation itself is plainly not an
instinct. "Ethical instinct" is an even broader assumption.
(b) He does not shov/ how the alleged ethical instinct
had, or could have had, its "origin in the insiet instinct that
leads to a struggle for the life of a species." (P. 248) It
did originate in connection v/ith that struggle, undoubtedly;
but that is a different thing. He uses the word, instinct,
loosely and carelessly; he is vague and unsatisfactory in his
reference to origin and development.
(c) "The moral nature of man controls his actions
not by reason, but by impulse." (P. 248) This is true in so
far as the moral nature grov/s out of (or is influenced by)
the gregarious, and other, social instinctive tendencies. It
does not follow that there is an "ethical instinct," nor that
the moral nature controls actions by impulse, chiefly or
characteristically. The categorical imperative, and related
experiences and activities, may be intuitive; they have an
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instinctive rootage. But they are more than instinctive.
They are more rational, more controlled and directed, more
ideal than instinctive behavior could be.
(d) The ideal nature is not a v/holly new impulse. On
the biological side, it develops from the matrix of the social
instincts, such as: gregariousness, desire for approval, dis-
play, imitation, sex behavior, the maternal attitude and the
allied tendencies of kindliness and sympathy.
To sum up: in the proportion that morality is
instinctive (or impulsive), it is not novel, but has rich,
biological connections. In the degree that it is truly
ethical, it is derived, rational, far developed from the
instinctive plane. Here we have the new factor, or factors,
emerging. Conn has his attention so fixed on his thesis that
(altho a biologist) he makes many crude and careless state-
ments
.
(Note his disparagement of the importance of physical
inheritance, and his theory of human instincts, in the first
chapter of the book). And his psychological study of altruism
i.s mechanical and inadequate .
(e) Sacrifice, to be ethical, must be recognized as
reasonable. Socially and wholesomely motivated, it is
reasonable. Altho a little knov^ledge may be a socially
dangerous thing, it is not (necessarily) true that ” intelligenc
leads to disintegration.” (P. 265) The mere blind impression
of "oughtness” v/ould not, could not, lead the individual very
far. As a matter of fact, the enlightened individual v/ill
recognize that the well-being of society not only will secure
safety and physical advantages for himself, but also will
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make possible many ideal satisfactions and delights.
Certainly the ethical-religious consciousness is
not an isolated or ephemeral quality. It is an integral
part of the structure of attitudes toward life. The following
die^gram will indicate my general conception of the character
of ethical and religious development, historically and logically
vie7/ed
:
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Out of the original culture mass many ideal interests
have evolved. From the primitive conglomerate, art, science,
philosophy, the practical arts, literature, education and a
complex social org^/^feation have emerged. We are particularly
interested in the development of a true morality (based on
social appreciations), growing out of the more spontaneous
attitude tovmrd men, and in the grov^th of the tribal ceremonial
from the more personal attitude toward natural forces, (as well
.
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as involving and expressing tribal evalimtions, as Diirkheim,
Ames and King have shown) . Later forms of morality and cere-
monial fuse to generate the genuine idealism of ethical-
religious experience. From the formal type of conventional
morality, and from impersonal magical practices, no ideal
interests evolve. But true morality (stressing love as a
FLOtive and character as the objective), and the nobler cere-
m.onial (mediated by the attitude of awe before the splendid
mysteries of life), are conjoined (yet maintaining their
identities) in spirituality. As v/e have suggested in the
diagram, developed forms of esthetic, reflective and practical
experience make their rich contributions to the ultimate
idealism.
According to this view, ceremonial religion and magic
have a common origin, developing along different lines from
Mysterious Power. Religious idealism (in a sense) has a two-
fold rootage, evolving from the attitude tov/ard nature and the
attitude toward man; in addition, it has roots in other areas
of experience. The diagram presents, of course, an over-
simplification; for there are many other cross-references.
All ideal interests are inter-related; and they retain
much of their early irrational coloring. Religious experience
today is a mixture of many things; but it has become punified
and clarified, until in its noblest forms it has taken on the
character embodied in the definition offered at the beginning
of this section.
If this is a Just presentation, it follows tha,t it is
difficult to determine the proper interpretation of religion.
,i.ii T.afcii'tJ •'irriGa'oTKtJio bttB :vTri:vIoVni a^'
-•' iut> Irijs yj t 'ijJj?.:, . (frrOfO:j J&fis aonA
ST.;, -
.r.^..;jl<j-o i.j ai oatf'i /sicso.^
Cfi; .‘Oi fr{ ::>v/iv .> ‘lo ^x-1 at' T ao^r*^ . ooiif^i'i'iqx© at/ol^ile'i
IdO-t. -/r.r .C.T'Ort^iCT^i iftc-'st fca,e
/j ovr>X 3t'ii:8a^»‘T.tu ) viXIii^rom ac"t,' .^f/a . ovXova BJod'iaJ’ntl
I
-o'ioo -'rf^ r<a” , ( '=^v ailt aa ’ta^oaxorJo evt^om
J&tiU'xoXcra orfX to ..f.i/i orfi j.axX'ani) XaXnooi
'Ti'^iit ;:^-^ictJ:a.ti£XJLi''' i’o’j) b'r^tic^rxop on" .(«itxi, lo QpXnoJa'^OT
an* «£ Xo oyj3x( ev/ aA . \;;il,D^iv.txnlqa iti‘ (ooxoiixtobX
L:,-.oito*^T4 Irra oTiitoeXtO'r .ox 'axtwVao to fxixnot jbeqoIovBt ^infaisaii^
otac3i>Ijj oxlA oJ niioiJXTdXnJ'itoc/ fioin ixPilt eMacr &aapl'ioqxa
‘
.j’taiXaedi:
r.iont eofii'* inonettXf:' ;3<iiqo:ov9/x nojinioo a evarf
iS aarf (c'O.To:: xs rxi ) aJ^oiv-tiXofl .no^'/o-I •woi':o<i'.^^H
L w? oni/d.v.:! / r!-.n)i ani/iltij j»rfj ruonl :irrivXove , •jjbIoo'T i)Xo'l
5v3@nii no.'!*" riX a toon sjo/l _iii ^ o£xi-tx’J'<tB
-•xTr*ro fix ,oa"i;^o lo or5X * to
.
'^eonp ip'it'Tt-BQono 'torlAo anjs ono.it not' jiioitiioiliiqi'iia
itXcten '<or{t ix:a (Jjatiilon-nolinl onja ntaonet:^! X&oJ>i XIA
n,
yoaox joqxo airott^XoH . -ntnoloo C^irioitannl vins© niorU- to ciofjn
.f eiti’XJjn ou2ooe/i’ QJi[i ,tjt tt/'' : cj’atTX/it rntir: ^ snt/txxxi « aX
a.Ct no tl tiwnot te.jXvion att iii XXt.no ^ooX'UnaXo Jai©
’.'
• OiXc! f>en®'lto Ttoti odt nl X)©X5ofXno notowsn^iio
.noXioea ^Xiit to
ai ti J^viJ ar'-ollot. v-ti ,.r t tjj.t.nenent ooxj-' ^ ai aldJ tl












Thus it C8.n not be said that religion is good or bad. It
depends on the type of the religious consciousness . It would
be as impossible to say that government was good or bad, that
an ujidesignated hypthesis of conduct vms true or false. More-
over, we can not afford to drav/ naive, sentimental conclusions
from the prevalence of "religious” phenomena in human history
and biography. "Religion" conta.ins too wide a range of conno-
tations. In poetic mood, we may say that the long cry of the
human soul for God is 7/itnessed by the ruins of ancient civili
zations. With tender regard for the early dreams of man, we
may assert that in the child-race there are dim forebodings
of that higher life to v;hich he is related and akin. With the
poet we may exclaim,
"That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings
For the good they comprehend not."
But this T/ill not advance us far in our critical problem. It
remains to determine the precise nature of the religious
experience, and to adjudge its cosmic implications. The
prevalent objective assumptions of uncritical religious
experience create no a priori proof of its necessarily objec-
tive character. Primitive ideation is usually objective.
Prayer in the form of communion is the natural result of the
conversational (because largely social) character of thinking,
especially of idealistic, or valuational, thinking. Mature
idealism steadily turns away from the conversational method,
and has progressively less need for objective references and
absolute certainties.
We may recall our definition of religion; Religion
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is a pervasive sentiment, including appreciation of the
highest (recognized) values, loyalty toward adventurous
ideals, both appreciation and loyalty iii8.de more and-
w-jr&4f^l- -eriRd- strong by the attitude of reverent wonder toward
the surrounding and inclusive mystery of the universe.
B • Psychology of the Idealizing Process
1. Preliminary analysis
I believe that it is possible to analyze provisional-
ly, and to reconstruct, the idealizing process, and so to de-
termine its essential nature. Some have held that this interest
destroys the true character of the process. I admit that this
attempt at reflective understanding does modify the process
.
But the modification is not serious, especially since the
modification results (or may result) in an enrichment of the
process. We may admit that analysis temporarily interferes
v;ith appreciation. But the memory images are fairly clear, and
may be examined. Then, v/hen we^o back to appreciation's synoptic
view, we shall find that it is far more meaningful and adequate
by reason of the intervening analytical study.
This position is the more justifiable because the
critical study of consciousness, especially from the genetic
and functional points of viev:, discloses the ideal nature of
every process of intellectual growth. Idealization is not a
peculiar, unnatural state superinduced upon the ordinary course
of psychic life by mythical agencies. All intellectual prog-
ress, all unfolding appreciation, all volitional activity,
involve the idealizing process
.
Child psychology has thrown much light on the course
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of psychic organization and control. The young infant is a
center of relatively unorganized energy. The instinctive
tendencies provide an incipient order; hut the random movements
are the over-flow of surplus energy, finding expression without
regard to experience or desire
.
A fev7 weeks after birth the child connects his impress-
ions to a sufficient degree to exhibit traces of memory; his
memory remains weak for about three months, depending upon
intense stimulations. Kevertheless, a certain order is now
implicit in experience; there is more than a series of random
discharges. Attention, sufficient to arouse vague interest,
becomes noticeable after about three months. This interest
develops very rapidly during the ensuing weeks, especially in
connection with those clianges upon which the child’s own com-
fort and discomfort depend.
The actions of persons form the most significant and
variable factors in the baby's environment, and it is for these
that his powers of comprehension and adjustment are taxed. The
mother's manner of bathing him suffers variations, or perhaps is
perplexingly different from the nurse's method. The memory image
of the dressing process fails to get verified by the present
order of events . It is necessary to expand the scope of
expectation; later there is necessitated the projection of a
vague idea to harmonize the conflict. (Compare an article by
A. E. Davies, "Genesis of Ideals," in the Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods, August, 1906).
Even the mother's caress and way of fondling are dis-
tressingly changeful. These conflicting elements involve in
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the mental life an increasing intricacy, which is recognized
as complexity, in so fa.r as it baffles adjustment, thru the
presence of that which v/e may tentatively designate as ideal
images or experimental attitudes, - an experience, however,
which is significant for higher development only thru clarifica-
tion and recognition of these ideal constructions.
I have given the provisional characterization of the
ideal (page 22, above) as an imaginative and reflective con-
struction of a phase of experience whose meanings are not fully
realized. Nov/ v/e may say that the ideal is partially designated
as an idea which functions in experience as its organizing
factor, in the interest of progressive understanding, apprecia-
tion and achievement. It consists not wholly of perceptual
elements as given, but is (in part) a synthesis (governed by
an active interest) of selected elements of experience, v/hich
renders possible the assimilation of new items and their apper-
ception in a more definitely ordered life.
The place of feeling in this process is vital. Feel-
ing makes possible the valuation placed upon the environment
as result of the active relation of the conscious organism
thereto. Ebullition of feeling-impulses gives opportunity
and stimulus for grov/th. What further is meant will be re-
served for later study; we merely note here the fact as sig-
nificant for development early and late. It is true of the
child, as we have seen; and the great painter, inventor or
reformer, is one who feels strongly far beyond the limitations
of ordinary experience
.
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In this discussion we have made frank use of any
suggestions which the introspective method may afford. The
extreme behaviorist would deny the scientific validity of
this method. Hence v/e endeavor to come to v/ith the
behaviorist. We gladly admit our debt to the behaviorist
psychology. On its positive side, it has delivered us from
much easy-going "explanation" and some self-confident
mythology. To a degree it represents a wholesome tendency.
It furnishes an excellent method for certain problems, for
example, animal psychology and child psychology. Heverthe-
less, it can be only a supplementary method; for introspection
alone affords direct access to the unique phenomena, conscious
states .
Behaviorism* s elaborate avoidance of the central
processes is distinctly amusing. That which it drives out
of the door v/ith such a flourish flies in at the window.
J. R. Kant or, in an article on memory, makes a typical state-
ment: "We have no room in oiir description for the sorcerous re-
instatement of mental states thru a mysterious association of
ideas." (Article, "Memory: A Triphase Objective-Action," in
Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 624-639)
Now we freely admit that the notion of association of
ideas has been naively conceived, and its "laws" have been
formulated too confidently and have been used uncritically.
But mental states are not exactly subject to a "sorcerous re-
instatement;" they are immediate data.
Failure to admit to consideration any data, no matter
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ho7/ inconvenient the recognition may be, is not scientific.
Conscious data exist, and must be taken account of. On the
general evolutionary hypothesis, that v/hich is so obvious and
universal v;ould naturally appear to have a significant place
in the human-environment relation. Kantor calls his treatment
of memory the objective analysis of human behavior. He holds
that in memory the "factor of retentiveness is decidedly a
matter of associative connection,” but insists that "the
associative process is at every point a thoroly and completely
objective series of happenings." (Op. cit., p. 634) It is
clea,r that he regards any sort of reinstatement of mental states
as "sorcerous.” I submit that, altho this may be objective
description (and partially sound), it is not complete analysis,
and therefore not a true explanation. As a matter of fact, in
spite of his declared purpose, introspection phrases are em-
ployed, or hinted at, constantly. This habit is common among
behaviorists
.
Non-introspective attempts at explanation often become
mysterious, or meaningless, thru various forms of imaginative
neurology. No doubt the cerebro-spinal system (if accessible)
might be theoretically conceived of as a perfect table of refer-
ence for psychological explanation. In many respects it would
be the one adequate scientific method, if it were open to ex-
tensive use. But the critical psychologist must insist that
the cerebro-spinal system (with the cerebral cortex in particular)
as an explanatory table of reference is largely imaginary. Of
coujTse it is valuable. V/e know, all the v;hile, that the system
is there, and we use it as much and as far as possible. This
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is the justifiable neurological, supplementary method. As
such, it steadies our theory, and makes many valuable concrete
suggestions. It is exceedingly important.
Failing a completely accessible table of reference,
we have two other avenues of approach: responses of the
organism carefully observed; introspection. All three methods
are useful. For we have a three-fold process: Stimulation,
Central adjustment. Response. A psychological description
(which is to be as complete as possible) requires all possible
methods. Even then v/e fall far short of a full accounting.
Faced by a difficulty, it is sheer folly to reject an alterna-
tive method of description and explanation. Psychology too
often is guilty of a suspicious provincialism.
This estimate of the situation favors one current
view of the body-mind relation, which holds that mental
phenomena do not belong to a wholly different order of reality
from that of neural phenomena. They appear to belong to
mutually alien realms because we are in the habit of approach-
ing them from different angles. They are different; that is,
they present distinguishable aspects of reality. But they
can not be absolutely different, for they are organically
united. It is not so strange that here (as so often occurs in
nature) we have different factors organically incorporated,
v/hich are distinguishable, altho not separable. The evolutionary
story gives a sufficient indication of the situation: v/e have to
do with a developing process, unified, natural, operative.
The conscious state is a datum, altho not a thing-in-
itself to be isolated, or to be understood in isolation.
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Consciousness is a convenient term for the specific character
of subjective experiences. Absurd is the declaration: "Percep-
tion is an actual interaction of one object with another."
(J. R. Kantor, op. cit.) It is a mediated interaction. Recog-
nition and memory can not be reduced to behavior: the whole is
larger than the part; behavior is the end-result. Consciousness
reports on one aspect of the central adjustment (the middle
portion of the nervous arc).
Consciousness is the other side of the neural
process. Consciousness is certainly an aspect of reality,
but of itself (as a separate unit) is not necessarily to be
thought of as effecting neural changes. Something happens,
and the beinp; av/are is one of the phases of the happening,
and often probably is one of the necessary conditions of the
happening. Awareness is not a self-contained somewhat existing
by itself. The problem must be understood conceptually in
functional fashion. In the nature of the case, we lack the
mental machinery for picturing the situation. It is not
picturable, and we should not try to picture it. It is
enough for our purpose that we recognize the patent fact that





I named the ideal an idea which functions in the
organization of experience, mediating richer interpretations.
In the projecting of the ideal, we have at first the activity
of the "reproductive" imagination. In fact this is a simpler
manifestation of the "constructive" imagination which (always
j*
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functioning in alert and significant cognition) revives images
and ideas, selected portions of experience, freely molds,
manipulates and resynthesizes them according to some ruling
interest in a fresh conception, which (when it serves to
resolve conflicts in a higher harmony, or to infer novel
meaning from complexity) is an ideal.
Much of that which lias preceded has served only as a
prelimina.ry statement, and (altho true in part) is not at all
adequate for that which we are trying to comprehend. It affords
the first broad truth of the nature of the ideal; but it is too
broad. Hence I have preferred to employ the term "ideal" as
an adjective when referring to an experience which illustrates
one functional aspect of the ideal, being however only the
matrix of its development. The ideal is evolved in the course
of active, striving life; its projection is demanded in the
increasing complexity of that life by the impulse of needs,
appetites and desires for something more, which the ideal makes
better, something more satisfactory, which the ideal makes
more complete and meaningful. This requires explicit emphasis.
A mere reorganization of given elements would be a
general image, the result of accumulated filtrations of sense-
data; or it would be a general idea, the arrangement of attitudes
taken, for example, toward the social environment as offered to
the organism. But the ideal is more than a composite picture;
it is more tlian a formulation of tabulated items. If this were
all, there might be spreading and expansion, but no true develop-
ment. There might be voluminous rami;^ioations, but no
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differentiation, in inclusive and higher unity. Conscious
development is orthogenic (at least in a figurative sense),
and its principle is the ideal.
I have stated that the ideal is the guide to progress,
that it makes for advancement as v/ell as for order. In this
it is more than a resynthesis of data as experienced. It is
a synthesis of experience according to a new pattern, a pattern
which reveals a meaning not before perceived, and suggests a
further meaning not yet fully realized. It is a synthesis of
experience as actually assimilated, ¥/ith its v/ider implica-
tions. This synthesis is recognized as surpassing past
achievement, and as promising superior insight.
The v/ealth of new relations
,
discovered and created
by thought, provide sufficient data and give sufficient oppor-
tunity, for the fresh meanings perceived, and enable us to
understand the process empirically. (By understanding, I mean
having a reasonable sense of familiarity and degree of insight.
It is, of course, impossible to explain fully any process in
nature; for every natural process is a mystery. It is easy
to construct more imposing and architectonic "explanations;"
but these are apt to prove illusory.)
Perception is a complex mental state, made up of
sensational elements. V/e may think of apperception as focussed
perception. An image consists of perceptual elements, its
quality being largely determined by the retention trace. In
the case of memory ima^ges, the components are sensational
elements and primary traces. In the case of ima^ginative , syn-
thetic images, its components are reassembled elements (percep-
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tual, affective, conative) and modified traces. In the case
of the idea, sensory stimulation and muscular response have
served to alter the set of the cortical neurons . The central
process no longer retains its former character. To be sure, the
overflo?: current which arouses an ideational experience is
usually compa.ratively v/eak. On the neurological side, idea-
tion depends upon a complex branching system of neurons in the
cerebral cortex. Of course the retention traces are manifold.
This may not be very enlightening. At least it may
help to make more comprehensible the many rich border-line
experiences, the apperception of nev/ elements, a,nd above all
the comprehension of novel relations in our diversified and
ever changing experience. It is these relations that are
replete with bright, untried possibilities, and v/ith verdant
acquaintances
.
Shall we ask, how may we explain the piarer pattern of
the ideal, this transcendence of the actual? It will not do
to say that the ideal wells up from unseen depths of mind, nor
that it is the inf Iot/ of a divine life . One assertion is
mythical, and the other mythological. ?/e must hold to the
empirical estimate of the ideal as the principle of insight
and achievement. V/e are concerned with inventive creations
as means of self-realization.
In seeking the explanation of a process, it ought not
the making of
to be demanded that v/e explain in a sense other than^/a dis-
closure of the relationships and sjEtem system v/ithin the develop-
ment as given. The present as actual appears self-contained and
finished. The present in the light of past and future is beheld
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as a stage in an evolving process, - as product looking toward
the past, as factor looking toward the future. At any particul-
ar stage, experience is given partly as product, partly as
promise . The product may contain the germ, but as promise it
is not offered as actuality, but rather as potentiality. On
every level, experience in its broader meanings is given in
germ. In development, these meanings unfold according to
manifold laws. In its largest aspect, grov/th is in the form
of increasing differentiation within a wider integration, en-
largement of scope v/ithin a more adequate unity. It is an
organic evolution.
It so happens that present experience opens out to
the future, as well as recapitulates the past. Not only is the
future situation bound up "potentially" with the present, but in
that present is forecast the real nature of the future, together
with the conscious realization on the part of the individual of
an efficient relation to its promise. If experience were a
mechanical process, this insight v;ould be anomalous. Since
experience is conscious, intelligent development, it is
reasonable that the higher future should not only grow out of
the lov/er present, but should be foreseen v/ithin the limitations
of tliat present
.
Otherwise, the changing order would be a blind, mechan-
istic, or at most a merely organic, process, not an intelligent,
guided development, as it claims and appears to be. And I am
confident that we may trust the testimony of intellectual
progress as it validates and confirms its claims, believing that
the present is not only historic in its solid gain, but also
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prophetic in its richer promise
.
4. The genius
Light has been thrown on the nature of idealization
by the psychological and sociological study of the genius,
by the psychology of invention, and by the philosophy of
civilization. History has been made by the minority. Culture
has been created by the few geniuses: thinker, scientist,
artist, poet, social leader. The religious consciousness has
appeared most winsomely in the meditation and the vision of
the mystics, most eloquently in the challenging appeal of the
prophets
.
It is the perpetual miracle of history that the
genius, nurtured with others, surrounded by their limited
accomplisliment
,
should rise to splendid heights of under-
standing, perceive original meanings in human life, and create
new forms of beauty.
The creative me^n is to be understood as an organic
part of the life of the world. His productive imagination
finds its material in the opulence of social experience. The
genius is a social man. His ideals are rooted in the culture
and wisdom which constitute his valuable inheritance . Here he
finds much of the substance of his dreams. He discovers also
certain standards of theoretical criticism and of practical
suggestiveness
,
which will necessarily guide his insight.
James Mark Baldwin, in his *' Social and Ethical Inter-
pretations," lias explained that it is the glory of the great
man that he is so intimately related to his fellows, for on
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this account he is able to lead them; in so far as he denies
these connections and privileges, he fails of his high calling.
The prophet is a man among men. He is the master of
men; he is the latter partly because he is the former. This
does not mean that his thought is the adaptation of the crude
opinion of the populace . In this dross there are a few grains
of golden aspiration. These yearnings would remain ineffectual,
hov/ever, if there v/ere not some one who could gather up the
weak and ill-defined impulses of the heart, and advance them
as ideals of striving. The gold would lie unnoticed if there
were no dreamer-artisan to select the scattered grains, and
shape them into a clean and beautiful image
.
The poet is a variation toward fine sensitivity to
suggestions of social meaning and beauty. His is a more
responsive organism. Being so susceptible, he detects the
abortive impulses in his fellow-men. Y/ith his power of vision,
he perceives the upward- leanings , inefficient because uncon-
scious and unguided; he will unify the scattered objects of
conflicting aspirations into a clear and shining ideal. Then
his fellov/’s, gazing with astonished pride upon this vision,
v/ill say, "This is what we loved. This is v/hat we meant I"
He who is able to do this for others does not furnish
ideals ready-made. To appropriate a vision, one must strain to
see it, and must labor to obey. The seer can only suggest his
truths. If men are sufficiently responsive, if their love be
deep enough, and their will strong, they viill be able to in-
terpret the suggestion. If they have not this sympathetic
resonance, it v;ill mean nothing;. Yet if it were not for the
'
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insight and skill of the artist, the poet 8.nd the seer, which
directs our feebler vision and enlightens our ignorant long-
ings, our lives would be dark, dim, con-fused.
V/e must not suppose that these are exempt from strife,
they who direct us in ours . Our effort is as nothing com^pared
v/ith theirs: where v/e follow, they must lead. These are they
who live splendidly v/hile the many dumbly exist
.
The dreamers are the saving men, world-quickeners
,
torch-bearers. They succeed in their ideal enterprise, altho
probably less satisfyin-gly to themselves than to those whom
they encourage. A vision and a melody in their loveliness
have captivated a poet's heart. As he sings, he knov/s that
he is not translating into rhythm all the tender meaning
throbbing there. Altho inadequate to express the worth of
hie ideal, the incomplete expression itself will endow his
thought with a richer intimation than he had guessed at first.
He V7ill be impelled once again to fix in carved imagery those
fair, fleeting forms. At the last, he v/ill not despair; for
he believes that the unfinished song will thrill the hearts
of many, v/ho by imaginative sympathy will find more in the
song than is explicitly present, who (tkiru reverent appreciation)
will catch a glimpse of the singer's meaning.
5. Conceptual thought, meanings, and idealization
The transcendence of the actual, in idealization, is
that insight which discovers, within the imxperfect, intimations
of the whole . Nov; this is much more significant and thorogoing
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imperfections, and the setting up by the fancy of an imaginary
good. I7e tiave to do with the process of reflection in v;hich
the logical distinction is made between mere existenc^es
(factual data) and perceived meanings.
In contemplating a vital area of experience - let us
say, a developing process - thought discovers significant lines
v/hich suggest values involving experience lying beyond present
realization, recognizes a design v^hich gives meaning to a whole
thus held in imagination, and infers the being-to-be of goals
for achievement and appreciation. The mind constructs ideal
configurationsthru a process of inference. This process is,
of course, unpicturable
;
but it can be conceived.
We must not distinguish too sl^arply between the
perception of things and the inference of meanings. Because
perception is apperception, it follov^s that mere things re-
ceive an enhancem.ent in perceptual experience, and are
invested with an inferential quality, nevertheless we are
aware of a real change when we pass from perceptual data to
conceptual inference. (Compare LI. T. lIcClure, "An Introduction
to the Logic of Reflection.") Things have mere local and literal
qualities. When their meanings get dislodged from the particular
things meant, xie have concepts. We are no longer in the realm
of precise ingredients, but rather in the realm of "essences,"
inferred meanings, conceived values. Plato \inderstood this;
but he did not see that there is nothing in this that requires
us to venture beyond the empirical idealizing process under
observation.
"Meanings work loose from things meant, a.nd operate
'
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independently. They become weighted with representative
reference 5 that is, they become concepts. A concept, there-
fore, is a standardized meaning. When meanings are entirely
disentangled from things meant, they become concepts." (Op.
cit., p. 171) Since thought deals in conceptual significa-
tions, since it makes use of signs for ampler, pre-figured
meanings, and even for the drift of intention, an indefinitely
v/ide and magnificent range of idealization is opened up. John
Dewey observes; "As data are signs v/hich indicate other
existences, so meanings are signs v/hich imply other meanings."
(Dev/ey, "Essays in Experimental Logic," p. 52)
To quote McClure, we may employ the term "meaning"
to stand "for the body of interpretative material, of explan-
atory conceptions, which are used in any cognitive experience."
(Op. cit., p. 174) He points out that betv;een Problem and
Solution, various tentative mental processes intervene. These
are instrum-ents in knowing "v/hen special care is taken to
investigate the evidence which supports them." Some of these
tentative activities are: Vague impression, conjecture, assump-
tion, hypothesis, theory. (Op. cit., p. 176)
He quotes John Dewey, "An idea is a meaning tlrnt is
tentatively entertained, formed, and used with reference to its
fitness to decide a perplexing situation - a meaning used as a
tool of judgment." "Ideas are not then genuine ideas unless
they are tools in a reflective examination vfhich tends to solve
a problem." (Dewey, "How V/e Think," p. 108, 109) Dewey
summarizes by saying that "conceptions, or standard meanings,
are instruments (1) of identification, (2) of supplementation,
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(3) of placing in a system..*' (Dewey, op. cit., p. 126)
Reasoning is a more extensive elaboration of mean-
ings . Reasoning as a more developed phase of reflection,
interpenetrates with the simpler conception of meanings dis-
cussed above. As Woodworth states: "Reasoning might be de-
scribed as mental exploration, 8.nd distinguished from motor
exploration of the trial and error variety." (R, S. Woodworth,
"Psychology," p. 462) Dewey asserts that, "Deliberation is a
dramatic rehearsal in imagination of various competing lines of
action. • • • An act tried out is irrevocable, its consequences
can not be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not
final nor fatal. It is retrievable." ("Human Nature and Con-
duct," p. 190)
Thus reasoning involves inductive thought, which is
the imaginative flight making possible some daring hypothesis,
the perception of explanatory pattern lines hidden in the data,
and deductive thought, which is the taking account of stock,
the backward look, the application of the hypothesis to knovm
facts and to data newly collected. This normally results in
the modification and amplification of the hypothesis. These
two processes interpenetrate, each supplementing the other in
the organic oneness of reflective thinking.
This is a fruitful field of logical inquiry, which has
been investigated by many thinkers. We need only to suggest the
main lines of the theory of thinl?:ing, indicating its relation
to the life of idealization. This v/e have endeavored to do;
we v/ill carry the discussion a little farther. Santaya^na gives
expression to the significance we have in mind:
"Thus if we use the word life in a eulogistic
.M
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sense to designate the happy maintenance against the
v/orld of some definite interest, vie may say with
Aristotle that life is reason in operation. The
Life of Reason will then be a name for the part of
experience which perceives and pursues ideals. . . .
Thus the Life of Reason is another name for what, in
the v/idest sense of the word, might be called Art.
Operations become arts when their purpose is conscious
and their method teachable . In perfect art the whole
idea is creative and exists only to be embodied, v;hile
every part of the product is rational and gives delight-
ful expression to the idea.” (George Santayana., "The
Life of Reason," p. 5)
And John Dev^ey has said: "Every ideal is preceded by an
actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner
image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider and
fuller form some good v^hich has been previously experienced
in a precarious, accidental way." (Human Kature and Con-
duct, p. 22)
It is important for our purpose to stress the
superiority of the abstract image as an element of technique
in thinking. We may first quote a definition of meaning
given by Irving Elgar Hiller: "Meaning is the mental anticipa-
tion of the outcome, or result, or reactions not yet made, but
v/hich might be made, in response to data immediately given to
sense or to images arising in the mind." He asserts that
meaning and symbol are strictly correlative. ('The Psychology
of Thinking," p. 155)
The abstract idea bearing meaning is not mechanically
formed like a composite photograph. The organism is so biassed
by interest that the resulting meaning is largely predetermined
by this partiality. Meaning therefore is to be understood as a
functional pliase of consciousness. With this general concep-
tion of meaning in mind, we may quote Miller in regard to the
-H- oIxly:? I^iQb ' 9;iri©a
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superiority of the abstract image in thinking. These are the
qualities of excellence: (a) Less irrelevancy of suggestion,
(b) Greater rapidity of movement, (c) Superiority in making
logical connections, (d) Increase of power. (Miller, op. cit.,
p. 160-162)
The mind by making use of concepts can move swiftly
from meaning to further implied meaning. It can '‘skim” along,
thus moving to outlying implications and suggested possibilities,
ranging far beyond the r»ng© of perceived or fully validated
values, opening up new realms of half-guessed and fascinating
mystery. This suggests again the facility and pov/er of ideals,
with their constant accession of novel import. - V/e may note
that modern methods of training children to read develops a
skill v/hich should expedite this idealizing process, freeing
them from sense anchorage, and preparing them for the adventur-
ous flights of imaginative appreciation.
I have tried to present the process of hypothesis-
making, during v/hich - thru long contem.plation of a given
situation - the significant lines of a pattern gradually emerge.
This emergence of a design makes it possible for the mind to
adjust itself to future possibilities, larger meanings, and
thus in an imperfect experience to gain intimations of e. more
nearly perfect.
V/hy then are these ideal constructions not defined
merely as ideas, as phases of actual experience? It is because,
altho parts of actual (that is, present) experience, the v/ord
"idea" does not include the implications thereof. Ideals
refer beyond themselves; in a sense, progress is tov/ard them.
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They are goals of striving. They remain perceived possibili-
ties involving richer fruition. They are fore-gleams on the
upward pathway of attainment
.
It is denied that the ideal transcends (exceeds) our
total experience; but it is asserted tliat the ideal does
possess a transcendent (surpassing) quality, that is, it
contains a meaning which is elevated above present realiza-
tion. Actuality consists, in the first place, of degenerative
processes and of merely factual items devoid of evolutionary
value; and in the second place, of assimilated and tabulated
circumstances. These would yield multiplication, but no
genuine developm.ent . Hov^ever, these occurrences are seen to
be minute threads and partial tints in the pattern of the
whole, conceived in imaginative thought; and thus the facts are
assigned to their fitting place.
V/e have seen that the ideal is not a luxury or far-
off prize, but is the immanent principle, implicit in intellect-
ual development, making possible and revealing the inner meaning
of that growth. We have noted the transcendent nature of the
ideal, guiding in progress because it is exalted above all
achieved success, nevertheless, our conception of the idealiz-
ing process is too broad; it requires further explicit limita-
tion. We may proceed on the basis of our study of conceptual
thought and meanings
•
We have traced the early stages in the process of
idealization; these processes form the matrix in which the
ideal is conceived. The ideal is not brought to the birth
until it is recognized and consciously adopted. In early
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process there is a restlessness, a dissatisfaction, a desire,
a reaching -out for something. The "something" remains un-
known or misjudged until, in conceptual thinking, its ideal
aspects are disengaged from their sensational and affective
contacts; the clarification continues while the ideal emerges
in resplendent meaning.
The process thus simply sketched is irreality much
more complicated, and is subject to many vicissitudes and
reverses . The principle of growth, long unacknowledged, has
been present in the strife, resolving its conflicts, guiding
the struggle. Only gradually does the process become conscious
of the dramatic situations involved, and aware of the epic
movement. By degrees the process comes to be intentional,
directed. At last its inner worth is recognized, and in this
conscious prevision of the unattained beyond, the ideal comes
into its own, achieves its being.
There is a perpetual interaction betw^een our
certified knov/ledges (with the success which they make possible)
and our ideals. Progress involves both terms which have their
being in reciprocal influence. Achievement is ms-de possible
thru the ideal principle, and in the moment of victory the
ideal is projected beyond present realization. In its very
projection, it organizes and further interprets attainment,
and suggests an even finer fulfillment.
In its nature the ideal is intangible. It is forever
elusive in its onward flight. The idee.l is transcendent meaning
and surpassing loveliness. We m^y possess it only in imagination,
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loyal surrender to its guidance. A retreating beauty leads
us on.
C. Types of Ideals, and Their Implications for the Religious
Consciousness
1. Introductory statement
Ideals are of three main types: the cognitive, the
emotional, the volitional. These are not mutually exclusive.
Every ideal involves apperception, affective tone and senti-
ment, and active attitude and response. However, depending on
the proportionate emphasis, there are clearly marked realms of
idealization:
(a) Ideals of practical understanding, and of systematic,






(b) Ideals of imaginative appreciation (elementary: friendship
love of nature, literature, art; derivative: esthetics,
philosophy of beauty).
(c) Ideals of social adjustment and happiness (elementary:
the moral life, self-realization; derivative: ethics, ethical
philosophy, philosophy of history and of civilization).
Religious idealism is the synthesis of all idealizing
processes in the imaginative and reflective attempt to achieve
the highest harmony and supreme ideal unity in experience.
Because religious idealism is composite in structure, it is a
complex experience; because it is unified in the attitude of
reverent appreciation, it is characterized by a beautiful
simplicity
.
Vie shall undertake a study of the specific nature of
A• no fiu
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these three types of ideals, with their implications for the
validity of the religious consciousness. I shall permit the
exposition of the thesis to be its principal justification.
Ro rigorous demonstration is possible. My principal interest
lies in the functional study of ideals. I shall develop the
thesis also by a certain amount of refutation, but chiefly
with the object of clarification and illustration. I have no
intention of attempting to refute elaborately or conclusively
any opposing theory. One’s conclusion v/ill depend upon one’s
temperament and general point of view. Hence the total impress
of a theory of idealization is its only significant recommenda-
tion. If at times my statements or claims appear dogmatic,
the impression may be softened by bearing in mind that I am
not attempting to establish a thesis, or prove a theory,
except in the (perhaps modest) sense of suggesting one con-
sistent^ and (to me) the most reasonable, interpretation.
If our analysis of the idealizing process is correct,
it would seem to follow that ideals are to be understood in
empirical terms . Only in human experience do we find idealiza-
tion. We have said that the ideal is a construction in re-
flective thought and imagination of a phase of experience v^hose
meanings are appreciated, altho not fully realized. These
meanings are more adequately determined as they work themselves
out in experience
.
It may be asked, hov/ far out into the realm of cosmic
reality, in the strength of logical requirements, does the
significance of ideals extend? The functioning of ideals lies
at the heart of the religious consciousness, for this is
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essentially a valuation experience. Our philosophy of ideals
validates the religious attitude, if this is conceived in the
spirit of simplicity and humility. If ideals are extra-
experiential (holding suggestions reaching beyond fully under-
stood and tested values), not super-experiential (transcending
human experience), it follows that they can furnish no definite
or certain information concerning the ultimate structure of
reality. Of course, ideals are a .part of the structure. It
may be that they are the m.ost significant and determinative
part. There are impressive arguments against this theory. If
it is held, it can be no more than a tentative postulate.
Perhaps a minimum of cosmic hope is a requisite for
religious idealism. Hov/ever, men can live successfully and
happily on a very little hope. The major portion of the
religious consciousness, when it rightly understands itself,
has to do with the ascertainable values of ideals in an
enlarging experience, imaginative and social in character.
Because ideals are functions of psychic evolution, they
minister to the religious sentiment, whose appreciations and
loyalties are quickened by awe in the presence of life's
ultimate mystery.
It is necessary to distinguish between this valid
religious a^ttitude, in v/hich ideals natur'ally and inevitably
eventuate, and the many invalid types of religious belief and
experience, v/hich seek to establish themselves by insufficient
argument and adventitious pleas
.
V/hen the metaphysical question is raised, the trans-
cendentalist forsakes the values as known for a super-experiential
to vn>j03\4j:iiltt ^ /.IlfiWctoaaQ
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reality, or at least claims to see in these values a necessary
reference to some wider entity than is immediately concerned
in the experience itself. The empiricist on the other hand
insists on the autonomy of the ideal, maintaining that the
values are factors in a developing experience, and must be
understood within the pragmatic series where they are evolved
and where they are seen to function.
It is clear that many thinkers would not admit that
this hypothesis will take account of their ov/n religious ex-
perience. Altho this formulation does not satisfy transcen-
dental conceptions of value, it may be held as a personal
interpretation of the situation that these conceptions are
misunderstandings of real values, or unjustifiable extensions
of their significance
.
It is inevitably a personal matter. Every one, pre-
sumably, will make that interprete^tion which makes one's most
precious values most real to one's self. This may seem to be
a trite expression. Nevertheless, altho the principle operates,
it is frequently not recognized. In point of fact, many appear
to take for granted that the desired and legitimate object is
to formulate a theory which will make the highest values central
in the universe of things and forces, or permanent in the order
of time. It is here claimed that the ultimate appeal must be
made to the feeling of naturalness, the conviction of reality.
It is readily conceivable then that a philosophy of values
which assigns them to a precarious status in the world of facts
might be more satisfactory in that it presents a view of the
ideal life which is believed to fit in naturally with those
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Critical study of the ideal shows that the values
denoted by the term are individual-social estimates. They
result from the activities in the group, and get their quality
and meaning from the nature of the social life. Thus the life
of value has a double polarity: one pole being the individual
appreciation, and the other the standards of the group. To
vary the figure, we might say that the orbit of the ideal is
an ellipse: its magic pathv/ay can not be calculated without
reference to the focus of the "socius” and to the focus of
the ’’alter." James Mark Baldwin (in "Social and Ethical
Interpretations"), Edward Scribner Ames (in "The Psychology
of Religious Experience") and Irving King (in "The Development
of Religion") have given us admirable accounts of these values.
I would put more emphasis on the individual within the group
for the higher development of the ideal, than do Ames and
King. I would stress not only the significance of small groups,
but also the unique and ineluctable claims of solitude upon
the creative moment of idealization.
The ideal arises in experience, and must be explained
in terms of its functioning. To extend its reference to a
super-empirical realm is anomalous . The wider universe is
explained, for example, by astronomy. Who v^ould think of
explaining the structure of the star by the use of psychology’s
definitions and descriptive adjectives? The positing of an
eternal Consciousness back of, or v/ithin, all existences is a
metaphysical psychologism.
To one accustomed to the empirical point -of -viev/.
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this sort of speculation seems altogether unreal. The
interpretative method of philosophy, like the descriptive
method of science, should he faithful to empirical re-
quirements, After all, the transcendentalist ’ s insistence
false
is at least largely due to a estimate of the idealizing
process. In spite of his professed loyalty to "the values of
life," they are deemed insufficient; and the attempt is made
to transcend the ^ere of experience. He assumes that a
strange thirst is developed in the weary course of evolution;
the fountain of living water must be sought in another realm,
and imported as a sheer influx of a different energy. He
insists that the real values of experience depend upon
Something Else.
To the empiricist, these words form phantom images.
But the super-empiricist is certain tliat the empiricist’s
thought is poverty-stricken and pitiable. "They (the natural-
istic philosophers) artfully extract more out of life than it
really contains, and the result is a life all froth and
shimmer, lacking inward sincerity, a life v/hich ir^tself can
never satisfy them, but can only keep up the appearance of
doing so." (Rudolph Eucken, "The Meaning and Value of Life,"
p. 67) Hugo Munsterberg, in "Philosophie der Werte," holds
the same viev/.
Nevertheless, the empiricist believes that in the
idealizing process he discovers life’s genuine values. He
refers very definitely to the values found in an improving
social state, where the feeling of reverent devotion purifies
every relationship. If he accepts Richard Le Gallienne’s
Oi-CT , anrsea aoJ..ti}£ijoc»qa lo J*rcb aivi^t
cvi:.tql-[e-a"iri ftr'i eiiX r'.aqceoXM^ lo 5oyiJ’om cYXifi^e-iq-xo^ni
-6': I-aoi^XfiruG o-t ecf folij'orfa ,eoneios to ^orl^oci
aofTo-2i.4'ff a * aoXX.G^ndiiawoertA'r.w ^IIjs , sir^onB'riji/p
ealxi'i
rt'ii Ir '^KiJ'-ae b 0.1 oirf; «tG^.oX at
If. .•le.i.Iov erf.f” OJ C>aaaGt'i'sq ;iitX "lo atjfcqe nci . feocoTiq
oljjtv: ai i '.'Ci'r t.tjs tru^. ; L'O'aeei) gtai “^©ill’ '’,e'txi
i >.wli a9;iti>;CTK ©?£ . o'v-0/*i©q%© “to o^ie/^ ©tfLt XjfTOooita'ti
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t'TXao'i r-axflorr^: ;f£ Jj{3£/oa ©d" .ta^rsi 'x^l-^vr jytivJiX to nlEtotrot erld
OL .v,2 ^o:fo ‘rio'iettx;. a lo .'arXxfi'i ^xaerfa e bg XoI'tocciX orris^
'Ch"U- Jai.-xo^wI'' ';?c;'f’.#i.'ioq;va to b©wX.ct laei axil tiidi aJoiani
. eaXa aairiiefiioS
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e * qclc x'^Xqna ai icioiiiqcre-'ioqUQ add ^j;/3
-li-’aL'.v : i ©i.{i ) vor?!”’
^
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^
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'\otX'J to ©LfXEWJbnE ^^ilrtr.eU odT*’ flqio/iM/H) ". oo ^niofo
aXjXorl oMqoaoI JirH" fxi
^ 3aod'idiani}u ogi/IX (VQ »q
.•vsiv efUEQ ©.di
©rid rfi ijecii cev©i.i©cf dfaioi'xiqrt© ©rid ^ajsoXerlvi'ieY©?!
©H. . aeXilEV Oi.U.vrt©,- e'etil etevcoail) od aoooorrq QnisilE©!}!
^i.cvonqnJ: riE r.U QOii£E*c ©rid oi s£l© iifrilsJb a-ietoT:
asitiYoq ftoidovoJb ino^©v©/i- to tvTtlo©'.- -aid o'lodw ,.odEdQ laiooa
a ' erjr:c»x£lEc) oj X'ladoiH adqoooE. ©iCi tl .qiilraidoijEXo't
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definition of religion (in "The Religion of a Literary Man,"
p. 5), "Religion is the sense of the all-pervading sanctity
of life," he will mean that it is the dream of an ideal social
experience, where life in all its forms is sane and strong and
beautiful, with its cosmic outlook of thrilling mystery. Prom
this point of view, the apparently somewhat detached qioality
of reverence characterizes the general disposition to\7ard
reality when no concrete social valuation is stressed. It is
the mood of expansive appreciation, of imaginative enthusiasm.
It may take the form of esthetic rapture, or indulgence in
cosmic expectation, or saintly contemplation and absorption
in dreams of human v/elfare. This is the genesis of reverence,
altho with the swift enlargement of the emotions it may
readily assume the proportions of worship, mingled feeling
of exaltation and attitude of submission, toward the Universe,
personified in imagination.
2. Nature and implications of ideals of reflection
V/e are now concerned with the self-conscious effort
of thought to achieve rational syntheses. V/e may observe that
the marvelous advance of science has been rendered possible
thru the agency of ideal constructions. Scientific investiga-
tion postulates certain principles which are called laws of
nature. These "laws" are not written in a book of nature.
They are recurrent tracings given generalized (preferably
mathematical) formula,tion; they are pattern lines perceived
by the mind, being based upon - and pro;3ected beyond - observa*
tion for the purpose of ordering experience, and of making
possible further discovery and more effective mastery.
io c\ci* aX &J: i.'-.U ctaoi^ IXiv, «d '%9'UX “ic
b^rToiSjob .t^avWiOo tWcj/v ic J-nlcq eiiXi
rto xXxaC'tjfsib |.fl'ion©;jii od^ aev*;x'i^J‘oj6’‘txuXo oononovoT lo
u.', iX . beoae'ict;* ctc i&&JLuv ZmIooh ai^^oaoo on noxiw'^^xlxje't
.;.:»x}iQi/n'i:re ev/i-^tXr^jSKiI 'x<'
,
•'^Xcfaiooirfqa oyjtaxfjsqx© lo Looni wxfi
fii eonoyXixbnx 'lo' oiioriJao nnol: effJ* yian il
coX^q'tO'aa.s Skis nox J’jtiXqKed^noo 'to <fioi txsJ’ooqxo oXmaoo
^ennQ'Tove*! ao.QXean©j«v ai clfiT .©“te'iXow rr-sfiu.fil 'to am-aeib nX
vem St actoxuon© edi 'to Xnemsg'iJsXno dllwa arid' dSLv '^=ridlxj
SaxXset boXc>'TXLi ^qirfs'iov/ “io anoXdqoqo'iJ erfd ^miraas
»ODT:0vXnU c-TT^t b'LflifOd ^noiesxKrfu’a *10 ebydi«^dJ3 baa xtoXdx'dXax© lo
iioXiB;^X5i3(^i nt -omnoG'ieq
.'*toido€I!^'©'T 'IC ?,l39X)x lo »3f{0 Ixra ©ixfdall .(1
•inolA© ^iUoXoefJoo-lI«a <cjj^d ddt‘.s- bonioouoo "'Oit 0*1© ©m
J'iyfd o'^moad’o Y.^ eV' , naesxidrtys Xar':oida^i ovwirfoa 0 * d^^^fiOiXd lo
oXo'Xraoq be^iobnoa nusd ooiieXca *3x) so;:x:vj\a oooXovo:«n &siS
-^p.X taovn t oXlidrt©/; . ar:olJcii'£-taj’'Oo XaobX lo ^^ofceyx oiid uridd
1 awaX beXXao e'ta dolnv/ aoXqXorxXrtq ntadneo aed^ilr/dacq noii
. 0’WJd;^a lo iCocd ^ ''i tfQSJl'tTf don on;? ’’awjiX'* oQodT . etudsn
‘^rXcf^j'Tolo’Tq) XesiXaioccoa atvl;!. agrriot-iX drr^'iiiioo'i yodT
btftVXoo'ioq '^orfXX nio^daq ena
^
nOXda Ioiinol ( Xao.tdar;©rfd43rj
-'V/teocfo - bno^’cacf Jbodcoto'iq £kt^- - acqia boaad ;^,ftXdd ,J3p:^ ©rid
jy:.Kstf lo bit^i , dOirsx'xoqxo ^tX-r-ib'io lo ef-oq.-j;L;q odd 'lol rroXd
•
.:. . . . 'i>
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Since ideals of reflection are discrete aspects of our
experience, concrete instances may be noted. However, since
ideals are conceptual configurations (as has been shown), the
analytic and synthetic treatment of the idealizing process must
in the nature of the case be chiefly abstract. It is possible
to list specific instances, for ideals are actual happenings.
Nevertheless, if our theory of idealization is correct, ideals
themselves are always abstractions; hence their interpretation
must take a similar form. Ideals have their rootage in percep-
tual experience and in specific emotions; they maintain valid
connections with facts; but in their own nature they are con-
ceptual projections. Hence, when explanation is attempted, the
terminology, as well as the point-of -view, unavoidably become
abstract. (It should bej/clear tliat, in this dissertation, the
use of "empirical” and of "empirical method" has always included
the literal fact, and the practical significance, of concepts,
theories, principles, and other generalizations and abstractions.)
In section "B" - Psychology of the Idealizing Process
(beginning on page 59, above) - we have given an extended
scientific ("empirical" - as defined) analysis of the psychologi-
cal process of idealization.
Ideals of reflection are scientific or philosophic.
The history of science, and the contemporary world of scientific
investigation, are replete with instances; for all scientific
thinking involves ideal formulations and postulates.
In the seventeenth century Isaac Newton achieved a
great mathematical synthesis, illustrating beautifully the ideal
process. "Newton stands at the end of that rovi of scientific
'i;-'"- 'h' ndoc;q:.i5 Qrji noi toeJt'to'x *5- . '^.!r cbi ocni:8
.
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geniiises who effected the Copernican and the Cartesian revolu-
tions: he finally drew up in complete mathematical form the
mechanical view of nature, that first great physical synthesis
on which succeeding science has rested, and which has endured
unchanged until a present-day revolution bids fair to modify
it • . . The *Age of Enlightenment and Reason’ laid the founda-
tions for our present-day beliefs in every field, and it led on
naturally to the two great ideas which the nineteenth century
has added to the achievements of its predecessor, evolution and
relativity." (J. H. Randall, "The Making of the Modern Mind,
p. 254)
Wrote Newton: "We are certainly not to relinquish the
evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions
of our ovm; nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which
uses to be simple, and always consonant with itself. . • We must,
in consequence of this rule, universally allow that all bodies
whatsoever are endowed with a principle of mutual gravitation."
(Isaac Newton, "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,
Book III.) "From Kepler's rule I deduced that the forces which
keep the planets in their orb must be reciprocally as the squares
of their distances from their centers; and thereby compared the
force requisite to keep the moon in her orb with the force of
gravity at the surface of the earth, and found them to answer
pretty nearly." (Quoted in F. S. Marvin, "Living Past," p. 179)
Locke’s ideals of liberty and progress furnish another
most significant example in the long history of thought . "Locke
stands as apologist and heir of the great seventeenth-century
struggles for constitutional liberties and rights and toleration."
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(Randall, op. cit., p. 254) In connection with the expository
reference to Locke on pages 10-11, above, the revolutionary
natiore of Locke's psychological and social ideals is evident.
"Both Locke and Nev/ton stand at the threshold of a new era,
Newton as the prophet of the science of nature, and Locke as
the prophet of the science of hunan nature. From their inspira-
tion flow the achievements of the Age of the Enlightenment; in
their light men went on to transform their beliefs and their
society into v/hat we knov/ today." (Op. cit.)
In 1859 Darwin published his "Origin of Species."
In the course of long observation, and taking a hint from
Malthus's idea of the bitter struggle for existence, it occurred
to Darwin tlmt, since slight variations from con-
tinually taking place, "favorable variations would tend to be
preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of
this would be the formation of a new species . Here then I had
at last got a theory by which to v/ork." (Charles Darwin, Auto-
biography, chapter I.) In due course was projected that general
ization which we know as the theory of evolution, one of the
most magnificent abstractions which t he mind of man has ever
conceived
.
These are instances of scientific ideals of reflection.
The psychological analysis of the process in detail has been
presented in II. B, above.
As for philosophic ideals of reflection, specific
instances are presented, examined and criticized in this section,
in the pages which follow. (For example, see the discussion of
the ideal of truth, pages 87-91, the consideration of the ideali-
zations of Kant (p. 88-89), of Leighton (p. 94, 96f . ) , of Hook-
ing (p. 95-96), and of Coe (p. 98). For an extended treatment of
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Our examination of the psychological and logical
nature of the idealizing process has made it clear that in
true induction the ideal-synthesis surpasses experience, and
yet makes experience intelligible. In the nature of the case,
the ideal-design is never absolutely verifiable; hoviever, the
hypothesis (altho subject to modification) may authenticate
itself in experience with reasonable assurance.
Scientific hypotheses are provisional in nature, and
are strictly subservient to facts. They do not contemplate
an order of reality alien to, or different from, the experienc-
ed order. This order has an objective, as well as a subjective,
aspect . It is the reasonable assumption of critical thought
that there are certain facts and relations which, existing
not dependent on our perception of them, are parts of the
order of things. The empiricist is convinced that we can do
little more than accept this situation, and proceed v/ith the
ambitious and exacting program of scientific description and
explanation.
There is such a splendid panorama in the out-reaching
est
.
prospect of Science, there is such a disintei:j;edness in its
attitude, there is such a universality in its principles,
that it is natural that it will compel some sort of world-
viev/ in the mind of the faithful devotee . Y/hat v/ill this
V/ orId-view be? The devotee, impressed by thought's magnific-
ence, may be persuaded to place confidence in rationalistic
speculation.
It was this persuasion that found a too militant and
self-confident expression in Hegel's conception of fcgie Logic
X.- bn*: &di '):v noiJta’i^isx/iX^i "Xi/'O .‘.. 'r-yi
pjv J’/5! v; 'tia.Io ti a£d BBtioo'iq ^rrislLaoilii: . aif^ lo
.-
.
;vv p, jf-yonoi'iQfpco r;eG,e*^q;w*i •3istoxi:j‘a^^,-',E4isfci: orf^. «o^o;i“fec:l r;/ -t:J'
mi
,G-'Jco o;£.J lo i-}dJ ill » ..Xg.i’,5£X£o«Jni 'le.Xii'.tr
ed.t ^ 'i-'iy.ewo;! ( «I‘Xb4 •^iQi.crXryurf^ 'Tov*3fj a£ nijiGojb”XBC)M erC^
e^BoiXi-^erfui/B (ncXstjacXllftocri: oX ( Xo0t<Xw£3 orf^fX^s) aXaeriXo^^ri
. fjgriB'XiJGsja aXdXia<?H.fie'T rlXlifc' GOfioi'toqxs wX lleB-Xi
XiTf^ ^6T:i;.f<arr rfi i'^-rioiBX'/o'iq e*i.c' 00e^J‘og\jil oX'ii-trioXoa
oq/’Iqrrre.tr£0^> d'o.t'i- ifX'. '^adT , oX vjnoiV’iead'.irG vX^oi'td'u O'ijr
-Ovtgi^toqxa adX ^‘UKi'li ^3•^o*selil•f), 'lo |Oi «o1Ib liXilcaq. Ic teXiio ^ua
^ovlra^ildirQ ^ ai? XXaw s.e ,oviXo<»Gcfo iiB tohno eMT . bo
.tXx^ro. ' t IboZ^^'jc lo ,££o.i-;q?ti/eaA‘- o.rcfpaOaAo^ aiiJ' aX XI . j oeqaB
..
,
«££-oi.iw aiTC.cXJsIen: u:t^ eXo^l rflBl-reo t/i-o'i j X:>iIX
or(i lo eX'jjcq oiu?, ic ricxXqoo'ieq tjjo i^p XnoJtntqvI' Xort,
0/ rr.io ov,- bt'O^XiTf^o;.'- oX toX;>l*ii;.'fato a/ll . a^vxi: ^t Ic •tob'io
e.ri.1 oXiw f; :)<.oc'iq
p:





:v-fX^--.:o''-XT/o orfP cfl X i.-:jj^ r.j o'ioifT
Xae
1




/^ rloua eil ti'iedj tObirXIXJc
.
Jo Xt:oo cKOej Ife^rmoo Ixi'-.' Xi d-adtX XjBTtf jbii aX 41 Xa:IX
oXPX IXi;7 XBrilV .ooXovab Iiflii.t £^'1 .aifX lo ijnia oi^X ni vroiy
-ox'Uxj’s^Ba: a’Xr£nx/ofIX -per tuoXovob oriT v^oiv-Mtow
0-‘'
'':!
‘^-/onobx’lCYf'O' ox l>er «i/uioq oef ym' ^oorro
• acrXXja-Ct/goqQ-
^









as the self-unfolding of Thought, of the concrete universal
as the synthesis of opposites, of God as Logos, Geist in
rhythmic process of self-alienation and self-deliverance,
of the development in nature and in history of Freedom; and
again in his dictum: "ITatur hat weder Kern noch Schale.”
Kant, in the "Critique of Pure Reason," found that
the crude stuff of mental life is the manifold of sense . This
is first run into the molds of Space and Time as the pure forms
of the intuition. Then these representations are strained and
ordered by the tv;elve categories which give us the twelve concepts
of the understanding, in terms of which v/e get our experience.
But beyond the categories are the three transcendental con-
cepts of pure reason, to which the senses furnish no corre-
sponding object. These are the ideas of the Soul, the World,
and God.
They are not mere fancies, but are supplied of
necessity by the very nature of reason, and refer to the whole
of the understanding as the immanent principles of its use.
They aim at the absolute totality in the synthesis of con-
ditions, attempting to carry the Hire mere synthetical unity,
which is realized in the categories, to the absolutely un-
conditioned. It is the function of these highest powers of
mind to impart to experience a direction toward a certain unity,
comprehending all acts in an absolute whole. Within the three
ideas there is a progression to the third, the supreme idea,
God. This is the concept of the "ens realissimum." It forms
the foundation of the complete determination of all tliat exists,
to v/hich all thought of objects must be traced.
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1^- . liiQ'tevifftf t^^errorioo erf^ lo t tri^uodT 10 .yiibXo'lrar-lIec edJ^ ss
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^aof i ejroiq;/Q odd odd od noiaaoT^onq a ai ©*isrfd aaoJbx
i
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^ndsixo daf£d XXa lo n<'- 'dariis'jodtJir ©doXqiiToo ©r'd lo (iotiobrvsol odd
.ooca-xd od dar.'n odoc(;do lo dd^-'/odd Xla doin'.? od
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This may seem to present an architectural perfection
of idealization. But the empiricist must call in question
even the modest regulative function of the three Ideas.
According to our thesis, this speculation not only goes far
beyond the validation offered by available data, but presents
an essentially unreal type of explanation.
It does serve to show that the natural course of
reason is tov/ard comprehension of the fullness of life, and
philosophy is called upon to secure the widest possible
integration of experience. The several sciences are limited
to restricted areas of experience, and yet critical, systematic
thought is continually raising problems which open out to the
Great Universe with which reflective thought he-s to do. If
there is a universality in the thought-ideal which urges to
the transcendence of the limits of scientific method, philosophy
may v^ell stress the values of acquaintance, study the scope
and nature of civilization, classify the sciences, labor on
the out-lying problems of valuation, and persuade its earnest
followers to bov/ humbly before the ultima.te mystery of existence.
Many religious thinkers are in the habit of using the
word "God” as a sort of incantation by which to exorcise the
such concept or doctrine
mystery. It should be evident that is an experimental
is a symbolic
idea, subject to error. It idea in consciousness,
and must be critically examined. As a symbol it gathers up
many valuations, and synthesizes them in one major concept.
But it enjoys no peculiar felicity nor special privilege.
Our age is notably interested in the theory of
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reality, V/liat is knowledge, and what can we know? It is
becoming increasingly clear that in experience v/e have a valid
acquaintance with reality, with the actual being of the
universe. At the same time it is rather evident tliat we can
not photograph, define or fixate this substance of things.
I might suggest that we are in functional contact with reality,
but can not quite capture nor comprehend it.
It is not possible to look reality in the face. It
is only as reality turns its face this way and that, that we
may expect to catch a glimpse of its profile. Now this facial
outline is interesting enough, and attractive enough; but it
is not reality’s whole and proper self. What is given is seen
in a glance, in many glances; these tell much, but the much
is suggestive rather than entire. The "face of the whole
universe" is turned somewliat away from us, and is looking
forward: the significance of its expression is due largely
to what it sees, and what it sees is yet to be.
What is truth? That use of the term which identifies
it with reality is to be deprecated. Knowing implies a real
duality. Truth is our working knowledge, or tentative com-
prehension, of reality. Elementary psychology indicates that,
even in the process of sensation, our perceptions are not
strictly "representative" of the real v;orld. The sentimentalism
that talks grandly of Truth is decidedly futile, and somewhat
fatuous. Our judgments are held to be true in so far as they
render a coherent and usable account of our experiences in any
particular exigency. But they do not enable us to pigeonhole
‘ii ?wgi'I2£ J£ir[w iMt-A Bt SBcT/i
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being, nor to tie up reality in packages.
Our glimpsing of reality is dependent on the
psychological lav^s of attention and interest. We can gaze
on the face of the universe only from some selective vantage
point. Our view is largely determined by our angle of vision,
our interest, our preparation. This angle puts the face of
reality in profile; its features can be observed only in
contour
.
We should not quarrel with this situation. We are
thrice happy if the universe is silhouetted for our private
delectation. Our little truth is not reality, for its meaning
and its mystery are elusive indeed. They escape our fond
examination. But we may say that our small truth envisages
the profile of reality. For the silhouette does not offer
itself as the total view of the matter.
Moreover, this view that we enjoy is our own under-
standing (partial and yet practical) of an order of being
unthinkably complex. This forward-looking coimtenance, this
contour of creation, has all the significance that v;e can
take into account. In fact it is infinitely meaningful (in
promise). Looking upon it, we grow humble; and it may be that
we shall become patient, and then increasingly confident in
our modest (and yet perhaps amazing) insights.
If the nature of the ultimate reality is defined, the
be
definition can be only hypothetical. It is to/feared that it
is unreal, and therefore futile, and therefore deceptive. A
fair estimate of science would have to hold that, if science
exalts the powers of mind, if offers no evidence and little
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GW iarfi eonaol’iin ’ i a o ii XXa axui tnoiiaoTO to Twoixtoo
ni) Ix/t^nifi/sefli YXeiincitTi si ix iojst rrl .irwocos oini oxfai
i^rfi ocf v^Ti ix bma ( eXdnxrrl wot,?^ ©w ^ix noqn gni.'iooil .(eainoTq
nX i xebJ^trroo vX^tnlGjBOToni ttarii baje ^irralicq ecooed IXaxfa ow
.R.trfjiarfi (gnisjania Qqx>.XT:oq te'i^ brrja) Jaebont two
en': ^bonitef) «X >4iiXxi©T aiaptiilw erfi to eTt/iiirc edi 'il
iX t'GTB6'3\oi oi . XisoiiedioqYd ’tjXno ed nao xio iilniteb
’ A4 .eviiqooeb eTOToTodi bctjn ,eXxitr'i eTOleTaxIi brta
. XaeTrtw ai
r-
ooiitioe ti < isaXi bXod oi ovjad blwow ©Oiieloa to ©iaffixiee Tijst
if ;.
eXiiil bail ©onoj J ve on a'letto ti to CTewoq aifi eiXiixe ,
^ bL: ; . .. .. .q -
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indication of an immortality. Altho science is concerned with
the intimate v/’orkings of nature, it finds no trace of a
Consciousness in the universe. Kant held that the arguments
for and against the Soul, the V/orld, and God, could be conducted
with equal facility and formal conclusiveness by the Pure
Reason
.
Some thinkers would argue thus : In as much as the
physical order is made known only in consciousness, is it not
inevitable that it should be an expression of Consciousness?
For consciousness is the highest form of being; it discloses
the truest unity of being. For the quality of its oneness is
unique and penetrating; its unity is unparalleled in that of
which it has experience. It is a oneness within its various
activities, of which v;e may say (transferring the v/ords of
Anaxagoras), in each there is something of all. Here then we
have suggested the nature of absolute unity, which nay assemble
within its perfect meaning the lesser and inadequate meanings
of all other things. They would hold that reflection demands
as the necessary postulate of reason the ideal of being, the
spiritual World Ground. (To the empiricist, this is vain
speculation. Granting the uniqueness of human consciousness,
we can only accept it as we find it.)
This is the rationalistic method of tracing the inner
necessity of the way of reason toward its ideal. Borden Parker
Bowne has given a cogent statement of the felt necessity, that
is, cogent for the one v/ho grants the fact and the validity of
this felt necessity. The real crux of his argument is found
in the alleged inevits.bleness of the conviction. In his
.'iJiw 3i oriiLA . m& lo aol^fBolbctt
a 'to eo&'i* on sfrrtl'i J"! <o'ix/J‘sn ‘io ©J’aaiJ'rtl erli
i
‘
t.^rte.Tsir:;':© aili inaX . ©s'sevim; ©rid' ni rsaena'/oioorroO
i^iouJ'SiCo ©T ^-Xiroo ^Jboi) bci~ ,‘jC'ioW ©r:i i.CyoS ©rid- ^arrla^a f>fta 'lol
j'Y.cr^ orfj ’;rf aeerreTiai/1 0:100 Xacr'io'i tna •^dilloa'l Xjrr/po ticMvr
.“loeaoH
I
ofid ajs doui.: aa itl : oirouQ oiaTirxirf^ ©rT03
ton Ji af
,
soOiSOLTOxoanoo ni. '^Xrto nworoC ©fcarn ai leJbio laoia-^dq
»-
^ ::athiai-oioanoD rfciaee'rqx© n« od* fc-Iuoila tx tjarit oXdstivenx
»•
<4
aaooXoaiL ti ;^xtKi 'io ir.iol tae.iairi ©rii al eaenGJJOXoanoc 10 '?
ax caaneno adX 'io ^JlXj3ixp e;id 10*5 .^rtiecf 'lo d'aou'id orit
lo .taiit rri it*- CeXrfi'iJt^qnfr ai ^d-inu a- 1 ^gnidfiid-eneq bnja ©x/pirrxr
ei/o riBv six itirid-iw aaeaeno si dl . ©orieiieqAe aerf di rioirlw
lo eb'iOr: erii ^fflnelErfJSnd) "^jaa er, rioldn lo ^ aoxd-ividoxj
©w rrarid oisH . II« 'xc sniiide.iioa oi snerfd rioose ni
,
( ajB'ioajsxBnA
oXcrEi':aafi vxT! rioinw edL/Ioacfii lo onijdsn aild Jbod’aa.isiXB evjsri
a.Viiiseir 6d'jsxfpoiv©nl trxfi '^.veaef e:ld ,'jnir!Xi©.'!i doelnoq ad'i nixidiw
arn°LTOf) noidooXlon da it Xilo/i b. 'jOTi ei^iild lorido XIr lo
©fit , 3ni©c{ lo LBBtl affd iioaxso'i lo otaXxrdaoq '^naeaeoen ©rid ae
.ixirv QX eirit , d-aioinigcie orid oT) .bnxrcia bldoW iBU.fl'iiqa
.aaertanpioonoo namxd lo eoorreuplmd erld ^ridnanO . aoidalxrbeqa
.
(•di bnil 0w aa di dqaooa x-Cno njso ©<r
i jani orid lo Xoridoni t id'.ilanoidci ©rid ai aMT
lejr-xxil neino-l .Xx^ebi adi b*ieir.-od rtcciXiai lo '^ew ©rid lo-
fjxiJ ,\it '3Beo©r£ dXel ©rfd lo dnoaedada drrsgoo © rtevlp, bbcL qctuoS
lo '^dioiXjev tsrid inx? do-sl ©uid adnai^g oriv; orro ©rid 10I dnegoc
V
biXLfoJ c.t drtoirttXii^ija airi lo .zw'zo I.Jei ©iil’ . ’{diaaooerr diel airfd
oi:I nl ... idoivnco ©rfd lo cionelrf^divoni boseIXs ©rfd ni
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"Theory of Thought and Knowledge," he examines the categories
(immanent norms by which the mind proceeds in defining and
relating its objects), and holds that they are insufficient
to explain thought and the reality knov/n by thought, that we
are sent toiling back along a line of infinite regress until
thought is elevated to the conception of self-determining
personality as the supreme principle in causation and being.
The dialectic of thought necessitates the affirmation of
purposive causality, that is, divine Intelligence.
How if this argument does not produce in the mind
of the critical student an inevitable conviction, then the
statement becomes pointless (at least in the opinion of such
a student). 1^e may admit that this line of reasoning is
really the dialectic of thought, and yet find it necessary to
maintain that it is nothing but dialectic
. viewi
considered mentality in its mature express j.on, hence/
mind as a finished entity; it is the intellectualistic viev/
•of mind. I would hold that thought can be adequately viev;-ed
only in evolutionary process, that thought is an instrument
in a complicated biological and social adjustment. With his
perfectionist viev; of the mind, Bov/ne argued that thought is
in unstable equilibrium until it rises to theological specula-
tion. V/ith the evolutionary theory of mind, we v/ould expect
thought to be of limited range, and to have an essentially
tentative character. Hence we would hold that thought fulfills
its true destiny when it seeks to make its adjustments in
empirical, albeit in idealistic, terms. When it violates
empirical requirements, thought is in imstable equilibrium.
eri > aorflitaxe *\ ogbelTconM bns ic xioerfT”
f^rrjs :JCitcit'\i>i} iti «l>oeoo^q brrLn erf^ aoJLrtw x6 Bu'^n.on inon^imi)
ir.fjxc L‘lljjant Q'lr. fii>Ior! ftn^ BstX
ew wfftili ^v/fOCL-^ on^ Jbn-3 nlAlqxo oi
eae'?:50 'f ©Jiitilai lo octtL b 3itp[fi ^Joacf gnXXXoi xtn©3 eiB
vJf:j;^^i:trrr^.^o^-.‘tIoa lo noiSq^onoz orl.t oc>' beJ'BVele aJt IrfscJodJ-
I
.r'-ii‘3d Mb ctol.t-BBssBo at elqtoataq tmeaquQ oii.f as -^J-lI^oaieq
Ic cro -arfj aeljoJ^iaeooorf qrCi^orlJt lo oXioelalfo orfT
. ocao^i o-'ivii) ^ai: evXEoq*^ii/q
Arrian ail ^:t oo.aJ.otq ion BeKjX- jtrQf^/^is dxxii li; woTi
e'ii rrexii .n'Xioivnoc eldfiJtivorci hb inoix/^Ja Ijeoilino orii lo
lo no ini [0 arfi at ioael ijs) aa^Iinioq aocooecf in&aoijsia
Ri grtinoa.so'i lo oniX aidi .terfi SlailyB \Bin eU .(inebuia a
ot ’^'laaaeoon ii £>nil is’^ ixia
< tdanoili lo olSoelslb orfi '^Ilaen
bowetv .oliooXaib incf ^Mioxi ei iX ijadi niainXaci
Veono/i ^rfoiaaa'rrra ©lU’.ta.T: eix at vlilainod bonebianoo
' eawoS
vielv ot JutIbu foot leJat ^(^rlJ et tX i^^iiine beilainil b bb bctitn
bowoiv xXoijeiipoba ocf nao iacuL blori Muot/ 1 .bitiia lo-
inofrfxjiiaiii na aX irf.'jt/odi j^swii ,aa©oc'iq \rT:anoXix;Xo>v9 rtX \Lao
n ti .r'7
,
in cj3 iBXooa fMia XaoX^pIoXX boiaoilqmoo a nX
aX ixi^uoiii iifii Jbotra^a env/od Mi lo vreXv. iaXfioXi ool-ioq
-aXt/oeqa Lz:otjio£oQiii o.t aesXrx. ii XXixixr iio/X'icfXIXx/p© aXdaiam; at
ioeqxe bluow ew «ftf:Xm lo %''iaedi ’(‘'^xitoXioIovo odi riilW .noXi
YlX^XirToaao aa ovsd oi bn : tOSjuBi beiXinXI lo acf oi Jd^worfi
elXXlDw'l id.’i^orti iadi bloii bXnow ew aonoH . leio^'i.Bdo ©vXi^inoi
at aii’i©miai/(,bj3 QiX oi adaea iX nedw ^nXiaob ooni aiX
aainXoXv iX aocVXl- . J^iTCoi ,oXiaXX^ebX al iXsuIa ^XBoi'iXqrao
. nw/X'j.c XXi*-*v^) ‘^IdBiiiau at al irX'^iodi ,air:o£iiaT;Xup©T: LBotatqae
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Surely it is not such a tragic fate to recognize an
ultimate Mystery, and to wait, with awed mind, before the
splendid spectacle of the universe. This means much to the
poetic temperament. As we have seen, mind has been evolved
in the long course of evolution as an instrument of practical,
social and emotional ad jif;Jiment . Every line of inquiry and
appreciation leads to mystery. Humbly to recognize this
Mystery is human blessedness. It must be accepted, unless
we desire to indulge in pure speculation.
Acceptance of life is the appointed lot of us all
who have been called to the task of living. "I accept the
universe," was a favorite utterance of Margaret Fuller, doubt-
less spoken with some dignity. Some one repeated the remark
to Thomas Carlyle; his sardonic comment was, "Gad, she*d better I"
To be sure, ideals of reverent appreciation have made
their appearance in the given world order. These values have
emerged in evolution. To many, this consideration justifies
the spiritualistic hypothesis. If so, it remains tentative,
and not necessarily logically valid.
J. A. Leighton maintains ("The Field of Philosophy,"
p. 370) that evolution is meaningless unless there be an
enduring teleological order of meanings. A statement like
this seems to me subtly disingenuous : as tho one would prove
by insistence (that is, by grandly assuming to be obvious)
that which is difficult to prove by logic. Leighton^s asser-
tion is far from being axiomatic, as he takes it to be. Our
needs and desires are relatively enduring; they are sufficiently
stable (quite apart from the presence or absence of cosmic
r£jd esirr^ooTsT dcfsl ij lioi/a Son ai SI ^^C- ";i3
towJQ oJ Jbrw ei
“iic? r-sT ahi’X • '^m'vL.'ssj eds lo olojoioeqa MbrroIqB
- need . /^r{ Iiriirr .rrecc evxirf ow aA . dn&njanoqno^ oideoq.
t lici'oenq le ir’i n. aa n idij'Ioye lo eannoo erfd ctl
i. ';;*a/iJenX Jo s>n±£ .;iov:' . dnex lBftoicJ-<Mi© hna iBiooe
©nJLLi; 0 001 oi .v/r ^Jb 'ci od aixaeX itoidBioonqqB
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^
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£££! p.ij io iol br ^r.Ioara edS t:b elll 'lo eonsSqeooA
odJ sq^oosi X*' lo CsBi odd oJ beXiBo neocf eviid oriw
'SiSuot CIjlt^ d 9 '‘X-;;3'iBlt lo oonsnoddu oJinoval s. qbw ”, ©eneviruj
i?n add ^ ’d^ecron ono ewoS .-^iingit erroa ddXw noxoqa eaol
: iSod b* . t' st')'* ,aBir ine.'^noo ohtobnAH ^id ^oX^InaO ejemodT od
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ovad a^iJZtiV ocu-/' ,'i-jbno bXnoir novX^ tcCd ni oonBTaeqqB nierfd
e»-'.’ iida*!’; noidiins:;- jnoc ""addd '.rr o? .rroidnXova ni be.v*;©/!:©
,=•*'1 Join's -/ axiisnon ‘i ,on i-. .fi’’^r-'T:zqxd oXdailBxj’dinl re edd
.^;IIbv vXIjoX^^oC vIXiBOoeoerf don bnjs
\;dcq0 30lid^. lo blsi'-i op": "} i liBdniBn noSn -LeJ .A .u
no ed onOiKt QCiOXmy 'riaoX^rrii ./jorr ad npldj/love darU ( 0V5 .q
edl,; dnaaodBda /- . a?:xrL'iBJ:*rrr io neXno IjeoXp.oXoeCed sni'xx.'bno
MVO'iq tXnov: eno odt ea ; anounegniaXL ^Xddna 03 od araeoa aXdd
(ai/odvdo Od oj 3r:i:nu;s8B
< 6 -^ djadd) oonednioni erf
-n-teaB Q* rtoS:iul^.T .’^tyyL evon • od dluoXllil' b1 doldw j«dd
n/*. .erf od dd QQsCBi oif a/.* , cid/y!ic ii:.a i;nio.r nonl 'iBl ai noXd
Xdiieicdliya ei-o '^odd j:^-.Xn:/hne {XoviJBle'r o'r.o aeni^eb bfixs aroon
oi^'. ' jo lO eoneaefB no 0 meaenq orfd , •oil doeoB odxi/p) eXrfx da
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corollaries) to give evolution a genuine meaning. Any v/ork-
able standard ms.y be selected or pragmatically determined, by
reference to v/hich the evolutionary process may be evaluated.
That evolution is not valid or valuable in an absolute-
idealistic sense, if Absolute Idealism be denied, is too
obvious to require assertion.
V/e may take note of a suggestive discussion of religion
in E. Hooking’s "The Meaning of God in Human Experience.”
He states (p. 1-26) that religion is in part symbolical of
truths beyond-reason. But religion (he continues) is alto-
gether relevant to conduct. Hence reason and beyond-reason
would seem to be not independent functions, and all truth
would enter into the one system of the world. Religion is
concerned with present values and with the Other-world.
Religion can be understood best in terms of fertility, rather
than of utility. For it is the "mother of the arts,” remaining
the more fruitful for its fruitage. It has an inalienable
quality, a perpetual supremacy. It ever retains the primitive
sense of reality’s integrity. Religion is communication with
the Whole .
Commenting on this passage, it is notev/orthy that the
most miscellaneous benefits are assigned to religion, thus
conceived in too generous and hopeful a fashion. For example,
the author remarks that creativity comes from sensation warmed
and wet by the sky of religion. This is a confusion of the
psychological and the poetic points of view. It v/ould be more
satisfactory, starting with the concept of sensation, to stay
with the psychological terminology of inventiveness. Again,
'{r . !Vflrseer: u noUt-Iovo ovIit; oj ( aeZ'isIIOTOo
,L:>r'lz:'*^Siib v^llaol^^ri^s'xq ^o bedoel^Q od" '^jorr b'uabrrs.tQ oldo
. ocf vTaeociq ^'ijs.'ioi^ulove Oiid rfc±rfv oi eaae'te'ia'i
- oa rJ: j ' TiSijIav ao I^iX^v ^orr el noiJ^wIov© djsxfT
; ocJ^ »3iX e-i ifctliiwi-I ^^^lo^rcfA 11 ^aenee oi^ailaebl
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. ocriwA’ioq a r iHt/H fT.t bOo lo ^irteel! eilT" a’gnlxooK .3 .7? ni
*10 l^solZodci'ia j'ssq rfi ai noi;ii.IO'i (dS-X .q) aecffioa eH
-odn ui ( set/rrxJrioo •bit!) rjoi^rUIoT JJuS .noa^et-'bno^ed adJu'ii
nO’Jt^oi-Jx'iO’C-^ nOSiao'i eo-TaH .d‘OJ/bfroo irravolei *T9££deg
:ilu^^ L^b bnsi ^9nctJ Ztojj'i inabnaaeixil .ton ad od ayoe bl^jov
ji noig-iXe.q . bX*iOTr erf»t neX^ave oao sr'X oJrti ^oX^Io blifOTr
, 'r'lor-'ieiid^C oxli rfdlw brt.s aei/Iisv Jrreae'iq ifSir/ bectieonoo
'xed.JB*i lo ameX ni X’e^cT boo^o'iebfUf ed n^jo nolgilefl
rxirfiB.TT©'! erf:f “io 'leiiXodr" erXt al *xo3 ft/uli
aIdjsrteiXmx rt-t; aarf ^ . d^AjXXu'iT: aix ‘lOx oiors exlJ
avXJ-imi'iq -ilX --tBiO'i '1 - 7© JI, . ^ ^'^X^XXjaup
diiw noiqAoi.Tf.'-xatoo ai noi ’to eanea
. eloflW ©fix
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r ?‘'qaLGj:e 'Xo3 . 'lOXila^Vt a iLrlsqori fxt-i: aao'xeno;^. ooX rrX bevXeonoo
beniew r!oiq3ar[0o noTl: qoctoo '\i.tXvX-t#*e'io B:['i/xne^ 'xoditr^ add
©iii ‘10 n*: iau^ioo s ai- alr.r . rroX.-’^XI'? .' “>0 ©dX
-ttf X©?/ bn/J
eion 0*i bXi/ow il . -..elv xo aiatcq oiJocq o*lu fvri* iaoXgoXorio^eq
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he refers to the cruder (primitive) mind that knows its own
integrity. It would help toward a more adequate understanding
of religion to say: "Back to the animistic mind that enjoys
an undifferentiated culture." The exalted diction is out of
place in an analytic undertaking. It appears to try to float
a reasoned argument on the vmve of an unsuspecting emotion.
Eis discussion (op. cit., p. 23-24) of freedom as a
reasonableness which refers everything to a source of its own
kind, and of Religion as the comprehensive irony of the world
tov/ard all Ov.'ns, is fascinating. However, one might search
for a certain operative unity in life (a system of varied
values) without involving (as an axiom) Religion, - with a
capital "R" . His advocacy of religion is rather too naive.
It is an example of his proneness to arrive at a too early
synopsis, before adequate analysis and synthesis. The method
appears to result from a characteristic habit of mind of the
author ' s
.
J. A. Leighton, in "Man and the Cosmos," (p. 476-500)
maintains that truth as a value is basic to all other values
.
It is the most comprehensive (reflective) harmony between
conscious life and the cosmic order. The cosmic standing of
all values depends on the conservation and increase of reflec-
tive life. The supreme principle of continuity would be an
over-self. We can not knov7 the general structure of the
cosmos. But this hypothesis is based on the supposition that
the realm of intelligent meanings can not be sundered from the
total character of the real. Selves respond to the incitements
afforded by the energizing life of the over-soul, and so become
nr;o Btt av/ocn* tnta ( eviJ^iai'xq) •30>*>£rro erW oi a'l^le'i 9x1
Q'lobrtJ/ s-Jjat/pHr-B e^OL^ £ Jbi-fiwocf qioxl feXi/ow
G’iOtrf© l^riin ol^cInilffj3 erl^ oi xo^a" tvaa oi rtoXp.i.ia'i “io
•io j-ixo oi rtoXJclf) Ivjil^Q 0xlT “.gtjjJXjjo be^aXXfie'xa'tlitrcu n©
.t;ec :i <:i e^xidoq^ Jl . 3fIi::^©:^'Ie£;^^/ oiX*{Ij8^ta .xtls rrJt eoalq
. 'loi^c'vie lyii^oeqeuoixfJ rr© lo ©vbw ad-f no cfrromir'.'ija t-enosas'i a
£ ar. £nof>©o'i'3: '^o (^S~^:2 . ^ ..tio .to) xjoiamxooiJb aiH
n 70 -;.tf “io eo^soQ o ^irltv^neve a'rwlo'r rloi.lw aaenolcf.anoaflo'i
bL’zo^ Gncr lo vnon: evi: irtaaongnioo -^-Xt aa nolT^lIeH lo L-rt^ ,Jbxrl3f
nonces oxr' ^novewoH . gni^snloes*!: gX ^anvrO ILjz Jd'ixjwoJ’
nainjov lo a) ©Ixl x;i evlianaqo nla^neo a nol
a rfi^r - ,xtoi3ll9K (noiicc na aa) [^ivlovni ixJorfiXw (eeulav
. evijsn ooJ 'xeriJan ei rioisilan 1o '^oaoovoa olH . la^Xqao
*^Ji^a6 oc t B iB evi.'i'xa oq Baenaxionq aid 'lo elqaax© na aX
^)CI^^3^ offT . °laod3n'{^ aia'clana eiaLfp0^a ©’lo'iedr ^oiaqorrca
odi "lo fcrtxii lo iicfa:! oii^.i'ioJ’oa'ia.io a "Tonl J’luson enaGqqs
. a'norl^Jcja
.q) "^ao.-.GoO odl rtaM” trtl ‘7no^d-BLo.: . .X.
. a ex/I at* nw.iio Ila ol oi tacf af e;^JLav a aa rlJoriJ Jarfq anIaJnlaci
no©«r^o<I vnoLinaxl ( 9v’JI:.toeXlon) eYi^n^.Xo'tcmoo J’ao.Ti Btii el 11
lo oir^eoo eri^ .noJbno oLzeoo ©rf^^ Xina elll ex/oloanoo
-oellen lo ©eaenonl fcna noiiav'TOsrtoo orT.^ no ifcneqel) yjoi/Iav Ila
ct^ oq f?Ix/OT. '\jixirrrii:'' o lo e.Xqiofflnq omonox/e erfT .©111 ©vIJ’
e.Tj ':o I/in9ri9’> ©xi-t nonjl fon fiao ©!? .'^fea-novo
ia.ii fioiileoqqx/a ©xii no leaacf n/ alaaxl-oq’^d al.iJ ixxS .eosiaoo
©rii ujonl boref^nx/R ©d ion .teo airrlna^n Jnejilloinl lo alaon ©rfi
einecreironi: edl oi laen a©vX»5’-l . .'!aon Ofli lo ‘le'ioartaxlo laioi
€«oo0d oa ^na tIx/c.7-i©vo ©i!'^ lo ©III ^TlsI^nerio orii feelnolla
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partial incarnations of its spirit. The latter is universal
and individual, for universal meanings are immediately known.
The universal Self has intuitive knowledge of us. As the
absolute center of values, he transcends in worth all finite
selves.
Leighton’s discussion of selves as partly things and
partly persons is interesting. If, as things, we are enmeshed
in the motion-system of the spatial-dynamic world, we may the
better understand the shortcomings of our psychophysical life.
Hov/ever, one feels that the author stresses too far the
physical eddying of the cosmical energies if, as he maintains,
nature in its individual forms and in its totality is the self-
manifestation of spirit. On the basis of his main thesis, he
would scarcely have the right to sketch in this manner the
impermanence of "pseudo-individuals.”
Our alleged "immediate knov/ledge" of another self
(op. cit., p. 492) should have a more critical exam.ination.
I am considering first the epistemological aspect of the
problem. The implication is that the normal acquaintance
v/ith another person is a sort of magical insight or miraculous
comprehension. To be sure, the process of inference is not
deliberate. But it is as certainly an act of mediated percep-
tion. We have become very expert in this reading of personality
signs, and features have come to be rich, suggestive tokens
of chiaracter qualities. The "intuition" doubtless rests on
instinctive tendencies (the social sympathies, for example),
and perhaps reflects a racial aptitude in reading facial
expressions. But a swift judgment is not "the imimediacy of
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his discussion of the intercoinmunicat-
ive experience is very much worth while. In regard to the
ontological implication, we must note that the ease v/ith
v/hich the imagination (and memory) operate, in the recognition
of persons, has induced the author to have recourse to mystic
formulas. The specific point should be stated thus, explicit-
ly: The intimacy of friendship is a.n immanence of meanings;
it is a logical, not an ontological, immanence. The experience
is possible because knowledge is the knowing of something not
the knov^er. And friendship implies an expertness in the art
of symbolism. Thru the activity of the imagination, a sign
re instates a mental con^!^|^ct, with opulent va^lues.
In private conversation with the writer, Professor
G. A. Coe has maintained that the God-friend is an essential
postulate to complete the fragmentary circle of experienced
(human) friendship, thus making the latter intelligible. I
did not believe that this reasoning was logical. Does not
experienced friendship have an immediately ascertainable value?
Is not the only known species of friendship incomplete and dis-
appointing? Does the yearning for an ideally completed circle
prove that the perfect circle exists?
Let us turn to the Christian religion, and seek to
gain a sympathetic understanding of its objective, appealing
symbolism. How shall we interpret the v;ide-spread use of
Jesus' conception of God as Father? The poet may express his
vision of the ideal in its elusive onv/ard flight in som-e such
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horizon and the outgoing of the heart eager to lose itself
in the great tide of Life flov/ing everywhere. But this is
not the reality. It is daring imagery descriptive of that
v;hich is known only in the immjj^^ate experience of learning,
of loving, of serving. (In literal' language, religion is the
projection of some sort of ideals, and the attempt to be loyal
in their service.)
If this experience is v/orthful, the presumption is that
its expression can be transferred to the common life of all,
and that there it can be reinterpreted in terms of everyday
living. In that case the translator will make use of the
most exquisitely tender phrase, and will draw from the most
meaningful of experiences, to impart his ideal conception
to the imagination and the life of the listener. Now friend-
ship and family affection are the richest and rarest and most
subtly suggestive of all the elements of daily life. As is
"ideal” a quickening symbol to the philosopher, as is wonder
in the presence of mystery to the poet, as is Beauty to the
artist, so are love of friends, consecration to noble service,
v/orship of the hypostatized goodness of the world, in the
form of concrete, personal imagery, to the common life.
In every set of terms, and in every one of the corre-
sponding experiences intim.ated, we have disclosed the same
generic type of reality, the essence of religion. It is
the opposite of self -ness, of factioal, insignificant existence.
It is the life of self-s'urrender ; it is the devoted life, the
striving for the realization of fair ideals .
Hence, when the translation of the poetic symbolism
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for the ideal is mde, the legitimate terminology for the
highest values will be that of friendship and the family
relationships. The supreme conception of religious experience
v/ill be God, and God will be Father. This symbolism taken
literally has no cogency; but it is helpful imagery. Neither
is ’’the open Horizon,” nor ’’the tide of Life," literally true
as used by the poet. But the idealistic experience symbolized
in the imagery is real, and is the same in essential nature in
both cases. The language is not literally correct, tut is
adequ8.tely suggestive. When thought, aspiration and purpose
move in the realm of everyday living, the ideal may be
hypostatized as God the Father. This will serve a practical,
social need, and will be satisfactory according to the language
of symbolism.
Most men have not outgrown the more naive symbolism.
It stands so directly and simply for an experience of profound
and enduring meaning. This recognition should not deprecate
the value of more mature and artistic (if somev/hat
sophisticated) religious symbolism. "Religion becomes
as natural and vital in a democratic and scientific age as
in a patriarchal, custom-ruled era. The same will-to-live
,
to lay hold upon life-giving powers, which in primitive
groups fashions ceremonials, with their dramatic action,
myth, m-agic and emotion, may operate also in modern life
thru the sense of a far vaster social whole. V/hy should
not the le.tter also produce pageants, festivals, poetry and
music, uttering and elevating its ideal life in powerful
forms of art?" (E. S. Ames, "The Psychology of Religious
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Experience,” p. 414) Y/e have the beginnings of this forn of
artistic expression. Eov;ever, neither the mental clarifica-
tion nor the felt need is great enough to produce v/idely its
beautiful ritual, its thir thrilling symbolism.
With this understanding of the value and limitations
of symbolism, we may assert that, from the point of view of
formulation and ^dance, thought in the development of ideals
is primal. This is not to pre judge our estimate of the ideal-
izing process considered from other points of view, nor is it
to be taken as positing the preeminence of thought except
from this angle of approach. I sliall discuss this problem in
section 5
.
I have been concerned Yilth the enterprise of critical
philosophy, not v/ith uncritical religious belief . Nothing in
this section is to be taken as gainsaying the right of the
individual to construct his own doctrines of hope and belief,
in the light of that which he may deem valid experience or
authentic revelation.
3. Nature and implications of ideals of esthetic
appreciation
Feeling, in general, is the peculiarly vitalizing
quality in consciousness. We may say, for our purpose, that
it is a mental state whose chief components are systemic
sensations, merging with the hedonic, affective qualities of
pleasantness and unpleasantness . This subjective experience
modifies perception. Fee ling-affect ion combines with cogni-
tions to form the ampler emotions, which are modified by
kinesthetic experiences and developed by volitional expression.
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When emotions are connected with acquired modes of behavior,
and are organized around an object, person or situation, we
have sentiments. Of course ideation is important in this
process, as v/e have seen in the section dealing with the
psychology of ideals
.
Our preferences are largely determined by tempera-
mental tendencies, and by imitation and suggestion. In its
higher forms, esthetic appreciation is an ideal development,
in which the emotional type of experience holds the central
place. This is the core of esthetic valuations, altho all
forms and phases of the psychic life are involved. In the
intuition of sentiment life is recognized as possessing its
intimate and compelling vitality.
In expansive mood, thru social suggestion or
philosophic contemplation, our emotions may center in the
natural or human environment, largely and impressively
conceived. Thereupon our sentiment will assume (in imagina-
tion) cosmic significance.
The nature lover may find this subtle yet compelling
intimation in the mysterious murmurs of the forest brook, in
the quickening caress of the spring zephyr. In the fair
suggestiveness of the wild-flower’s charm there is (to him)
much more meant than is physically embodied: he feels the
presence of an evasive Something which still escapes his
troubled gaze. And in all the elusive loveliness of nature’s
manifold forms, the vanishing spirit of its beauty compells
him to exclaim, with Faust, "V/here shall I grasp thee,
infinite nature, where I”
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Let us consider more closely esthetic idealization
as found in the experience of a lover of natiare . Such a one
will confess a relationship more intimate than that based on
observation of growth and becoming, or the physical inter-
v/eaving and interflow of energy, more intimate because charac-
terized by the consciousness of oneness T/ith nature.
The devotee may thus express his rapture; Freely
accepting her generous invitation to comradeship, I no longer
perceive, but only feelj I do not observe and know; I participate
and enjoy. Joy is unpremeditated, and pleasure free from the
calculation of results. In the bright, bracing, before-break-
fast hour, how good it feels in the lungs; how the dew sparkles
and the sun warms! Everything thrills and tingles. The chest
expands, the eyes sparkle v/ith the eyes of the morning, - I jump,
I run, I laugh. The communion of sorrow is more deeply initiative
than the play of lighter happiness. In her somber mood nature
speaks to me in a more compelling intimacy. In the joyous hours
of sunshine and flowers and singing birds, it is I and nature;
I come to her, and welcome her, receiving her gladly. Yet I
condescend; I choose to forget my more important interests for
a time to become the consenting admirer, the amused, the de-
lighted. In the storm - on a melancholy autumn afternoon -
beneath a tov/ering cliff - on a still, snowy hill-side - by the
shore of the sea, there is a difference. Now nature is command-
ing or she is mysterious; she awes the spirit. She may soothe
or quicken, but she will touch the reverence. It is now nature
and I. A vast pov/er surges about me; I am alone with it. And
if so be that I am worthy, I may lose myself in it . I forget
arto 3 ilo'J" . o^iiJ^jEKt ‘io 'layoX a 1o eofieiiaqxa eMii al UvJO^l as
xto /.>OBJScf rrsr!-t eiJsmJttnx e'lon qirlartoXJ’sIo'i s aaolnoo Iliw
-tcJ'rtX i.soxa"^;.(q ofii "lo , 3fiXnooe^cf tos to noXJ‘sv*ioado
-os-i^o oaL-^vj-id R^sc£l<riTJ: O’lon '.voXt'ieinX Jbfts ;yi.Jtva 6'w
, o''iiJ‘jarj i£iiw aaenorto to aa©nGi;oXo^oo eiU i^esiioX
'^leort'? : aiLriq^'i oirf sso’iqxs esL/rld y,s£j eoXo^reXs odr
i^*'3noI on X ^qidQofosTtioo Oit ncft&a^lyai ajjonofiaji ^er^ anl^qeoos
Ovtacioid’i.^q I : ^oxaf Lit.M ©•'/nead’o Xoc? I xleet xXno iJjcf. ^evieoioq
R< •= ed-J- ctont &'u/as©Ic: Jbfis ^fject-sdiooinanqn;/ aX :;ns
-




> acyi.r'rjoqa w©£» o.dX ‘^axs^sx tii aleet tl Jboog wod ^nt/oxl Xast
y-
.
'j dsoxlo ©dT .aoXartiJ ins aXIinfli aaidi^nova I annsw itx/a odi £)ns
,qir::xf; I - ,3x1X1x1012 edd to aoijo eriX dXXv/ ©Idisqa 8©;^© edX ,aJbnsqx,e
©vXX,&X. XaX yXqooJ!) ©lom ai T/onoe to noinuiactoo ©rlT .d3JU'sX I ,m/i I
©i/xXjTirt jbooci lecfx.ioa lod nl . uaenXqqjad laXdsXX to ysXq odX risdi
j‘, 8U/o;I oilX ii' . vr.!iJ^X ,-^XIl9qi20o ©lOfli s nX ©cr oX adseqa
: o*y/X^i r:3 I aX XX taJbiXcf sftXsixia X>n4_aiewoXt bns ©nXdarora to
I XeZ .yXX>«X3 loxi '^fi/Xeoai ,101! ecaoolow .f.Jrts ,i©d oX ©moo I
lOt oXasieXftX XnsXioqmX oioai*y!ii Xo^iot oX ©eoorio I : Jba©OR©X>aoo
-er ©dX ^f>0Gj;;me ©dX ,i©iXf2f?s ^niXaseno?^ ©dX ©moDOcf oX omXX- s
- noonioXts rtiixXui? yXodpujaXom o no ^ moXe odX nl ,t©Xd3XI
©dX yd - 6f;jf: a -XX id y^/ona ,XXiJe s no - ttXXo 311X1© v,oX a riXserred
-Xfi^omoo bX ©luX^n vroVi .oonaiettXX) a oX ©lorfX ,a9a af£X to ©loria
odtooa yasT ecEX: .XXiXqa adX a©Ks odB : emoXiaXcym aX erla io gnX
©luXsfx 7/on aX XI . ©onaiovei ©dX doiL^oX XXxw. ©da incf ,r£©jIoXyp 10
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self and am v^afted with the breeze or drift far away v; ith the
cloud
.
Here is .an esthetic idealization which can be under-
stood only sympathetically, and described only suggestively.
It can be analyzed and explained by the methods of psychology,
and in terms of its fundamental principles . In the light of
our investigation in II. B, and at the beginning of this section,
it is easy to see that we have here a series of hedonic exper-
iences which have evolved into an enveloping sentiment. This
has taken the form of an ideal abstraction in a way which we
have elaborately analyzed above.
In Augustine's "Confessions," we find an excellent
example of friendship idealization. Augustine was deeply affec-
tionate; he lived in the lives of his friends. Giving so much,
he received accordingly. It is remarkable to find how many fast
friends he won, binding them to him with bands of steel. As
Ruth testifies to the tender character of Naomi, so his friends
the
testify to/devoted nature of Augustine.
Alypius was one of his intimate companions. Of him
Augustine wrote; "He clave to me by a most strong tie." At the
death of this friend Augustine "bore about a bleeding and
shattered soul, impatient of being borne by me; yet where to
repose it, I found not." Almost distracted with grief, he v/ent
to Carthage v/here he found solace and refreshment in new friends,
with whom "the tongue, the eyes, and a thousand pleasing gestures
were so much fuel to melt our souls together, and out of many to
make but one." ("The Confessions," VI .26)
His heart was most beautiful in its filial devotion.
rLil^ 'f,afra 'lo esosicl ^.b Ixib ties
. buoLo
‘-^&bnLf ocf ^150 Aiolilw oiituX^o© iSB. ai s'!©!!
.\:X©v±Jno3^3 Yino X)Odi'ios©f) fvi£ »v£lxjoi:X6JJ-JB<xcnja ^Ino jbooia
i-^'-ojEodo'iQq *to ecC& v^d b^tB£q:^Q ©cf aeo XI
Jo .edJ riX . aoIqiorrX'tq lainof^jaliruit aXl “lo an'ieX ni Ma
tftoIXoen alrfi lo gri'lfiTig.ocf ©rCX Js iXLc »II ni /toiXaj’jlXa©vnl ni/o
'-'jtjf'X© olrfont?:! lo uo/;^©q © evad ©w* X^xlX eoa oX 'ieao ei Xi
re,' etiT'*' , Xrf©<2lXrx©B na oXnJ: i>evIov© ovfid dolifvt aoorzel
e-.i a nx no 1 ^/ob’xJadjb IsebI :ts 'to r/iol ©riX iiodaX ead
. eTrod‘^\ h<$siY.XBn-i^ x^^^^’todBle evad
Xneil'-'oxo fiB ixx-i €'\r ” » crroXaaQ'lrioO'* a’oitiXoi/^A nl
’CXqoefo aaw ai-UXat;5v,fA . toIXaslIaeXi qiaai^elix Jo tdqmaxe
,r{oi££:j oa gaiv.t*? . aXfiox'il aid 'io eavil edX rti dovil ©d ^eXjeitoiX
oaa!t r/od feoil oX sXcf,*‘of'ixiaio'i *ji XI , '^I^nid'ioooa i>evioo 0 *i ed
3A .leeXri to atn.3cf riXiw .-rid oX ciodX ^ibaicf ^rtOTj -ed airtei'il
niutoi'i'l -M oe ^ixro.ell to ’te^o^Ti-iIo TCeXneX exfX oX eeitiXaeX dXxrJI
. miiXaiJ^A to /)©Xo’"9L\oX ^tiXaeX
nid to . anoirraqxrtoo eX/r.TLXrti aid to ono oaw awi^^IA
©riX XA ”.©iX gnoiXa Xaoai jp. ^ oX cv-elo oH" :©Xoiv/ ©aixaiJ^uA
£)rt5 5ifxxjboolcf is Xi/od.: OT;cd” ©nio wgi/A dnoiit oixIX to dXi3©J&
oX o^0rfT^ Xs'c ; emrd :^nla<S to XaoiXijqail <Iuo8 JboaoXXjsda
1 Xnt»v7 ax ttsxns dXiw fcoXo-^'iXBix) XaonCA. ”.Xon btxxrot I ,Xi eeoqei
.
tCdnoiit won ni Xrreridao'itot baa ooaLoa brnroj &d ododr osxafXdaO oX
uo"xi/Xa ©;9 3r:>a,nelq irta>rx;odX s bna ^oov© odX tOXfyfbX edX ’ nodw .iXiir
oX to t'lodXogoX aIt:o>5 'ijo Xfaoi oX lojjt do>J.^ oa anew
(tip. T.V ", a-ioiaa^trioO adr”) ".©no Xi/d ©da*
noxXovoii XAilit sXi n.t IutxX;ia.OG jMon acw Xt-sod exH
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It is portrayed with consximinate beauty of feeling and delioacj’’
of touch in the story of his mother *s last hours. ”I closed her
eyes; and there flowed withal a mighty sorrow into my heart,
which was overflowing into tears." This is the sweetness of
love, altho it is deprecated unless it issues in the love of
God, the Creator of all. In this way his later friendships are
lifted up and purified. In the time of his carnal associations,
"these friends I loved for themselves only, and I felt that I
was beloved of them again for myself only." (VI. 26) Later,
his earthly comradeships ministered to his sense of God*s in-
timate presence. Augustine loved his God v/ith all the passion
of his ardent natinre . The glow of this warm devotion is re-
flected back over the whole story of his Confessions. In the
one consuming love of his soul all desires have been purified,
all passions purged. His very curiosity became a reverent
wondering and holy questioning: "Say, Lord, to me, thy suppliant,
say. All-pitying, to me, thy pitiable one -" (I. 9)
Here we have an ideal amplification of sentiment,
analyzed in the sections ;)ust noted, and more particularly
also in the passage on pages 98 to 101.
For our purpose it is desirable to return to the
esthetic idealization found in nature-worship. "By what name
they (lovers of nature) call the object of their contemplation
is in itself a matter of little imports^nce. V/hether they say
God, or prefer to say Nature, the important thing is that their
minds be filled with the sense of a Power to all appearance
infinite and eternal, a Power to which their own being is in-
separably connected, in the knowledge of whose ways alone is
safety and wellbeing, in the contemplation of which they find
a beatific vision. . . I can not believe any religion to be
healthy that does not start from Nature -worship ." (J. R. Seeley,
"Natural Religion," pt . I., p. 22, 24)
vDZoLI&t tar, o^jarasitfanoo d&t'n’ ^'e^i^tSaoci qI dl
idii ^daolo I” , »Ti;od ip-^l a’'i6i'I^0in aid To \ao^Q erli ni dotJo^ To
^ oirxi wonoa a ladiiw oeTToXl e"8i£^ Xica iae\:o
To ar^ehiifi.'VQ edd nl aid? ’.e'lae-t oicti sitiv.'oIT-'ievo aaw doiriw
To ovoi odi rci saiiaai di aaolm/ ^edaoonqoJb nl ;tl od^fXa ^sivol
ania aqlflabttoli^ neial aid aldl .-tl
^
...X^ To lOloeiO edl iboD
jaffoi J.ciooaae Xjtxn.eo aid To awil aa'l ill .hol 1:l*D!iq oaa qt/ iSe^tTlI
1 IXoT I bciB tvXno sevlt^a^^-rfi toT bevaX I aiinol'xT ©aori.t’^
.XV) TIoq-^.-^: ^oT «ii-. isoiil To bevoXecf- aow
-.xl a ’box To ©arxea aid Oit beto-Jali-'li 3ql.de eb^s'imoo old
A^lanaq edi Ila riSti? bOf) aid bevol ©ctl u ai/twA , abneae'iq ©laiall
-©1 ol rjol jovoXs A-?/i3'.7 aldl To V0I3 ecll' . ntirljart Irxeb-is aid To
a/ll nl . nxTOiaaoTnoo aid To 75'iola olorlw siil novo belooIT
t-OelTioi/q ft0©cf ov^irf eenlaeb XIjs Xxr^a ulri To evo£ jirrlcix/urroo ©xto
cTffeneven b aGuaood' qlleolii/o qnev eil- . na lea^q II
a
t.'x.ciXrjqiLfa qdl ol tlnoJ tV:33” ; -^/xlrol.+oftyp vljfi r.na gnlnobnow
(0 .1) (3fi0 cfXcf.aillq 'i;il ,3'. v*jj , '^nl’Cvdtq-iXA t^£C
^ixi'icliTt^a To nollaolTlXqsa I/^br rra ©w oneH
YXn^Xi/olln.aq wnon laixf^ eatotSoea eriS nl bes’^Xaaa
. XOI OT 89 3e^3q no ©:-jiJHEy3q udl nl oala
ofll g 1 nu-rlon ol oXcfanlaob al 11 t'il'ct nx/o no^'
,
.* on n v:Q” . qlx(anov,-~oTUjlBn nl bfti/oT ftollasllaebl oliorflod
fXollBiq.'nalnoo nladi To loecdo- axil Xiao (an/Jlan To onovoX) 'cadl
X-fi^ . oonalioqinX oXllii To noilact a TXooli nl oi
niodJ- ladi al In.^lnoqwl erfl cl noTonq no ,bo0
aorranBOqqB Xla pi newol a To oanea diiv, beiXlT od ainlxa
-nl eX ::^l0':r it no qlorfl xloldw 01 nxvvtoq a ,XBn'i©la bnB - oilnllrxl
,
«i ©noixi c3\;bw aaoda To egb^Xwordf oiCl ai: ^boloe^tnoo \:XcfanBq©e
, I^lT ^jerll dotdf/ To nollBXqnalnoo ©dl nX t.ytlodri«T.' Ins qleTBQ
i ocf oJ" .-lol^jllen eveXIeo im niio I . , .nolelv olTlTaocf a
T^eJooc ..: .T.) qLdfanOn'-unx/liJlt xaonT Inal^: Ion 000b ladl 'tdlXaod
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For V/ordsv/orth, the absorbing passion was Natijre
and her deeply significant beauty. He liked to sts^y, as he
tells us in ”The Prelude,"
"Hot with the mean and vulgar works of man.
But with high objects, with enduring things -
V/ith life and natujre."
In communion with these, and
"With an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy.
We see into the life of things."
Plato gave us the classic account of our progress
toward the heavenly vision, the supreme ideal of divine
perfection. In the evading beauties of earth, he beheld
intimations of beauty absolute, "the divine beauty, I mean,
pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions
of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life."
("The Symposium," p. 343, Jowett's translation. National
Library Company, New York)
In the allegory of the charioteer and his steeds we
have a graphic description of the conflict between passion
and true love. From the former no ideal will ever spring.
But the true lover of the beautiful will be led along the
upward v/ay. Using the beauties of earth as stepping-stones,
he will go from one to tv;o fari fair forms, and from two on
to all fair forms, and then he will pass on to fair notions,
and then he v/ill see the beauty of institutions and lav/s and
sciences. Gazing upon the sea of beauty, at length he waxes
strong, "and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single
science, v/hich is the science of beauty everyv/here ." This
absolute soul of beauty neither grows nor decays. "Separate,
oTWueff noiaajBq 3rricf'ioacfji oilt ,r(l‘towal>‘TOV7 'lO'ii
Oil QB o:f beiifl oH . %iLr.30cf ^rtaojt'tingJta 'iQ.i bne
’\9£>£/Xo*i^ eiiT" at qu aLtoS
^tmvL lo aj(iow 'iBrilsr/ btia adi d:)ivf Soil"
-
'a^rfxfl^t flilw ,R*09{;tfc rigirf fliiw J-ix3
, ^
'’.oijjiafx briij eliX liiXW - •
Jbfi<9 ^oaorii iliXir rfslromtiiioo nl
rraifoq vcf Xalup ©fcam a^co .ili’S’'*
lo 'levog qaar eri^t firrB
,
^gnon-iisfl 10
''..ivpliiS lo 9liX e<fl oXni aea d?/
aQO'tgo'rg wo lo iau'iooB oIqbbIc edS esj eVB^ olxir*!
3::tv it lo Ijaooi aiifo^txL/Q 3di ^'loieXv ’jIiTovaerf edl b'lBwoi
bLodod «d lo aoiXuflecf ^rtiXave adt nl . noxd’oel’ioq
^'Tj30^ i OitXvxX) edX" i^iuLoGidB xS:i&Q<S lo anoXXrxaXXnl
aoX.tyXXoq odcf ilX.cw baggoXo d’orr tbOTiOlXjartiX jbrtfi ibqIo baa ewq
ciBaiird lo aexlXrrav bfiJB bioXoo odt ££b brts lo
XanoXlaU ,noXlJsIaif^'iX a’lJ-ewoL ,SX^ .q '^oKjriQoqavg udT”)
(:rwy W0 rl <\;naqaioO
ov; abaola aid bna TaoXox'iiS-Xo edi lo '{rio^ell.s eiU nI
rtoXaoaq rc-oylod JoiXlrioo Ofd lo itd’Iiqi'iooeb oidq'i'iQ a Bvsci
.^.'tl’xqa novo II.i“ar f^aebi: on t:o;:=!'x01 adl aoi'i . ovoX ou'iX baJs
eiXt ^rroXjB neX od XXXwr fxj’ltlfjjsoif ed t lo 'lavoX gx/t:! eril ctuQ
.aertol.’3 ~3rtxqqOXa eta dct'ixio lo aalXt/aod edt ^fiXoU , b'lawqtJ
no owl .Tto'il ba-fx ,Bflnol ^Xal in**! ovrj ol eao raoil 03 II tv ed
^orroXlori rr.iB'i OS no saijq XX xw ed nedl bne ^acnol ‘tXel XX e ol
bnx3 0WX3I i^dB bkioISi/ ^iSiMti lo eiil oea ££tv ©fi nodi byoa
a©xj3w ed dipnoi 1 ^?
^
Y,Suj6ed lo bsb edl aoqu grtisjeO . iiooneioa
el^frla b lo ciid ot baXaove'i at noleXv OilX la,aX la bci^”
oxdT ”, o'lod'A^.'tovo lo eorto/oa eniS -d rfoidw ,oonoXo 8
,ol«iqi3q 0p” . j'^aoDb Torf swo-t:^] 'tedSien /luaed lo Xt/oa ©It/Xoacfa
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simple, and everlasting, v/ithout diminution and v/ithout
increase, or any change, it is imparted to the ever-growing
and perishing beauties of all other things.” (Op. cit.,
p. 341-342)
In meditating upon natvire, the lines of observation
radiate vastly. The enveloping loveliness can not be grasped.
Ideas vaguely v/onderful throng the mind. The result is a
strangely moving elation, alternating perhaps with sub-
missiveness and av/e before the splendid spectacle . In-
explicable systemic tremors add their thrill. Deep-lying
instinctive tendencies are stirred; there appear pov/erful
and unai unanalyzed emotional states, perhe^ps the echoes
of racial fears and amazements, the rhythms of ancient
prostrations and weird exaltations.
Thru the influence of meditation and the restraint
of poetic artistry, this cosmic ecstasy may assume milder
forms. In form intense or mild, do we have in this esthetic
rapture any genuine cosmic implication? In the warmth and
persuasive beauty of the esthetic experience, many thinkers
have held that we have evidence to substantiate the super
-
empirical hypothesis.
According to our analysis, the claims of the
esthetic experience must be passed upon strictly and solely
by the reason. According to our claim, there are only two
possible sources of knowledge: experience and legitimate
inferences from experience. Logically, v/e have to do in
esthetic rapture only with sentiments, wholly subjective as
far as their valuational aspect is concerned. (Of course
duodft'n iir3£iunfjs.ib &sjO:l^t\r bns
*y:iT<OT’^,-'r 3VQ yrfX oi aJc St ,9^J5r(o xrt^i io ^eGBercoitX
^.J-xc .qO) '*.a:5nirCj- "lO'iXo XIjb “io oi©iJ“iJi5Scf gxrXrfoX'ieq br,&
(9^S-I^v8
.q
aoxJ'.^v'iaacfo lo aertil mis t©rart^t aonr;f g.tliJ'isJ'Xijoci rrl
£>ta4 ; 3 ji'ig ©rj Xofi rffio GBenilavoI ^nlqoleva© a/iT .’^XJ-csv eijBXbsrc
’i
at XIr/80 'i ©(IT .firit.Ti eilX 3rtO‘ir{X Us'l'ieixio^ ’^jIOiXSBV aj59i)I
-cfi/a jUiw Qqjsriiaq TJinXisrt'iaXXs ^notSBle '^rtivom ^X 63fi-a*iXa
-nl . ©XoaXooqa fiilxnal.ia exf^ o'lolod owjb bOB aaertovtaaLi
^iTXvI-qesQ .Xlxirf.t Txorit bbs a'lbsiQ'iS oJLued’ave ©IX/Jcilqx©
• iL-'i's-^ffoq 'laarrqjQ ©lerl; j oia aaionaibrteX avtSontJaat
aeoJo© ariS aq.jd'roq ^aatsSa X^toiXano besiiXjKtJSftxr fa.w bnjs
Sr.a torts lo acrlXT^iXi a:IX t ajiTsaasjQ.'iije bnjc aiaol Lstos’t Zo
, anoiSsSLsxa b'lto'fr brts anoiSsnSao'iq
ifiXxi'i^aa’i arf.t bns rto ISsStbQf:! lo eofioullni: oriX x/ttIT
'leXIii'a eotraciB '^.ai '^8aw>30Q oX.>Tiaoo -aldS oXJ’eoq lo
olJfei'taa aiiiX riX v/jRff o6 ^XjIXn: to oanoiat nnol nl . aniol
X>na aXmaw al TctolSsoiXqmt (jtqaoo ©i'l.vjn^s e'li/Jqan
^^na'iT tQorr^Xi^qxe oijerfXae ©rit 'lo v.J’^/Bed’ evtusuaTeq
-'i©q:/3 erlJ- ©ial^naXndxfa ot eort^Xivo ©varl ew Ssd-i bladi avsd
. alQerf^oq’^xf Isol'itqme
edS 1o araxalo erli
^
aXG^^’a-'t'S *^0 oS ^nXftioooA
•^XeXoG Jana •^Xloxi^Ja ttoqu beaasq ©cf Smsm oortel'ieqxe olSaiiSao
owS '^Xno eia ©loilX ^rriaXo 'li/o oi ^^^ifj'ioooA .rtoaae'i ©rfi ^Jc^
©iarriiX^oX Xrru oo^^eX^oqx© : ©3X>eX W'orfjf lo ©©o'Iixoq ©XcfXaaoq
itX Ob oi ovsd err ,^XXaoi:;joJ . oonoiTOiix© noit eacfaa'io'tcit
as avtSooldsja ’jlXoitfr ^airtotriifiiea rfixw \r£no oTcxriqaT oXierfia©
ea'TLJOo 10) . bart'tooTtoo at io jqaa XjBi'ioiijsjxljav iXexli sb 'xj©1
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they have perceptual contacts with the objective order. It
is the most flimsy logic which holds that this fact makes
"values" - which exist only as a convenient figure of
speech - "objective." See page 51 of this dissertation:
"Faulty analysis" and "Faulty logic.")
We conclude that the situation discussed in previous
sections remains essentially unaltered. No nev/ evidence has
been produced. Ideals of esthetic appreciation open no secret
passage-way by which we may pass to the contemplation of the
Ultimate. There are sufficient and delightful ranges of
realization for ideals of esthetic appreciation in empirical
realms. Since ideals are by nature extra-experiential (as de-
fined), they may at least enjoy rapt cosmic contemplation,
claiming no dianoetic or discursive quality.
E. M. Kallen, in a chapter entitled "Value and
Existence" (in "Creative Intelligence" - John Dewey, editor -
page 409), maintains that the world was not truly made for us.
If it had been, there would be no problem of evil. Thinking
came in response to discomfort, to problems. Civilization
itself has broioght nevi problems. Nature and human nature are
not completely compatible.
I would admit the truth of this contention, but
would question the necessity for the pessimistic tone. What
does it matter if the world was "not truly made for us" (not
perfectly and safely finished for us), if we are truly made
by (or in) the world as it is, or if we are able largely to
make our environment and our social world? We and the order
of things are essentially "of a piece." Why should not
.'lofc'io evJiioetcfo dilvr a^ostrtoo I^i/^tqeo'ieq ©v^
qqiLbdi ioGl: s±d^ ^erf^-aiblod rio^ilw olgoi NSari-tll -^aoni ofict e.^
‘Ip o'lu^i't inoJtnevrroD <b ojs ’^Ino d'aiso floXrivr - ’’aeuljev”
ajLld" "to 13 q^3q ©ea evlJ-peodfo" - fiooeqa
(”.oi«ol brz^ "aia-^Icarrs yJ-Xj/b'5"
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©iIJ- lo nox^^Iqnredrtop od& oJ- aa^ v.xr ©w doMw -^^w-as^aeccx
‘Jo BeTjftsn 'nlMsxI©/) Xn-s Jneiol'ilx/s on£ Q'loriZ
I^oinlqi!!© ni noid’^iosTqq^ oXi’erlia© lo alaeJbx nc'j- noid-ijsllaon
-sl> as) Isi,tnoi‘i©qxo-B'xd-x© QTSJiBn ^d ©ns alsebX ©oniG . aatlaan
tnolitslqc2e<tnoo oinaoo cfqsn ^o(;n© ^eseX js TjodJ- ^(jbanil
}
.-^^Xlsiip ovia'inoaXI) no oXJ’aonslf) on ^ircislo
Jxfs atrXsV" fieXXiine necfniiiCo s ni ,rt©irj©H .5^ .H
- no^xL© tV 6T70CI fifloi:, - "©onesllle^nl ©vlvtsonO" nX) ”ooneJaixS
,QSj no A sLsirr '^Xirnd’ .tox? Mnow ©xiJ’ d’sri^t ani.o^nlsa ,(60i^ ogjeq
^xilnidT •live Jrj noXdonq on ©d Xdp'ow ©nodi' ^ixeod £>jari il II
noli’sslIiylO .aaeldonq ^i'no'taiooatb oX eartoqoon nX eciso
©IS om/i’an iXXxoLTxi Xns ©rs/woff .ataeXJonc wen id^uond aad ^osiX
. ©IdXixitjaoo ^loioXqaxoo Xon
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o;t ^X93*tJ3X ©Xda ©ns an lx no ,aX XX as Mnon erCi (ccX no) ^d
notno odd Xins ©W fX'Xnow XsXooa nxjo Xrxs XnocinonXyne nno ©dam
Xoii X)Xt/or£D wiW ”.ao©icr s lo” YXXaXXnaaae ena agrrXxIX lo
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thinking evolve in praisev/orthy fashion in connection v;ith
adjustments? Why are the conclusion that the world ‘'is open
to improvement," and the corollaries that civilization is
"made hy man," and that "the world does not stay made," so
damning? The Problem, of Evil in a value-creating world is
bad; but it is natural, and is not necessarily permanently
tragic .
Justly he states that value has its seat in human natume
and existence has its seat in nature, of v/hich human nature is a
part. Hence value is a content of nature, is a specific kind
of natural existence . Value exists in nature in that nature and
human nature in some respect are harmonious. This would appear
to stabilize values. But he adds that value is irrational; it
is determined by our instincts, appetites and feelings. And
everything else becomes valuable or rational ( I ) by reference
to them.
We admit, and assert, that value always has an
insinctive rootage, and that em.otion (the conscious side of
instinct) is the core not only of esthetic, but (in an
important sense) of all other, valuation. But it does not
follov/ "that value is, in origin and character, completely
irrational." (Op. cit., p. 413)
Further, value is not even essentially non-rational,
just because it has an instinctive-emotional basis. For
emotion is central in valuation only from the point-of-view
of vitality-feeling. The idealizing process is not non-
rational, because intellection is an essential factor.
Intelligence must cognize the environment, thought must
i
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interpret experience. Reason directs the attention, sub-
limates the emotions, and hence controls the instinctive-
emotional life. Only thus is valuation made possible. It
is an absurd and serious fallacy to conclude from the emotional
natiore of idealization that value is irrational, or even non-
rational. Feeling-affection and intelligence have their
separate offices and ine-lienable rights. Consider that with-
out reason (cognition, comparison, understanding, imagination,
conceptual thinking, intelligent appreciation), no valua-tion
could issue from instinctive cravings, appetite or somatic
feding. (This sort of fallacy should make clear the importance
of our empirical inquiry into the nature of the idealizing
process. It is largely ignored. In my judgment, it should
be one of the basic investigations of contemporary philosophy,)
Nevertheless, v;ith the main currej^nt of discussion
in Dewey’s "Creative Intelligence," I am in entire sympathy.
Kallen’s
I shall give a condensed statement of kie thought (p. 414-436):
Every individual is a different center of
valuations, v^ith its separate interests and peculiar
emotions. This orienting is the establishment of our
v;orlds of appreciation, the creation of our orders of
value. And values fuse, and constitute the more com-
plex and massive feelings. (I would say, emotions and
sentiments.) A mind is an affair of saving and rejecting,
of creating its systems of objects for desire and for use;
mind is in constant process of change. Diversity and con-
flict are perhaps even more fundamental than cooperation
and unity of interests
.
Note the suppressions of the "nev/ psychology,"
and the compensatory dreams of art, religion and
philosophy. Note particularly the lyrical ultimate
standards of philosophic thought: the unity of the
world (conceived because such a v/orld is easier to
live in), spirituality (in which things are identified
with the values of things), and eternity (the negation
of change, and consequently the negation of the slaughter
of values). Specifications of the last are immortality
and freedom. They are value-forms, not existences. How-
ever, substitution of one for the other is frequently made.
~iuu dv ndoo'itb nroaJseE . ooite^Treq:;;© i3'Tq^ed•^^i
-ovi:ior(ixJ?ini ^Io^.tnoo eoneri beta .eriDt^ocs eii^ aeJ-janixI
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sdX lo x-fi.ciiJ sdX : Xrf.3Jjodj oX.iqo&oXXdq lo aXxBbrrjBXB
oX nbXoB© aX IXnow a dous onx^BOoef £ov if^ortoo) XXnovr
beilXXnebi ©ns egn'inX dolrixr ni) x&ilas'i'l'Ti^e ,(nX 3vXX
rroiXB^err erfX) ^XXnneX© bna lo eaulBV edX dXXw
•i-^Xr'^'Bl© offX lo aoXXaoort ©r£-+ v^-^donvoarroo bfije ^9mBdo lo
XXXlBXno'Txni ©-b Xf-bI odX lo anoXXBoilXoeqa .(aei/lBV lo
-’W.. aocneXa ‘xo Xon <a(L’ncl-0trXx,v fpn«. q©rfT .nroboonl: Lnjs
vXXnoi/psnl aX '^ed.Xo odX nol ono Ic noXxyXiXsd'na ^neve
C
108
Ideals of esthetic appreciation are embodied in art,
and may be clarified and interpreted in art criticism. I would
suggest this definition of art; Art is the spontaneous and yet
disciplined expression of an ideal experience in a charming
and unified sensuous medium, for the purpose of rendering the
insight and valuation illuminating, possessive, communicable
and permanent. (I have followed, in part, the definition of




It is the tentative (because incomplete and experi-
mental) and pragmatic (because dependent upon the vagaries
of taste and the shifting currents of appreciation) embodiment
of the beautiful, or the interesting and meaningful, in human
experience. I shall refer- to Parker's analysis of the
esthetic experience in the work just mentioned, (chapter IV.
for the elements, and ciiapter V. for the structure, of the
experience )
.
Bearing in mind our study of idealization (noting
Dev/ey's characterization of its diversity and conflict), it
is evident (to the empiricist) that Plato’s conception of
Beauty Absolute is utterly unreal and unjustified. V/e knov;
nothing of "beauty separate, simple, and everlasting," exist-
ing without change. This is a pure figment of the fancy. It
ignores completely the real process in which beauty is en-
gendered and comprehended. The vision of the mystic nature
lover may include many fine and valid appreciations; but his
cosmic dreanings (if taken literally, and not as a form of
imaginative play) issue in obscuration. They do not connect
,
^!;l at nO icfjo.toe'iqqa o.tJ 5rf:»SQ "io nX/ie6T ,!5|7i^sa!j'T
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Srrirr^ilo .c rri og;wXT[eqAe iijaeJbx fia *1:q nCxase'iqxa JbefrilqJtoaii)
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-r:© 3l 1 dOiiiw fix acec/onq I.so'Z ©ffj ^jloJelqmoc e^ ionsi
emlan oJtlc.'cn ©dl 'Ic nr'ialv ©liT . bexfiQifO'iqnoo bna benebnes
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with reality; they do not result in broad, sane understanding
of genuine valuation. Altho usually comparatively harmless,
because innocent and monastic, they are apt to create false
perspectives, and to fail to integrate with the wider demands
of reflective and moral idealization. V/ith the more critical
and the robuster types of people, this naive sentimentality
serves to discredit the value of esthetic appreciation, and
to interfere seriously with the fulfillment of art's true
and priceless function in civilization.
Art is the liberalizing element in our culture.
Thought should emancipate; morality should move toward world
cooperation. Nevertheless, art has a unique contribution
in making the spirituality of the age cosmopolitan. It is
the function of art to give sympathetic representation of
every interesting and significant phase of life. To its
hospitable gaze, nothing is common unless unclean. Its
effort is, "not only to reveal an object to us, but to unite
us with it.” (Parker, op. cit., p. 100)
Divorced from the spirit and pov^er of artistic
appreciation, the thought of the age will become stereo-
typed, infertile; its morality will grow suspicious, puritanic.
This is a hard saying, for the traditionally moral. For con-
ventional morality is repressive; it is tyrannically dictator-
ial. The spirit of art is fundamentally un-moral (in this
sense of the moral); "for art itself is a freely creative and
happy activity. . . . Thru art we are compelled to sympathize
with the aspiration toward grov/th, toward happiness, even when
it leads to rebellion against our own standards and tov/ard what
I*-*-
erj»s nl dlx/ae'J iocf of:
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we call sin." (Op. cit., p. 333, 334)
The spirit of art is in essential harmony with
rational morality, v/hich identifies the good v/ith wholesome
living, not with the merely traditional. Art and morality
should supplement one another: art may make morality generous
and tolerant; morality may serve to keep art from degenerating
into the trivial, precious or merely sensuous, and provide it
with significant purpose and deeper understanding. Thus the
interests of art and morality may be largely adjusted, to the
mutual advantage of each.
Nevertheless, their aims differ, and (in a world of
many conflicts) the ideals of art are bound, at times, to
conflict with the ideals of morality. The aim of art is to
give free and sympathetic representation of the beautiful,
the characteristic, the sublime, the tragic, the comic, and
of the minor types of esthetic experience . I.Iorality is
necessarily restrictive and disciplinary; when art threatens
ethical values, morality is certain to attempt the use of
some form of censorship. L. W. Flaccus reminds us that
socially destructive art may be good art, that to make one*s
self imaginatively at home within the immoral is not necessarily
immoral (it may be splendidly ethical), and urges that v/e all
should be "broadminded enough to allow a full, assertive life
to all large human interests." (L. W. Flaccus, "The Spirit and
Substance of Art," p. 40S . The entire chapter, "The Relation
of Art to Life," is important.) We do not need to deny the
right of morality to defend its values against attack, if we
hold that art has a similar inherent right. "Every form of
c..
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aaeJ’jse'ttlX d'ua d'-irfw bna evid'oX'iloe'i \:Ii: ijaoeeoort
lo oar/ af£o iqinoX^xi o,t aX3Jioo ax (Setrljav I.'30Xxllo
axj abfTlraei Ruoo.r^.r'? ,'S .J .qxilsioaitao lo giioI enroa
3
’©no Qdam. ol 1003 ©cf x>3rr Xixi ©vilot/itaaf) •v;ri«looa
X£ vton aA liiionml er'J- afrtJi'w ©cio:i la '^Xovllanl^ami lX©a
Ila ©^f laitl oesruj Jbns ((laoXiila YX£>XX!n©Xq8 ©d yijsn li) XaioaaX
Q“XI evilieaoa ,IIul a voXXa ol rlsuono bernirntusoid” ©d JbXxroda
JlnjB lliXqa arfT” ,auooaXq .W .j) '’.elooielni r£j3i:0Jii ogiaX XIa ol
noiool©?! orTX" ^lelqaiiO ©lilao adT .80^ .q ’’.liA lo eortJsiaduZ
©r£i ^a©b ol boon Xoa ob ©W » Clnalioqpeai si "<alj.d ql I1A lo
©T/ li ,3toalla lanXaqxi seo'Iijv elX £«x©l«f> ol \;liI^*iom lo Id^ii
i* ..
Ic aiol .Irinii Inoiarlnl rwiX/-inx« a aarf Its IjadJ filed
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life has an inalienable right to expression. . . • Without
knov/ledge we run the risk of becoming ruthless destroyers
of things which an intelligent sympathy might well pre^ve.”
"Mere purity of mind is not equal in value to that insight
into the whole of life which a freely creative art provides."
"To express life implies a certain mastery over it, a power
of detachment and reflection, which are fundamentally ethical
and may lead to a new way of living." (Parker, op. oit.,
p. 336, 337. Compare the entire chapter XIV., "The Function
of Art; Art and Morality.") (Note the ironic title of a
significant novel by Louis Eromf ield, "A Good Woman."
)
The elusive quality of all idealization appears
quite clearly in esthetic appreciation. Recognition of this
fact throw^ight on the general nature of idealization, and
may help to explain the persistent universal-significance
attached to valuation. There is a poignancy in appreciation,
due to the evanescent character of the objects of its regard.
It is due also to the comparative isolation of the experience:
it is difficult to secure an adequate social sharing of those
fleeting forms of beauty.
Because of tk© tender wistfulnessy the imsatisfied
longing to possess and to share, because of the evasive loveli-
ness of the esthetic experience, the imagination is continually
driven to contemplate vast and misty horizons of magic meaning.
If this is a daring play of the imagination, the cosmic reference
will add a panoramic sv^eep and imaginative range to thought. A
perspective of limitless distance is an aid to humility of
attitude, and adds a note of solemnity. Even if taken literally.
. . . .rtoiaeciqTco ocf eldfixtollsfii rr^ earl otil
3'ie'^C'ioaeJb aae^riJ-i/T snimooed’ l^o ert.t no'! o'vV ©shelwon^
'•V'fjo'iq How ^aegillej-ni rt,3 dcidw a^rtirid- lo
i’iiii.t o& otrijev al I^i/p© ion Bt bnia lo -^ui-urq o'loM”
•'.
'fiOfcsivo'fq j-tjs QvlJ'£OT[o ^ doldw o'"!!! io olodw edd odnl
Trowoq jp tdi ‘xovo Tj*toiaiant n.r std'zeo b eoilqai: o'iil 8Q0^qxQ oT*’
XiStdi'U'© '^Il0irr9noixTL''i eua riciriw ,noi:rfo©IleT: tnB irjomdosiof) lo
.
qo ^ 'led'ie'l) ".-^rfivil 1x) xisw wen s oi fjaoX 5ns
rfoi^cmr'^ oaIX'' ,.VIX ncy^qstXo oni^na erfi- enaqisioO .VS5 ^dS5 .j
ac
s lo elilJ' oxftCTi adJ ©io'.') ( ". ^oxlsno!! hna i’nA ;ctnA lo
(”.f£j3fnoW 5oo0 A" .bleXrtcEro'T?! aitroJ ^d Xevnn .InsoXlingia
a'^seqqs ncXixisXXBeJbi IXs lo T^J‘J;XsiLfi^ <?>vtBJJle orfT •
aM«f 'io no iJ-irt'^ooeH . noXdsioenqqs oiderld'a© nl ^c^'ineXo eSIup
cciB ^DioldpsilAebl to eni/^sn Xsneneg end no
earrsoi'iXfraia-XsanGVi/ur ctnodaxaneq edi nXsIqxe od q£&d xbss
^noxisxoenqqs nX ’^ortsn^l-^oq s at enadT . noxijaxrXsv od 5edosdd-s
.jb^gei '3dX qo eoCaf.'^o srfJ- qo nooos'i^lo ^naoeaxT^ve od^ eub
: eonriXneqxo exld ncxd^sXoai evX-J^ntoqb^TCf axit oi oaXa oo5 ei dl
6BOd.d to gninsTta Xsiooe eJ'sxrpoJbs ns eTXfoaa od iXxioimb aX *1
,^jutiBd 'io tflnol gnl^eell
tal'iaitaocuj add *^0 aai/soaQ
“iXevoX evXasve oild "io ©ausoed ^e^;sriR od 5ns fiooaaoq ocf gnignol
XlXBLntdnoo at noiisnXgsctX end toonelneqxe oldeddae edd lo oeen
.•^/ftrcsecf oigxsGi to anosinod ’^daXm bns dasv edsXqffEodrroo od nevinb
onene'io'r otmaoo exfd ^noxdsriigxsrX erfd ?o vsXq gciinsb s qX ai.id qi
A .ddgL'Odd od ognsn ? dsnigs'nX bns qeewe oJtasnonsq a ,bbs XI iw
*o Y^XXXrj£;d od bis xis ax oortsdaxb aaeldlEiiX 'iO evidoeqeneq
XlXs'iedXi; nadsd li navg . '<;dinxiaX03 lo adort s abbs bns .elxxdXdds
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the glamor of unearthly beauty may be wholesome. For it may
serve as a much needed corrective to our common absorption
in the materiality of the too obvious.
nevertheless, as indicated above, a sentimental
corrective becomes a precarious expedient. Thru courtesy
it might be tolerated; but it remains a dubious makeshift.
The mature mind knows that the enlightened imagination of
necessity inhabits an empirical realm. Poetic thought
requires spatial freedom, but is not deceived by expansive
imagery. ’’When Rodin contends that every great artist is




cosmic emotions and imaginings, thru which a
work of art is given reach, intensity, and volume for the
imagination. His ovm T;-orld image, in terms of cosmic stress
and urgency, reflects nothing but the condition on which he
can satisfy his sculptural genius; it has no other meaning
for him but that.” (Flaccus, op. cit., p. 400, 401)
Thus esthetic appreciation is rounded out and
completed in the religious consciousness, as we have chosen
to define the term. This serious contemplation is enough for
him who is content to wait before the majestic Beauty, the
silent Mystery, of the universe. For this meditation on
life's enveloping mystery, no "faith" is required; yet from
it come reenforcement of courage, consolation for disappoint-
ments, and peace.
The religious idealism of art is better than super-
natural belief; for that is subject to disillusionment. The
esthetic redemptive way is more sure: it neither attacks evil.
WSS?V^ ffppi '^fipiipi''' ’'‘'^^Qi|HB||
' ^’^
9" W" v1
’•r- ."i: r:*'. - •”' no Tc :i>; od vian x&:ig*''S xir^J'iAonif Jo ^omBl-^ v>ti^ ;,
rroiir 'Toecf^ A'oacico tjo oJ’ ovi^cve'X'too f^ol>©en dz^-rr a an ev's^a J
•“y
, j '-.Jo io* ©rli "to -{^ilstTej^jr^ ^fdf at
ijB^tno^ai I'l :•'. 1- f i vodn b*:f^ijl:' i 'c ajb , - ioXo*iJ'*‘i©v©K • ,
’.^KOw-u/^o Wu * t.^eXi)'. ^-'e © jc /.-iJ'o^:'iq £ cocTOoed ©vi^oa-noo ':
,
?" :.rn :''?< i.'. ar:ot'!uIj n dj^t^Jtno'i vli j LeXa-taloX ©d <
'to notJ/tai^^l Xic-rrodiisXilne 9u^ ajsd^ ti^xntd tirts erjj^tasa. ©rlT ;
i:f:y70.iJ' oijooi .n:©©'!- .raoi'riqr^o nit B^ldJBdai Y-^-tatiOoen
evieri/:q>;© -'d fcrviooeb ^t >,' si u^ rd tr^oboe'i’t X^aidjoqs ee'cicfpei ,
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ai ’{'lav© s-^t&drioo fii vH rte'iiV?” .•^'legjBait ‘*j.
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rtdj 'io‘: ocxrlov i>n ^vd terio-trti vrio^iOT; r'svi:^ oi .tT:B lo if'iow *'
easTvS vtrnoo Jo orr'isd ai ^sg^'il biaoTr nrro aiH .,i-^lii:atc\‘^i j
od lioldvt no aoiJi^rxco edJ iud vaJjUca edD©I‘>e'i iicon93'iiLr ban (
^aLtfiarT larido' oa and dt
^
ru/lrfas Iv3'^i/iqIuos aid v'iaidaa aao ‘
(Xi)-? ,.»0^..:: , . ilo . ?o ,ZiU:jOJ3L'^) ". tjsftt itrcf nlrf 'lo'i ^
Ji/o I'B'm/O’T si noid’ciorf’ias^^ oxJ'orido':; aix/d’ ^
*
neaoii© everl ev; ar ,^B^^J‘OiJoiooctoo ax."^ fcodolqicoc J
'(o^ li ijjoaa bX aoiSnl’-irretaoo atfolae -.iJ T .'^ i:si’ adS oat'tab o4 1
:v ^ ixfjjn^3 ol^ref^dxr. edi c'^c'trtd iJ:n77 oi iaeinoo al odvr iihi 1
:ic rt'vltxjdifje^ ' sild 'loq . a'revtrXf aiii Jo ,T^i©iavM -iiit'IIa
uio'.j iex ;x'a'iif/poi ai or: ^xaeiasyr: ^tXqQlovae Q*aJiC )
-'JatcqqBBtb 'xc*! ftoivixAlparfor ,e*>i3Tuoo Jo inenooiolaeai ocioo ii
.aoaec ba£ ."insn j
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-'xeqi/B 'iBiied al iz/s l:r> atctlzebi ai:/olQiIoz arlT^i J
::^ . Ja o:zfir>tairiilrilb o.t ios^dx*'} pit ijadi zoj ;Jdllecf L/sztiina
,.tiva BTlnjoHn "’•ditori .' L : tzLo e'lor ci /y.u tjv t iqcobe'T. oiJodia©
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nor by faith denies its real or ultime-te existence, but seeks
to rebuild the beautiful world in the imagination. (Compare
Parker, op. cit., p. 362) "Altho as an interpretation of life
based upon faith religion is doubt/^^s eternal, its specific
forms are probably all fictitious; hence each particular
religion is destined to pass from the sphere of faith to that
of art. The Greek religion has long since gone there, and the^re
also a large part of our own w^ill some day go - what is lost
for faith is retained for beauty." (Op. cit., p. 366. Note
the entire chapter XV., Art and Religion.)
This vision of critical intelligence is preferable
to the meticulous and futile attempt to trace the manifestations
of a will to beauty in the universe. Llany details in nature
might suggest a formative purpose. But the attempt, Flaccus
believes, will prove un^successful
;
"Nature is on too vast a scale, and too intricate
and disorderly in its ensemble to allow us to confront
it as we might a painting or a piece of sculpture, in a
discriminating and appreciative understanding of an
artistic purpose unfalteringly worked out and complete.
Such attempts usually end in either a vague, unsatisfy-
ing esthetic mysticism or a religion of cosmic beauty,
in dire need of all the faith that any religion can
summon and build on.
It is a significant fact that when art becomes
cosmic in its motives and ideals - as it often does in
tragedy - it gains less from envisaging the universe as
a transparent and harmonious system than from responding
to it as something huge, fragmentary, semi-articulate
,
and questionable - something that arouses the imagination
and perplexes the mind of man." (L. VI, Flaccus, "The
Spirit and Substance of Art," p. 406, 407)
Is the question still asked, V/hat is the utmost that
can be said in regard to the outlying significance of the
ideal? If the ideal is concerned with the increment of growth,
of knowledge, of appreciation, in conscious life, how far into
•SH]
-tixtf ^eonetglx© oiscticflu to Xiie^i oil 8etfiof> dtl&h ion
k- e-i^c toC) .rroiijaxtXsjacii arfl rfl M'low Ii/'ixJ'jj/jed odct fclXxrdc'i oJ-
e'ltL 'io fIOi^^J5 ^^»1{I'I©^^£X ^ ort^IA^ (23S .of . 'ijo ,^93£^B^
oi'iioeqa bS2. ae'jj^Jd'L-of) al noigileT aoqu XfoaBd
rfojea e^rrerf {ausotiiicl’i !£« ^J^djBdO'iq e^fi aa'iol
|K» .t/3iXt oJ ifco o'tariqa (d»'£vf i.nc'i’i ecisq oi bentJaeb al noigiXoT
! fccffi ,o^o/iJ uno 3 eonXa ^‘^oX and rroigiX&'i ed i . i-ra lo
lV
k f iaol al - 0.3 '^8f5 Won Iliw nwo rsjo lo PST-oX jb oaXa
[f . o^oti .br^S .a *'. 10 'i' Ix^ixa^eT si 'lo'l
r- { .r'f'l- lic.^P, Xjffi.' i'lA ^©iqJ5/^o OT-cin© orii }
r W ^
yg.' ©Xda*ic*‘iaac? ai teorca^x-^lejaX XaoIJ'i'io ‘io ctolelv aid?
H' aaol ta*o©'2[i‘ti!ca ©d*’ ©oxiiu ol ^qnie^da oXXJ'xr^ tna awoluoi^afi 6/iv oi
f . o'ru.t jiit nX aXxaJ'eft . ©S'levlncu ©dd ni ^.ti/ae^X oX XXiw © ‘lo
{ .. ©iw aoal'!? tXq**3©dX .9 erlX . ©aoq'ix/q evJt J-jamo'^ a d;Q03SWa
: Xu'>aa90CJJ3i|fijj avoiq Illv .auveXXocf
iooiiXftX 00 * ..lai?
,
6 X;:or a Xa-^v cod no Ri 9tx;X^M”
" ’ Inon'Xrtoo oi rlt tjoXI^ oi oId;nyan© eSl c:l •{XnoJbnoRlft firtja
.3 :rX li/tqXc/oe lo so:f.cj <; no ^rrijnijsq ^ ^dgXn otr aa ft
X'j v'ilbct^fit'ttfbn ! oviJRiconqap. off.3 sni-Xartirji'iOBfb
.©telqroo £f!fi o*io Xa^fio.. oliailna
-'/Oaxi^em/ a nodi i 3 ni Lno ai':p:©iJ’a rtot/o
.qiu^.od oXn-oo lo noivXXo" no ciBlnX ia-on oxlacfio© :^X
nao ftoX^XX an ’^nfi iaai* rliial c* ft IIb lo Loan enif) nX
.no tllLTd brtii nocsr^jja
aoxioood ina nerC" iarii inaoilin^Xa a si jl
IT- aeoX‘ neilo ii aa - alseti bite eaviJcn ail nX olaapo
'
f
na AQievlrtJJ adi gnx.'iial'/iio nionl aoeX arri«J5 il - \;/>oafinv
:-.fflPncqaen noil rusiid raaia^a af/olrtonnjB.d bna inanBoarusni b
< aii:^lLrc'linB-JLa©e ^ tOr>xrd attldiofiiToa as Jl oi
n'' lisrti^sal edi aoaon3T:s isdi anliliono's - eXdsrioliaefjp ons
k e/£T" ^ajjoos/” .V' .J) '’.'istJ lo bate: ©rli RaxeXqnaq 5ns
j (VOtS^ .q lo consiavfx/b' oojb ilnXqS
isr[i iBOciin ©rii ai isxT^? ,rex'8B XXXie i:fOiiee:/p erli aX
arii lo aoftsoilinsia srrl’iXino odi oi fcnsriQn nl 5isQ ocf rrso
,
-won" lo .tererroneni ©di dilw LonneoiTOo oi IsaXl edi II ?Iso5i
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-lal ^vod ^©liX awoloonco at ,; oi Jsioanqqs lo ^e35&Xwofci lo
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the universe does its meaning extend? The only a.nsv/er is,
as far as it seems real to think it as extending. Is the
ideal more significant for the universe at large than are
facts as fleeting incidents? Is it possible that the ideal
has a validity beyond those values apparently contained in
the raitural, evolutionary order? Does not the sheer occurrence
of values in a world-system justify this assumption? Does not
the ideal, simply as a given fact of experience, carry the gaze
into illimitable depths? And while listening to the strains of
exquisite music, do v/e not seem to catch the gleam of a strange
and wonderful light moving across the uncertain waters of
human life?
If so, the vision is purely the gift of hope. It is
the bright glory of tlie poetic passion, the mystic mood un-
restrained by the fetters of fact or consequence. Poetic
fancy is a marginal experience, and forsakes the consideration
of the whole. The genuine ideal justifies itself in the total
experience. To be sure, the ideal point-of -view tends to
universalize itself. V/hile one is living in the realm of
colorful appreciation, one is apt to see the^/hole of one's
world, even the universe, in glov;ing light. In poetic mood, one
nay take this attitude, and enjoy the exhilaration it brings.
prevents
But the marginal interest/the suffusion of color from having the
cogency of a critical statement.
It is always possible to reject the critical view-
point in favor of religious faith. Then one could allow the
postulates of belief. This paper is restricted to the critical
inquiry.
'rewafY^ ^Irio ©riT ?I>rf0.tx0 ^irx.nea Sui. noof. ©8'iavli-iL' ©rfi*
>)r:J al .-ytiLne^x© ea :lnirii oJ laet aa^’^a J-i an lii^ aa
;
ote n;3fi:t ia o^^iertrjj 9di *101 innoftlapta ©loni Xaefcl
IjboDX 0£i& indJ ©Icfiaaoq XX «I ?cX.'Y8J!)ioci aniXeell aa 8 X 0.3 ^
r:I i?8<rijGiifoo viineisqqjs o©;rl£iV eeorit Jbrto-^oa ^ixXiXav s aad
6orff>Tix.'ooo 'iouiJs Qiitt *on aeod ?'ioJE>'xo ’-’'lanolXu’Xov© ^iB’TSii’sa od^
i
rsooc 'htni&qmjjaan atdt ^clxiai/u ^ aeulsv lo
esiijx ©.:X ,8010 XI lo Jcal nevtg ij ae '^Iqsiie ,IisoXX
lo m Xc'iXft -.1+ oX ^TixieiRjtl eliilw tsiA ?a:Uqeb elda^tinrllXi oXftX
0^ , 1 . s Xo clsqI^ oxCj ito^j30 oX ira08 Jon as ob <aXauin ©dXsXi/pxo
•to 8 'TQ*£'i7 .xis^?'teoflU e.i^t oQOToa qrxvom JrCaxI Xxx'i'ialifiO’K’ bna
TolXI nj^:nxfrf
nt XI ,\-qO;£ 1:0 X*iX3 eilX ^XoTxrq ai cioiatv oflX ^oa 11
- L'ooa oX.raTcni a/lt ,ioXae£q oXJ’aoq Oiit 'io Xrfgx'icf ofiX
cxXeo^^ . :^an©upoarroo *10 ^ojbI Io aioX^el erfi ^cJ ivarris'iiae'i
.Toi ts'ieXienoo orlJ- ae^IjGa'io'i bna ^oorrei'teqxe Limi'p'iJia a ai 'iorsiJl
LsSoS o.X t fix Ixeadi eoXX'Jatrf. i.ie&X ©axxxft03 efiX . ©io.iv.' edX 'lo
'"1 7brfdX I’ioiv- 'lo-XiiXco Xjsei’i oX J - grf ox . 0oftoi*3aqx0
lo .nlBO'i ©fix fix 3ffiviX oi arro oXX.Xli , 1xoao^X asllao^svlnu
r^'jjio lo ©XorLWorlJ ©o-a v^js ai eixc ^xox^jaioe'iqqjs lul'ioXoo
0;*!C tXv'ow oiiooq nX . ^fii^voX:- nl ,oe-iovifu/ orf^ nov© tM'iow
. ::yil'id ii noxiisialifixo ©xlJ ’^oi.rre iiitB ^uXajiiiijB oMi aaLai
exaov©T:q
©i-i qfiivxs-l nortl *10 X00 lo .''oxai/llca ed;t\i8a"iajnx I ofrir^'ijsci erii ixrS
..'•fiafliciaiE Xjsoiui'xo e lo ’jcnosoo
~
.a l;v looxii'xo axCi ^oof;o'x oi olcfiaaoq ar^ijwXa ai
o:ii TfoXIs tLsJOo ofio fiarfT *a.tis1 ai/oi'vf;!©*! Io *iovx!l ni iriioq
XfiolSl^o erid oi fDoioi'i^ae'i ai 'laqisq . leiXocf lo eeiaXi/^aoq
. X'^i^pni
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4. Nature and implications of ethical ideals
V/e live in an age of shifting lights. The spirit of
eclecticism is rampant. Old lines of development have become
confused and blurred. V/e are living in the present in a newi
sense. V/e are influenced by our contemporaries to an extent
unprecedented in the history of thought. Lines of modification
and control run crosswise: they are found to be the woof, as
muq/\as they are the warp, of history. It is an age of hospi-
tality to nev; truth and novel ways. An alertness of attention,
a readiness of adaptation, a suppleness of interest, are the
marks of the modern man. It is an age of emancipation from
old fears and old restraints, and of joyous contact with the
actuality of things.
This is good. For the fundamental motive to right
conduct should be the desire for a more abundant life for the
individual, a more wholesome and effective cooperation in
society; true happiness is related only to this desire and
this realization. Recognizing this, men are coming to see
that intense eKiotions - whether of remorse or of exultation -
(if deliberately induced, or carelessly permitted) are bad.
Sinning is understood to be selfish, unsocial behavior. Hence
the consciousness of sin is due to abnormal or to incomplete
development. In the one case it should be regarded as a
disease, in the other as an immaturity, in the moral life.
Rarely should it be dwelt upon, never aggravated. The aim
should be to help the moral nature secure a normal, well-
proportioned development, and to find free, creative expression.
The present epoch (at least in the wide extent of en-
a£iS0f)^ Issohi&e Jo anoIJsolfqnl bnJB o'lUS^H
Jo f}‘'-ilqa orlT . eirlgil gfriit'lirfa lo egs ne fil evil ©W
©Eiooocf ©vjarf c?rreEtqoXevob "lo ooitlX bXO . irtjsqnai ai uteioiioaX&e
wen 3 ni ineTortq erfi rrl ^nivil ou .bOTUJXcf bne £>eaLr'inoo
irrsix© ne oi geiniiiocr.'Hainoo Tiro •^cf beorreuX'^i o'ua eW .eanee
nolo£olJli>o'/j Jo aecrld ,Jd:.\uoci^ Jo x'^odslii ©ffi rti boinabeoe'iqnu
Ds ,looTf eai eO oi bnwo'i ene :e8lweao'io nun Xoninoo bna
- :aaor{ as*' rr.a el il .xioiciff “io ^qiaw eiii a*Ls ^©fli as/^un
^r.oiJiieiia Jo aeonineX*? nA . ®v*!.w levon briJS liiuii wen oi ^ixX^si
' erli ©Ti* ticiOTaini io acenalqquo £ ,noxi*iiqj3bJS lo aaenibfien £
iTO*!- na / tjBcri on©rrs lo ©•^ ns ox il .n-ac nn&bofi ©rli Jo ajX'isis
erfi diiw ioxiiffoo aL-o^jot lo bns bXo bns anseTc bio
.agiTXiii io
oi evxioc Isiixe.'nsbftxf't ©rfi .boog ai aiclT
erfi nOi ©111 iasbrujcfs ©toe s 'xol eilsab erfl ©cf bXuoifa ixnjbrroo
ill rroiis'iaqooo evxioel:!© bcrs ©raoaeXoriw ©non s tXsirbiviJbni
brts ©niaGb airfj oi 'CX‘^® beisIOT ei aeaniqqsfi ©iini j’^^ieiooa
©ee oi -nAxicriOo oris ria^T ^shii ,^:isin34*o©H . T-jilssilseT: ai;ii
- noiisiXt/x© xo tc ©sTonit. t Io T:©{£dof{w - aneiiow© eaneinZ isrfi
.bad” OTS (beijiuu'ieq ’r:XaaoXoTso no ,beotrbrti ijIeisnodileJb ^i)
ooneF?
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nis ofi'^ . bai JVSTq?)s noven ^noqxr iXev/b od ix Mnoda ';^X©tsH
-.rier ,Xs"Ton s otjltooc ©TL'lsn Ictom ori qXerf oi ©d.JbXiJorla
.‘r’
.
. TOiaaerqjf© ©’- XiseTC ^eo'iJ bctiJ ci fcns , inenqolovab .JbenoilToqoTq
lo ineixe ©biw eiii ni iaseX is) xloon© Inoaonq edT
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lightened thought) is more sensitive to essential questions
of right and wrong than any other period, (even if in many
respects we come short of the vision which the leaders of the
humanitarianism of the eighteenth century had). For the
morality of yesterday was largely self-centered. The morality
of today is individual, but also governmental and economic.
It recognizes that citizenship is a responsibility and patriot-
ism a religious quest, that we are bound to maintain sound
national policies and a just world order. The new ethics
(the ethics of the Old Testament prophets) is concerned with
the social sins: disease, poverty, ignorance, crime.
A conventional ethics does not satisfy men. Virtues
and vices are being subjected to a nev; classification. In
regard to many matters, the individual is being allowed more
and more to be the judge of his own actions. In regard to
others (which touch the public welfare) he is being held to
stricter account; for the social conscience has become an
instrument of control to reckon with. According to the
principle of relativity, actions are coming to be estimated
in relation to their special connections and environment.
On the other liand, the principles of purity and honor and
mercy are being applied more generally and practically. Hs.ny
tragic happenings mock the spirit of optimism; but we are
speaking not of the modern age as a whole, but of the new
enlightenment
.
Confronted by these serious, heroic virtues, we can
easily understand that the long-prized ascetic qualities
(centering in abstinence from the common human pleasures)
Briot&dQLfp od’ ovlctlaaoe enorr ai ( rfilj-ViorXd- Jboned-dajtX
Xrt^ rd lit nave} .Xsoi'isq 'lerfto njarfd* gno'sw fjnjs d-rfaXT lo
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Oft.d •'JO'''! .{bad ijii/J/tpo xfjrx©e«drI;!3X© extcf "io aainair£acl“irii3niLfr£
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. oi^ofxooe trta IaJrtaxan‘iuVv?e5, osis itrd
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I
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ot bled ^nled at ad (e-^xlilew otLdtsc edt lionot doiilw) eiadio
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odd od ^'ittnoooA .ddiv/ xtoi^oo-i
-
oi.-Io^dao& lo dnenundorii
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will count for nothing in an emancipated world. The moral
consciousness will despise the easy tag of asceticism,
designed to indicate that some men are different from the
general human kind. The ethical individual does not desire
to be set apart from the world. He wishes to make the world
of human relations natural and v/holesome and beautiful. In
this devotion, the present age cooperates with the ethical
idealism of every age. Franklin K. Lane was fond of referring
to this problem as the human one of getting on together. "And
this is no more than civilization's whole movement from the
primal day."
This achievement is made not without danger and loss
.
Sound conventions help to safeguard the mature, and to induct
the immature into an ordered, healthful group life. Because
of the clamant lower impulses, the drive of selfish ambitions,
morality must be to a great extent restrictive and disciplinary.
These restraints should not be arbitrary, repressive, nor
merely conventional. The true ethical life is ideal develop-
ment .
In the imfolding of the moral consciousness, thought
is clarified; life presents itself as an earnest experience;
the demands of the ethical lav/ are recognized, its wholesome
imperative is felt. To this degree is evolved "the impartial
spectator," to use Adam Smith's fine phrase. ("Theory of Moral
Sentiments" ) The judgments of the group are not altogether
sufficient, because conflicting; the approval of men is not
quite adequate, because external. Efficient judgments and
final approval the individual assigns to "the man within the
r.«'ioc?i o/fT .Jhlio-w rue. ni gnirfd’on lot ;trti/oo Iliw
^laaiolieOBB lo ^a/so ori;i“ oalqaeI> IXlw BaecajjTJxoanoo
jfi9*j'a*l?‘XJ& ©*16 rt^''- ©CiOB (tarlJ’
o-ieai) dorx aeob iBi/blvlbLil I js o iriic- ©iIT , 6frX3i n«xr/rf I^-ieitss
bX^ow erlJ aerlaXw eir . ©rl.t mon'l J-irsqa ^©a ed
nl . It/tiii/aod Jbfi^ ©tfoealori j b«a rr?a?ft*an ticioi:.tsI©'r fiBCiiifl lo
i
ZBoLi^e edi aeJB'ioqooo Xiioae'tq ©rli ^:'ict;toveb alriJ
T^rXi'ieadT lo trTO’'z esw ©rrrJ «'i ^{^0ve ‘io aaxXaoXsi
Xn.^” . 'to:.{J©:!^o j ao 3f:ii.t©3 Tto ©no orii Q£ neldo'iq aXrCJ’ oX
odd err^Tl dt'forrr^vofTT ©loriw a’fJoJtdi^sXXxvio fiijrld 0*100 on ai eXrld
{Bb X-Aoinq
. fift© *i©3rw6 dtjOrCdxw don obBKf ai dnooovoXflo.© otdT
dct/Xrtx od lifue .eTUdao ©rfd b'lBU^eJ^a od qXrari erroxdnevrroo tnnoa
emraoeS . ©IXX qxro'ig XntffdXaerf t^enoJ^-io nx odni ©'ti/danoX add
^anoXdldjTta rfaxlloa ©vX*xX- ©rid ^aealLrqrxi *i©7.oI drcaoaXo odd to
l-iurtXXqXoaXb tna ©vXdox'idaon inedx© daen^ a od ocf Jr^/m YdXXanoci
non ^ovieoonqan ,v'T-3'u*i:'i'i3 ed dojt fjXuorfa odrtXandeon ©asrlT




ieerranoioertoo lonoo orld lo -nnibJotnL' arid nl
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' ©ooeoXodvi adX tbesixi^coon ©*ia waX laoiXd© ©rid to admaoei) ©rid
XaXdnaqarX ©dd” XevXove lX oenaef) oirtd oT .diet aX evXdanoqoi
Xanoil to -inooriT’*) .©aanriq errXt a'ridixxC Dtad)A ©an od ".nodadoeqe
neddo^odla don ©na qnon^ ©rfJ to adneoaJbn^ oriT ( "adndaXdnea
don aX noo to lavonaqa ©:Id j^nXdoiXtfioo ©auaood ^dneXoXtti/a
6nrv adnomafcLffc daeioXtt*. .Xari-iodxe oet/ao^cf <©do-qJOi>^ edXnp
Ofid nXadirw nxau orld” od annxoaa XanfcXvXfjfrX ©nld lavonqqa lanXt
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breast." In the creation of the unseen gallery, v;e observe
that idealizing process, that imaginative projection, which
makes possible the noblest moral achievement
.
This is strictly empirical progress, provisional,
experimental, uncompleted. In the evolutionary, natural
order, this must be its inevitable character. However, with
these receding and uncertain lights, with this fragmentary
adventure, naive thought has never been satisfied. Unless
ideals are viewed "sub specie aeternitatis ," they appear as
tantalizing and incomprehensible will-o’-the-wisps. To find
security for conscience, validation for duty, the rationale
of obligation and its categorical imperative, the warrant for
ideals, man h^s persistently sought to transcend the empirical
order to attain to the absolute and eternal, to rid himself of
the limitations of the finite in order to ascend to the
infinite. In less figurative language, he sees in moral
ideals the necessary implication of their ultimate Ground.
This Spirit becomes the Justifier of strife and of suffering,
the Adjuster of tragic inequalities
.
Neither fact nor legitimate iiTference support this
simple faith. It is sheer speculation which is negated by
the obvious indifference of nature and the casual aspect of
things, and discredited (if not actually disproved) by the
presence of sordidness and pointless suffering, and by the
mechanism of the universe, by the prevalence of physical forces
in human history. Every one is familiar with the curious
rationalizations of the theologian. For one so minded,
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empiricist, the argument of the rationalist is pitifully
evasive and fallacious in reasoning.
But we have the Great Universe as the limitless
background of human life . Vie play out our little drama on
a perilous stage, with enormous recesses, in a theater which
thrills us by its mighty mystery. The critical ethical con-
sciousness is not unmindful of these vast perspectives, nor
of these suggestions of unmeasured possibilities of destiny.
Altho the enveloping life of the universe remains an enigma,
and the future an impenetrable veil, mystery and (possible)
destiny lend dignity and eleeiant solemnity to the ethical
life. The moral adventure becomes a quest.
The rationalist might be tempted to call it a
forlorn hope. Perhaps it is. Yet sometimes the desperate
valor of a forlorn hope has snatched victory from seeming
defeat. The history of the plirase is interesting. It is an
adaptation of the Dutch "verloren hoop," ("lost band"). Thru
happy similarity of sound, and by reason of the "hope" that
springs eternal in the human breast, the "lost band" has
become transformed into a cause not quite lost, not altogether
hopeless. It is easy for the rationalist to make fun of this,
to him, pseudo-religion. But the empiricist does not feel
responsible for life’s situation. He can only reckon v/ith the
facts, and be honest with himself. He takes the attitude which
appears to be v/ise and necessary. It seems the inevitable
reckoning with the universe.
•When ethical idealism becomes intense and inclusive,
it assumes a religious character. Ethics and religion are not
y,l :iq- daLlmiolSB*! to erli'
.
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discriminated
wholly separable, altho easily sepapafel© in meaning and scope.
(See diagram on page 56, above). Ethics has to do with social
standards of conduct, Xlhen these ideals become sufficiently
intense, and intelligently conceived, so as to involve some-
thing of our total attitude toward life, and imaginatively
held so as to include an attitude toward the ultimate mystery
of the world, v/ith its unknovm potentiality for life and
destiny, then they interpenetrate with religious ideals.
This differs from the usual understanding of religion
in that the empiricist does not really Imve "faith" in the
Larger Life; he does not actmlly believe that it is an order
of existence different from that which appears in scientific
description. However, he realizes that it may be different;
and he confesses willingly that he does not know what the
natural order of science is, or may be, in its farther signifi-
cance. This modestly hospitable attitude does not justify
the expectation of a causation outside of the observed order.
V/. G. Everett, in "l.Ioral Values," has an exceedingly
valuable study of the principles of conduct, centering in the
concept of "value." In chapter XIII., "Morality and Religion,"
he ms-intains that morality has certain claims, prior to the
claims of religion, largely because the speculations of religion
are uncertain. He states, "As long as it be admitted that
religion derives its essential character from man’s interpreta-
tion of the whole of being, we can not refuse the nam.e of
religion to any life-moving experience that springs from this
source." (P. 386) He adds that unswerving devotion to high
ideals, even in a bad universe, v/ould constitute a religious
ooi/rx-L iiosih
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I^ioOvT d^'.TT Ob Of aj3f{ loJLl^a ,(e:70<Sii o^scr cto eea)
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attitude. (P. 386) He holds that ideals are "genuine realities
organic to the v/hole of Being." (This would depend upon the
meaning of "organic;" ideals certainly have connections,
indirectly at least, v^^ith the world order.). He virites:
"The central insight which is vital for all
religion and morality is that the laws of spiritual
life v/hich hold v/ithin the kingdom of human values
are no less valid because they are not laws of the
whole empire. V/ith presumptuous egotism men have often
declared that love and righteousness have no meanir^ or
worth imless it can be shown tliat they are principles
which govern the entire scheme of existence. But this
they can never be shown to do.
"Rather is it clear that they have their
raison d’etre and their full justification as elements
of value within our human experience . The same is true
of all our other ideals. Their sufficient vindication
lies in the fact that they er-rich anjd ennoble man's life.
Their validity is established in and thru our experience
of them. Happily it does not fall because we are un-
able to show that they determine every part of the
universe. That ViTOuld indeed be a precarious position
for the ideal." (Op. cit., p. 419, 420)
When ideals are intensely felt, the resulting con-
sciousness may assume a mystical character. This is a highly
emotional form of experience. Because of its personal and
volitional nature, and on account of its ethical connections,
I consider the important theme here. Much has been written
concerning the psychology and philosophy of mysticism. I ha-ve
given years of sympathetic study to the problemis of mysticism,
from the psychological and historical points of viev/. It will
be necessary for the present purpose only to record my con-
c lusions
.
Consciousness normally has its subjective and its
objective pliases . The emotionalized V8,lues of the mystic
state are (to the psychologist) plainly subjective. By the
mystic, the images involved are given an objective reference.
arilwn^” 9T3 clAobx i-ailct aii^Od eH .1) ,
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' g^fonaXo ais r!.'>.tiooi1i.tai(t XliJ"- £>«« s'l^S i> nooisi
x;.;xnd <:ii am.aa odT . oonoineq-na n^xind tx^o rcdddiw atflav lo
noid.coibrtlv dnaXoXllua nXedT , aXaabi -i^ddo wo XXa .0
aliX drf ••'rt oXdoxi.'to l3fi© doixn© -^axid d-cdd to^l add nX
aoaalxj.xo nuo xrndd bna rtX bodoXIdadao aX \^dibil3V
-w one avf aanaoad XXal dorr aeob di ^fXiqqdtl .niadd lo
add lo dn.'jq •^neva onXninodaX> \jadd d^idd v/oda od oX-d^
fioXdXaoq aaoXwoanq a od baabnX blnow dadT .oanaviw





~r£00 .nrrtdljjaan add ,dXel ^jlaanadnX ana aXaabX nad'.V
^XdaXd aX nXdT .nadoanailo XaoXda^^n s om/aaa aaenanoXoa
bn j XsfioanoT adi lo aanjcooS .oonoXnaqxa lo fTiol Xoiioldoina
tG.noXdoonnoo CaoXnda adX lo drcxfooo.a rta-bn© ^ani/dan XBCtoXdiXov
nadJinv; rroad axid doiii . onad oniadd dn^dnoqiaX add nabXanoo f j
avAfl I .maXoXda\;ni lo YdqdaoIXdq bfrii \;3oXodo'ceq siCd ^nXnnoonoo
,'iTaXoida’iiJi lo aaoXcTonq odd od ^^bt/da otdaddaqCT'^a lo anao^ navXs
j. XXw dT .wa£v lo odnXoq laciXnodaxd bn© I©oX3oXodo\;aq a^ld cionl
~!toy bnooon od 'cX<io aooqwq daaaaiq add nol ’inasaeoan ei
4 anoXanl o
adi bn© avXdootcTifa adX aad '^XXc-xnon noanoxroXoanoO
oiday;n ad-d lo aanX^v basiX^SiioXdonia adl .aaQ©dq avXdoat.do
add .evldoocdna ^clnX^Iq ( daijioXodo^caq af(d od) on© ©d©da
.^ortonolan ovXdoet^cfo n© navX^ on© bavXovnX aa^iiiaX add lOXdQ^in
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in harmony with the law that any mental im^ge vividly enter-
tained tends to take on sensational qualities. An emotional
experience (especially of a fanciful sort), intensely realized,
has a strong tendency to he projected (in imagination) into the
environment, as artlessly pictured.
It has been frequently argued th^t the prevalence of
the mystic experience, and its strong reality-feeling, justify
its postulates . It is admitted that the character of thought
(with its urge to objectivity) is of such a nature as to call
for the assumption of the reality of the external world.
(Integrated perception, and volitional and social experience,
confirm the postulate of objectivity.) , It may be admitted that
the v;ide-spread tendency to have and to enjoy the mystic con-
sciousness - v;ith its practical (wholesome) outcome - tend to
does
establish (in so far) its genuine subjective worth. But it deea
not follow tlmt the two assertions will fuse into one thesis:
that the habit of making an objective reference in thinl^ing
can legitimately be practiced in the case of the subjective
(emotional and imaginative) mystic states. The common argument
has no cogency whatsoever; the merging of the tv/o judgments
involves a subtle fallacy.
James H. Leuba gives a psychological explanation of
"the Unreality of the Real" and "the Sense of Invisible
Presence." (Article, "Invisible Presences," the Atlantic
Konthly, January, 1927) He points out tliat the conviction of
the reality of a person (recognition of a friend) does not
depend merely on familiar perception, but on the awakening
by these impressions of complex reactions, among which the
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emotional factors play a conspicuous role. Knowing a person
means "being able to anticipate his thoughts, feelings and
in
actions; and tliat involves the production with/us, by his
presence, of certain feelings, emotions, thoughts, and volitions.
It is the production of these effects which gives to the sight
of a person the vivid, intimate meaning characteristic of a
real presence." (Op. cit., p. 80) The measure of this anticipa-
tion is found in the infinite nuances of behavior corresponding
to an infinite variety of impressions.
When this complex pattern of inner responses is absent,
mere perception of the person is utterly unconvincing. (Leuba
gives pathological instance^). "On the contrary, whenever these
inner responses exist, the impression of a real presence is
produced, even in the absence of any sensation from the external
world," providing (it might be added) that the imagination is
active, the critical faculties dormant, or an effective sugges-
tion is given. The fancied individuality of the invisible
person will be determined, of course, by dominant preoccupa-
tion or concern, or by suggestion. We must remember also the
powerful reenforcem*ent of vague emotion, dread, fear or joy.
Suggestions from the fringe region of consciousness may be very
effective. Hallucinations may be involved.
It follOT/s tliat the sense of the presence of God is
no proof of his presence or existence. "The mystic is mistaken
when he gives the sense of warm, personal intimacy he has
experienced as proof of the reality of the Presence." (Op. cit.)
Nevertheless, genuine valuations may lead, or con-
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enrich and empower the idealizing process. In spite of many
extravagances, mysticism has been beautiful and worthy because
it has been the nourisher of values, and often in the history
of civilization has been the producer of pioneer thinking.
(Mysticism has had a double tendency: to reenforce familiar
symbols, and therefore orthodoxy and tyranny; and to break with
the forms of sacerdotalism, and hence v/ith the claims of
ecclesiastical organization). At its best, mysticism has
intensified loyalty to the more intangible worths of experience.
If this intensification and clarification of the
appreciative mood be called knowledge, then mysticism may be
said to add to our comprehension of the possibilities of human
life . But there is no evidence that the mystic trance adds one
iota of information concerning the structiore of the universe.
It opens no secret door.
Mysticism merely causes familiar values to glow with
a brighter light, or to take on a vaster (imagined) significance,
or discovers values in some hitherto unnoticed, or perhaps im-
suspected, relations. These ideal estimates are necessarily
the precipitates or developments of the more commonplace judg-
ments of daily experience . Here we have a tv/o-fold source
of the novelty found in the mystic rapture. The meditation
involved may create meanings, may make new interpretations.
It is not necessary to discuss mysticism and the "sub-
conscious." It is enough to note the fact that many judgments,
appraisals (especially of an emotional sort) are drawn from the
marginal field of attention. Hence their genealogy is often
unnoticed, and therefore their causation is attributed to
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supernatural influences. Moreover, mood and emotion have
physical (unconscious) determinants, often mysteriously
perplexing, oppressive or elating. We shall return to this
theme later, in our discussion of William James.
Mysticism, as poetic idealism, may have more than
historical or biographical worth. It may be a legitimate phase
of the modern appreciative, striving life (all too meager and
hectic), and therefore a permanent aspect of religious ex-
perience. Under its quickening influence, duty may be
transmuted into loyalty to a Cause, greatly and imaginatively
conceived. Morality, which is a tv/ o-dimensional affair, is
thereby afforded nev/ vaultings, and therefore new horizons.
Its idealism becomes thjr’ee-dimensional
.
Religion adds something to "mere morality." To be
generous, free and daring, life can not be* lived on the common-
place plane of factual human ness. It must be lived with the
quickening consciousness of the surrounding Mystery, suggesting
boundless possibilities of destiny. Every line of scientific
and cooperative experience leads to the threshold of this
mystery of being. Before this enveloping power, in its infinity
(or indefinite extension) and in its ultimate (or unknown) sig-
nificance, the member of society is endowed with a nev/ sense of
humility, and attains personal elevation.
Ee waits and wonders; he may bow his head in reverence;
he may worship. He may go much farther, and confidently specul-
ate concerning the nature of this ultimate Mystery. He may go
farther, and dogmatize. However, the more certain he becomes,
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truth in a suggestion which Chesterton makes somewhere, that
only the agnostic can be truly religious, in the tender and
T^^istful sense of the v/ord, with the passionate wonder of the
poet-mystic
•
In our social thinking we need this new humility and
this nev/ confidence* Perhaps they will appear only with the
coming of a more comprehensive view of things. This will
suggest the contribution of philosophy to social science. We
are still rather wofully parochial in our outlook; in political
thought, in ethical theory, in religious idealization. It may
be that a genuinely cosmopolitan spirit is the chief need of
the hour. Decidedly we have had enough of sentimental generali-
zations, futile doctrines, fanatic counsels and conventional
expectations. We have had more than enough of childish
optimism and of heroic pessimism. We are ready for the
emancipation of the mind.
The world is waiting now^or a more general recognition
of the natural fact that we do not look full upon the face of
life. If we could do so, the sight would mean nothing to us.
To see everything at once v/ould be equivalent to seeing nothing.
We must be content with effective understandings and with
demonstrable ideals.
Art is the fine and enduring Esperanto of the spirit's
speech just because its eloquence springs from tangible figures,
and soars with the flash of color and the lilt of song. The
moralist has been in the habit of suspecting art; in part his
fears have been justified. Our social theorizing must be more
artistic, and our artistic creations more profoundly imbued with
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the spirit and pov/er of morality. We must study the principles
of esthetics, and emulate the artist's skill in dealing with
life's elusive values.
Our theory will probably grow less didactic, and more
suggestive. By the creative artist, life is seen in silhouette.
He deals not in literal absolutes, nor in super-experiential
realities, altho his thouight quivers with extra meanings. He
is steeped in the appreciation, and cognizant of the activity,
of his own time, and is aware of its dazed gropings. By reason
of his superior sensitiveness and his expressive skill, he can
tell men of things that they had dimly guessed. He is an utter
patriot, and therefore a citizen of all centuries. The prophets
of Israel have challenged the ethical mind of the ages because
they were stalwart nationalists. The melodies of the world's
supreme poets move in racial rhythms. The social thinker
must have an empirical interest in movements and motives; he
must have lifting horizons and a fine artistry.
Such a realization will prick many bubbles and check
some boimding enthusiasms. It will destroy the cults of the
hour, - no loss; for we are perishing for lack of clarity and
poise and power. If we learn to look upon the entrancirxg
profile of reality, we shall distrust a too buxom metaphysics
which rejoices in the mathematics of matter. V/e can not
believe that reality floats so blithely and so unconcernedly
in and out of our ken. Reality is more organic and more av^ful
than this
.
We shall mistrust an airy confidence in Democracy.
Who has looked upon its countenance? If this fair social
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ideal is indeed reality in the making, scarcely more than its
profile is now revealed to our anxious gaze. But we shall not
fear. We shall the more clear-mindedly and courageously accept
the challenge of these revealings . As v/e trust less to
Democracy, we shall believe the more in democratic facts and
principles. Altho vie may not gaze into the eyes of Eternity,
we may contemplate in a sort of ecstasy the profile of reality.
This is the truth of idee^ls
.
But we V7ill not scorn ary form of v/holesome and
pragmatic symbolism. We may say that the exalted customary
religious mood is the sublimation of the experience of friend-
ship. It is human affection carried out and exalted to a
universal enthusiasm. It is the poetry of the home cadenced
to more majestic rhythms till it becomes the poetry of the
universe
.
This is not the careful stepping of the mind from
perplexity to amazement • It is the vast and splendid flicker
of the imagination, like the lightning splendid and unshackled.
Concrete, familiar imagery may still be used, even tho now the
purpose is not the indication of a particular value, but rather
a suggestion of the largest v/orthfulness of life. Bearing in
mind the uncritical, practical attitude, the representation of
this worthfulness as God the Father (with the related symbols)
may be more nearly adequate than any other language would be
.
But by very reason of its function in naive devotion and in
practical activity, it becomes selective and partial in outlook,
and hence foregoes the point-of-view, and with it the preroga-
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Genuine religion is the projection of ideals and
their progressive realization in the realms of thought,
appreciation and social achievement. (Some of the fields of
religious idealism are; Science in the service of the community
life, Friendship v/ith its love and loyalty. Art, Music and
Literature in their more imiversal aspects. Love of nature
as consolation and inspiration, Meditation on high and
practical themes. Service as a passion. Education v/here
enthusiastic guidance is given to the av/akening mind and heart,
Adventure for freedom's sake, the Kingdom of peace and good-
is found
will,) . The philosophical interpretation of these values /in
terms of empirical idealism. B’cr their naive comprehension
and imcritical use, the same values may be clothed in more
picturesque phrase and in simpler, more familiar beauty.
Meanwhile the poet will employ his soaring melodies, seeking
the vanishing form of a glory not possessed nor fully com-
prehended. The essential experience is the love of Beauty
and the quest of the Beyond. Religion remains the Great
Adventure. The choice of expression will depend on the need,
and the purpose
.
We must be patient even with bizarre insights and
with the fanatic’s vision. Idealism does not always develop
in symmetric fashion, and the philosophy of revolt contains a
strange accounting. Of course we shall seek in all legitimate
ways to secure just understanding and wholesome harmony.
A democracy will never save itself thru the mere
existence of a camp of reactionaries and a camp of revolution-
ists. Neither is the tolerance on the part of conservatives
’ •*
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and radicals sufficient. We need a new tolerance. The
negative tolerance of supercilious indulgence, or of cold
or cowardly forbearance, should be abandoned. It is not
good enough for the tv/entieth century, even tho it was an
improvement (in some of its forms) in the past. We need the
positive tolerance of sympathetic sharing of insights, of
cordial cooperation. We should study the inter^^orkings,
and the respective values, of conservative and liberal
principles. For this purpose, the modern philosophy of
history, such as is presented in that splendid volume,
”The Making of the Modern Mind, A Survey of the Intellectual
Background of the Present Age," by John H. Randall, is in-
valuable .
At this point, social idealism may learn much from
the sometimes erratic course, and yet healthy evolution, of
Art. Many a time, revolt has served the useful purpose
of restoring the balance v^hen the social motif has come to
overbalance the personal motif, in the creation and mainten-
ance of art. (See the chapter on "Tradition and Revolt" in
"The Spirit and Substance of Art," by L. W. Flaccus.) . We
have creative eruption, as Flaccus calls it, when individuals
refuse to accept uincritically the current and accredited.
"Great rebels refuse to compromise. . • .
Theirs is not the fault if little minds ape their ways
and reduce them to a rigmarole, or if rebels flaunt
selves v/hich are not worth expressing. The right to
revolt is a dangerous one, but in spite of its frequent
misuses, it is a right that ought to be exercised in
the interests of a strongly personal art.
"The story, then, of art is one of tradition
and revolt: of the interplay of discipline and creative
freedom; of the steadying processes of elaboration and
social mastery, broken into and saved from a deadly
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mechanization by the force of individual artists who
are not afraid of nev; paths of aim and technique, and
who save themselves from caprice by the weight, bulk
and masterfulness of their artistic genius." (Op. cit.,
p. 394, 395)
This process will be recognized as fitting into, and
as illustrating, our philosophy of ideals. This fine develop-
ment is not the achievement of art in any narrov/ly professional
sense. It is the triumph of the4thioal spirit, as well. It is
/
accomplished by the splendid and impressive cooperation of all
ideals in the making of a nev/ civilization, a world of
illimitable horizons.
5. Primacy of factors in valuational consciousness
In our study of the idealizing process, and in our
interpretation of the types of ideals, we adopted the view
that the expression of man’s nature is threefold, and demands
a threefold statement: one reflects, one feels, one wills.
These three expressions were discriminated, but not kept
separate, nor accorded isolated treatment. The ideal con-
sciousness, in every one of its major forms, is the life of
the whole personality. "In each there is something of all,"
and in the whole each has its appropriate function.
Personality is a unique unity. It is such an inter-
penetrated unity that in every part of experience will be
found all factors, every one necessary to the others. Analysis
involves abstraction. In the case of the religious conscious-
ness, as the high manifestation of mentality, its varying forms
of expression are only modes of the one idealizing process.
This has been virtually denied by some thinkers, who
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do not recognize the intimate relationship of the ideals of
reflection, appreciation and moral striving, nor realize that
all are factors in the integrated experience where the true is
the beautiful, and the beautiful is the good. For instance, a
critic holds that art has nothing to do with morality; but hear
the words of Sidney Lanier, who is quoted (I do not know the
reference) as saying: "Ke who has not yet perceived how
artistic and moral beauty spring from a common origin and
toward a common goal, who therefore is not a__fire with moral
just as with artistic beauty, who has not come to that stage of
quiet and eternal frenzy in which the beauty of holiness and
the holiness of beauty mean one thing, burn as one fire, shine
as one light v/ithin him, is not yet the great artist."
However, the question might be propounded: within the
unity of idealization, which is its most intimate or primary
manifestation? Which is the central expression of the
religious consciousness: the intellectual, the esthetic^ or the
ethical, ideal?
Many uphold the first alternative. John Caird (in
"An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion") was fond of
maintaining that the central principle in the many-sided
aspects of the spiritual life is Thought . For it is only in
thought that v/e can transcend our finitude to grasp the
universal and infinite. (Query: is this the function of
thought?
)
Others insist upon the primacy of feeling. Writes
Everett: "We conclude that, in religion, feeling has the
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that thought is private as well as feeling, and that community
of feeling is the end to v/hich community of thought is the
means. ("Psychological Elements of Religious Faith," chap-
ter II.) (Query: Is any feeling or emotion "the end"?)
Is either one of these viev/s clear in its assignment
of "primacy"? Ro| both theories are false in premise and
in inference. In regard to the double formulation of the
question in the middle of the preceding page, I shall state
that the first formulation has no answer: no one manifesta-
tion is primary; every one is primary from the point-of -view
of its unique function. In regard to the second formulation
of the question, I believe that there is a real sense in v^hich
it may be said that the ethical manifestation holds a
centrality, which may be defended from the biological, the
psychological, and the idealistic, viev;’-points .
Lack of clarity here will result in strange notions.
For instance, it will be held that thought is the solvent of
all things; emotion may be tolerated in small quantities, but
it is by nature perverse and deceiving; it is narrow and earthly.
Or, it may be held that feeling is the pearl of great price; in
emotional experience we find the universal life; then we may
dispense with the crutches with v^hich poor, lame reason totters
along; v/e may escape from the pettiness of thinking. As for
volition, it may be relegated to a foot-note, considered as a
peculiar, intangible process, and summarily dismissed from a
serious psychology of religionl (See Pratt, "The Psychology
of Religious Belief," p. 6, foot-note.)
In this interesting foot-note of Pratt’s there is at
7..'
t
.. :t, r-'tRVl'sq .’i: J'i'.ai
cAi si; VJ a^/jTuTiOO rl • (u'u ri.t lo
GTir- 01 jc f-x ; , 7 ;. s Ji-rrjjri-,..: I OJT. or! pTj!;6'l”) . r: obi
( i' *l3no -1 '* noi&omr *.;• v/ti; -e-'i el j /TOLrp) (.^T -,
-uif^Xo a^.oiy oaeil r ' o.'c..* b'I
^ L'crji ',!.; rcr ooXi^'l .^'ib jirfou v ? '\rijinrx'i.7 ** lo









-jifi- Qrtf •: : oit XiRli/i'V':* 't Jb X »' 'J
.1
'‘•‘X:'’ mo^'t //..-x'xX'tq ‘-i. 'Cioy-.- ;\jiBn!inq &i noii
Aols-oUKiAO'z /.'/• 'ryf'!.; 0/(.f Ov,*’ t" :; :'/Q*Tf‘ " , ••jiwr'tti;? L'li 'i'6
.I v/ w 'A.l n-rtoa la^i b a* cv . i-. tk, Jooxip oil.^ ‘io
-1 iBojifJe 0:1'J i’-oriJ b-^^n du' viitEi :iX
rtrfJ
,












H ; > A CC.Y'.3 nt f V-SCI CiO t, ; .'Viirfi CXj9
-.-vi"u s MO^n/ijn' ai dX • ’rrj \ Xacab n„. si
o
' i X'jr, ,;bo-;,'7, '30 ilBOu t 7 flJE •V.''i raw Xv.ttxl ecf J"! ^'^^5
-v rt'j.i.i jeXil Xi‘,37 . ’.'Ltlj' ftrtci hriXi ew oor:.' i’loqxe Iartoi*omV
'n-i.tc.. ,'^.cr;q|^c»,’ A'f flirvf ^lodbdij'ic <;>dt rltX'* f-in^aK ib




ti jort • tool oj irGie^vl’-yi &i J L- ^ffolJXIov
.e- :uri'i i /.oa*:! b' i'b rX iVr,:: -Fiqc^too'i ' til liif Bini ,'-..'.i'i:i./ ^8e-









I -•* » *
1-




least a recognition of the unique character of volition,
considered of course as an aspect of the conscious process,
not as an element or faculty. This is what we v/ould expect
from the biological approach, v/hich indicates that psychic life
has been evolved as an instrument of adjustment. There is that
about volitional activity which seems to include, and to find
expression in, the reflective and the esthetic processes.
This suggests the function, and therefore the nature,
of volition; and perhaps justifies the postulation of its
"centrality” in idealization. It may be that, in this
centrality of reference, there may be involved a kind of pre-
eminence of value
.
Idealization is primari^ reflection, from the point-
of-viev; of the function of thought: illumination and guidance.
Idealization is primarily emotional appreciation, from the
viev/-point of the function of feeling-affection (with its
wider emotional configurations): vitalization, or the supply-
ing of that warmth and intimacy, and that satisfaction, which
create the core of value. Idealization is primarily volitional-
ethical in the sense that will is a convenient name by which
to characterize the whole personality as an active, striving
process. If the "will" is not a third factor, but rather
the entire process of consciousness in its most fundamental
biological nature, then it is just (as far as words can
suggest the organic, unpicturable situation) to assign a unique
"centrality" to "will".
Hence our key-word has been "idealizing process;" for
the valuational consciousness is essentially an attitude, a
It.
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striving, which is the result of needs and demands, sublimated
in ideality. It is the striving to knovr and to feel, to be
sure, but is rather the striving achieve in knowing and in
feeling. In this process, the cognizing of reality and the
I
vitalizing by the emotional nature ar^ecessary factors. And
the discriminated phases of process are simultaneous and inter-
blending in the ineluctable unity of conscious bein^g.
Everett insists that in the very activity of the will
is "the confirmation of the primacy of feeling. For what the
will is trying to bring about is a new condition of feeling;
feeling is the essential." (Ibid.) Rather is it not true that
the trying -to-bring-about is the essential? Feeling and the
desire-to-have-the-feeling are two different things; and the
latter is -the determining factor, and is volitional.
In most cases, the object is desired as the goal of ef-
fort, as the object of striving, and hence has directly a cona-
tive reference. But even in the cases where the object is de-
sired for the sake of the feeling which its possession will
stimulate, that the feeling is the goal does not make the
feeling primary or determining; nor does the fact that will
determines the possession, that is, is directed to an end,
make volition secondary. It is the essence of will to strive
to realize a purpose, and the volitional nature is enhanced and
ennobled in that process. V/ill (self-conscious conation) is
made more by creating efficient attitudes
.
Needs, desires, wishes are conative. Feeling and
emotion exist only in relation to these fundamental urges.
It is significant that, in a later chapter, Everett admits
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this very contention: "When I spoke of the primacy of feeling,
I had in mind its primacy in manifestation rather than in
fact." (Op. cit., p. 141, 142) This is not clear; is not
conation a fact also, that is, known in consciousness? "V/e
do not desire a thing because it is desirable; it becomes
desirable as we desire it, as it meets some instinctive demand
of our nature."
Everett is correct in this admission. It is true of
action even when feeling is the desired end-result. In voli-
tions of the higher type, in ethical acts, feeling is not the
end. The value of the moral deed is its ovm end and justifica-
tion. A kind act is performed not for the sake of the feeling
of pleasure which follov/s, but for the sake of the inherent
worth of the act itself.
Life is action. Intelligence functions properly as
the guide of activity in paths excellent and beautiful. Con-
templation should be an inspiration to endeavor; esthetic
delight should not interfere with life's stream, but fulfills
its mission in making the flov; serene and joyous.
With this conclusion there is bound up a judgment of
profound significance concerning the preeminence of volition
and of ethical idealism. From the point-of -view of logical
understanding, formulation, thought is fundamental; from that
of satisfaction, appreciation, love, the life of feeling is
primary. From the point-of-view of inner reference, will is
basic. In this primacy of volition there is centered a unity
of the whole nature, and human life is viev/ed in the light of
its most complete comprehension.
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If this be true, does not thought recognize it, and
does not the feeling of satisfaction validate it? If so, are
not reason and emotion (one or the other, or both) reinstated
as supreme, at the expense of the volitional nature? No;
thought is supreme as seer; the emotional nature is supreme in
supplying the intimate core of value. It is the office of
neither to constitute the dynamic principle of psychic life.
Both function rightly as the servants of the life process.
If thought fails in this function, it becomes a pallid and
puerile affair. If emotion fails, it becomes unwholesome and
dangerous
.
After all, we are primarily social beings. Delight
in worship of beauty and ecstasy of high thinking are
transcended in that v/hich Wordsworth, with all his exquisite
V
appreciation of nature, called "that best portion of a good
man's life, his little, nameless, unremembered acts of kindness
and of love."
V/e have stressed the fact that logical ideals have
their ov/n intrinsic meaning. Ideals of beauty are not derived
forms of ethical ideals; the former possess their own peculiar
radiance. Nevertheless, both the esthetic ideal and the
reflective ideal acknowledge their inner dependence upon the
will of man, and its wholesome satisfaction. Ethical idealism
is pervasive and determining, seeking the conservation and
increase of character values. The moral consciousness is not
a dictator, however, and must not disparage nor invade other
legitimate fields of idealization. We have discussed this
in
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The adjustment of life’s major interests is often
a difficult and trying matter. We must insist that the moral
consciousness, vrhen rationa.1 and sane, enjoys a real supremacy.
The great artists have understood this . Deprived of this
accounting, art has always exhibited a deplorable tendency
to degenerate. It is subject to fads and fancies. V/ith
v/oful readiness, it becomes superf icia-lly sensuous, and hence
its devotees grow sensual. The true lovers of art should set
themselves against these tendencies to triviality and banality
and voluptuousness. Much of contemporary so-called art is
decadent, even contemptible. This sort of offering is flippant,
drearily obscure, merely clever, sentimentally pessimistic,
precious, s^sational or sensual. Note the pessimistic pre-
occupation, and even morbidly cynical obsession, in present-
day "art." Its exponents are frequently fanatical in their
attitude, and vicious in their methods.
"The final judgment as to beauty can come only from
one who combines a delicate appreciation of technique v/ith a
v/ide insight into life and a sane perspective of its values."
(Durant Drake, "Problems of Conduct," p. 274) The preroga-
tives and contributions of art I have defended in a previous
section. The actual solution of the difficult social problem
must come thru an insight intuitive, pragmatic. It will call
for the operation of an intelligence for which no rules can
be put dov/n. It must be cooperative; it will involve many
compromises and some permanent friction. In a world, of widely
varying needs and temperaments, solutions must be tentative
and partial. In the real world, ideals are not altogether
symmetrical, nor harmonious.
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V/hayare the implice-tione for the religious con-
sciousness? Ethical idea,lism has no religious sanctions, a.s
they are called. Solutions of our prohlems of adjustment must
be worked out on the rational basis and in empirical terms.
Nevertheless, a fusion of contemplative (rational and esthetic)
elements with dynamic (social) elements (in which, kinesthetic
factors are prominent), both referring to the immensities of
the cosmic background, will yield the impression of the
Sublime. (Objectified and personified in a divine Character,
with the quality of righteousness stressed, vre have the sense,
or vision, of Holiness^
.
The religious consciousness (as v/e have defined it),
with its vista and solemnity, will contribute to experience
a majesty of proportion, and a dignity, which will serve to
create an attitude of humility and a spirit of understanding
sympathy
.
This general viev/ of the psychic life, and our v/hole
theory of ideals, leads to a rejection of mechanistic de-
terminism, and to the acceptance of rational determinism,
self-direction thru the operation of immanent principles, a
nature.! process of realization.
No form of vrords is very satisfactory. Probably the
only real knowledge of the will act is found in the experience
of volition, not in any theory about it. However, some sort
of determinism at least reflects my conviction that all parts
of experience are lav/fully inter related, that no real cleavage
exists in the world of reality, experienced or/known.
Our theory of ideals favors, and is favored by, the
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concept of '’emergent evolution" as worked out, for example, in
C. Lloyd Morgan's book of that title* Life is in the making:
new values successively appear on higher levels; novel meanings
com.e into being; fresh achievements are. made . But the principle
of continuity, hov;ever defined, (which evolution appears to
validate) would seem to rule out (make improbable, or unreal)
essential cha-nce or caprice, in a universe of law.
C. S. Peirce (in "Chance, Love and Logic"), William
James (in "Some Problems of Philosophy," p. 139-141), Hans
Driesch (in "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism") and
Henri Bergson (in "Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays," "Creative
Evolution," etc.), have argued for the reality of cliance,
indetermii^^, freedom of creativity. Their language is not
always clear ;their positions are somewhat dubious. But at
least they h-ave stressed the organic, becoming aspect of life,
the presence of spontaneity, insurgence (whatever these really
m.ay be) in nature. - I have given above (p. 67) a suggestion
for the conceiving of novel insight in empirical, scientific
terms. V/e must bear in mind, too, th-at much tliat is genuinely
novel to the individual is new in liis acquaintance, strange to
his memory system, not necessarily an absolutely original
creation in himian life.
As a critical empiricist I believe, granting the
directive character of conscious experience, that evolution
takes orderly ("predictable") lines of growth; that is, given
all the conditions, life’s forms are inevitable, and its
process determined - not mechanically, but organically, or
rationally (on the more developed planes). Even the more
o^i
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involved processes of idealization must be thought of as
continuous, lawful. It is inconceivable that a wayward
(uncaused), fickle or capricious factor should be present.
If so, v/here does it come from, and why should it come? This
is pure magic; it can not be clearly stated; it is actually
unthinkable. The "will” could not funi&h furnish this
mythological factor; for "will" is merely a convenient term
for the whole conscious process, where the principle of causa-
tion obtains as much as anywhere else in the universe.
This position is buttressed by the whole weight of
the physical sciences, the biological sciences, by psychology,
ethics and logic. Vitalists may assert the existence of an
element of contingency, nev/ or unrelated beir^, but can do
nothing v/ith it (as it seems to their critics); it remains a
bare characterization, or sentimental claim, an awkward viay
of insisting that life is manifold and mysterious. In their
genuine explanations, they employ the principle of continuity
and the category of causation. They must do so; for wjy%/out
them there can be no explanation, no coherence, no rationality.
Of course, we do not knov; much about continuity, or
causation, or evolution. But one is obliged to take the prevail-
ing attitude which all considerations render most reasonable.
Ignorance does not justify the recourse to a myth.
A careful and sympathetic definition of the problem
would probably go a long way tov/ard solving it, and v/ould
indicate that a rationally and organically conceived determinism
and a freedom of "spontaneity," of inner, ideal direction, are
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Method in Philosophy,*' p. 236.) The traditional controversy
largely misconceived the problem, and to that extent its
discussion was irrelevant. The true nature of the "freedom
of the will" emerges with sufficient clarity and power in
the critical and appreciative study of the idealizing process.
D. The Function of Philosophy in the Perspective of the
Progress of Thought
According to our thesis, ideals are tentative formula-
tions of value for the clarifying and ordering of experience;
they are provisional thought-forme projected by the imagina-
tion for the purpose of suggesting new reaches of experience.
They are constantly subject to revision; they are continually
modified in the course of their vital functioning. They are
validated only in and thru experience, and in no other sense
are revelatory of reality.
In the long epic of human thinking, the specific
descriptive interest of science and the more general interpre-
tative interest of philosophy have had curious interrelations
and a significant history. Science and philosophy have made
many blunders; each has hindered the other. Thru dramatic
clashes, and by wholesome cooperation, each has helped the
other to a better understanding of its function and method.
By steady pressure, philosophy has brought science to a social
interest, thus making it more friendly to idealism; while
science has slowly weaned philosophy away from its arrogant,
absolutist ic pretensions, from its sterile abstractions, thereby
inducing it to recognize empirical requirements. The following
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of the Scientific Method, v/hich has yielded (altho often
reluctantly) to the pull of philosophy, which has always been
interested in the larger, valuational interpretation of life;
and in the curves (A, and B), where Philosophy has been bent
(after prolonged and stubborn resistance) out of its former
(relatively) uncritical course. The dotted line (h - h) in-
dicates the scientific materialism and mechanism, which refused
to yield to the philosophic pressure. The curve (A) shov/s the
Critical Philosophy, as the result of which the Philosophy line
was pulled to a position at right angles to its former direc-
tion. The dotted line (M--M) indicates philosophic speculation
losing itself in the sands of time, having refused to answer the
challenge of experimental developments (inductive thinking).
Of course this is an over-simplification. Scientific
and philosophic interests and aims have always been more or
less intermingled. But I believe that there is an exceedingly
important development in the progress of thought, which the
diagram aptly reveals. And it is understood that science and
philosophy developed under their own leadership, and willingly
- as far as the progressive leaders v/ere concerned.
The sciences broke away from Philosophy (generalized
Wisdom) successively, thru the working out of specialized
techniques. (In a few representative cases, I hs-ve indicated
the transitional stages: e.g., astrology, celestial spheres;
catastrophic geology. Every science has preliminary stages of
pseudo-scientific development). Science also grew out of
the early arts and crafts (primitive technology). V7ith the
latter, magic was considerably involved; and magic h^s influenced
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the early and intermediate periods of science-grovrth all the
way along; e.g., alchemy. I do not think it is correct, hov;-
ever, to say that the sciences (in the proper sense) developed
directly from primitive magic.
The horizontal line, PHILOSOPHY, is the line of progress,
as opposed to the vertical line (5), which is the static line,
representing 99^ (plus) of the total population of ?/estern
Europe, past and present. The line of progress represents the
sma.ll minority (a fraction of one per cent.), who have been
aggressive, dissatisfied, courageous. These are the pioneers
of thought and culture, quick of curiosity, eager in apprecia-
tion. I do not distinguish too sharply between the aggressive
line and the defensive line. The light line (1) indicates that a
considerable amount of magic, convention and tradition passes
into the Philosophy and Science development; and the light line
(3) suggests that a little something of the more vital ethical
and intellectual interest seeps into the static attitude. But,
in general, magic and convention and tradition determine the
character of the defensive line of custom, superstition and
authority; while the more vital social intercourse and the
tribal religious ceremonial (mediating genuine group values),
thru curiosity and value appreciation (see heavy line (4)),
develop into mythologies, then theogonies (compare Hesiod and
the other pre-philosophic Greek achievements), and cosmologies.
From these interests and achievements. Philosophy finally emerges.
This diagram does not show the precise order in which
the sciences arose, but merely indicates that order in a general
way. It appears that the more abstract, objective and impersonal
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sciences were erected first. Then the more concrete,
manipulative disciplines were evolved. Then came, with
their special methodologies, the sciences of organic life,
of society, of the mental processes. Finally, the empirical
method was employed in the valuational studies. This was
the triumph of the philosophic interpretative spirit.
But it was a victory without dishonor to the
opponent; for, in the curve B, we find Philosophy itself
becoming empirical, forsv/earing its ancient pretensions to
heavenly insight and to absolute knowledge. To be sure, only
comparatively few philosophic leaders have made the thoro
capitulation to the scientific method, gracefully accepting
the terms of the armistice. Many philosophers do not see,
or repudiate, the necessity of taking the curve B, and remain
in the line (A - B), boldly erecting rationalistic systems of
metaphysics, or championing absolutistic theologies.
Such a one not only wastes valuable time and energy,
but obscures the whole issue. Ee is busily engaged in per-
petuating ancient, futile and petty mysteries, and is making
it difficult for students to perceive the single, splendid
and enduring mystery of life. He does not fully comprehend
the symbolic nature of concepts; otherwise he would not be so
naively confident in the power of thought to transcend ex-
perience. Ee does not adequately understand the instrumental
theory of Imowledge, the biological view of mind, or the empir-
ical notion of the idealizing process. Bis philosophy is clever,
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coherent, in the sense of enjoying an inner, formal consistency,
and also in the sense of integrating with life (by a liberal
and athletic adjustment thru faith and fancy). But consistency
is no guarantee of validity in a system of thought, the premises
of which are unsound; nor is an agile and gymnastic faith con-
vincing. Such a one is shocked by the imputation concerning
the illogical nature of his reasoning. (I have pointed out
these fallacies in several of the critical portions of this
. an adequate
dissertation.) . But he has not comprehension of
the truth. He never will comprehend it until he comes to under-
stand the empirical method. He can not do this so long as he
secretly despises the method, and deems the empiricist a shallow
or superficial investigator.
Another type of philosopher has lost faith in the
rationalistic speculation (A - B), and has passed beyond this
line forever. But he has failed to the curve B, and
is lost in other futile sands of pessimism, or of cynicism, of
"disciplined skepticism," or of the effeminate sentimentalism
of the dilettante. In the diagram, this is represented by the
dotted line H.
They v/ho, v;ith clear and cordial mind, make the turn
B, empirical phiJLosoph^, come to a sound and enduring Philosophy
of Value
.
(The diagram willingly admits that there are many
theories of value, partially illuminating, which do not fully
recognize the validity of the empirical method, and seek to
fit values into some rationalistic scheme.).
Here then is a most magnificent panorama I From
Mysterious Pov/er and primitive ceremonial to an empirical
coL
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philosophy of value is an epic march; it is a survey of im-
pressive proportions to one who finds religious value in the
progressive emancipation of the human mind. In the outcome at
the present time we have peace with honor; for it^ the shared
victory of science and of philosophy in an inevitable and whole-
some cooperation. It is the reconstruction of Philosophy on an
empirical basis; it is the broadening and humanizing of Science.
It is more than an amazing victory: it is a prophetic
triumph. The imagination is stirred profoundly by the anticipa-
tion of a new epoch just beginning, which opens up unlimited
possibilities of development in thought, in appreciation, and
in mutual understanding. This moving experience is the religion
of the future
.
John Dewey has presented this general view in his
’’Reconstruction in Philosophy." Philosophy has frequently
arrogated to itself "the office of demonstrating the existence
of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality, and of revealing
to man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality.
It has therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher
organ of knowledge • • ." (Op. cit.. Chapter I., "Changing
Conceptions of Philosophy," p. 23) If we come to an empirical
understanding of the matter,
"the history of philosophy will take on a new signific-
ance .... Instead of the disputes of rivals about the
nature of reality, we have the scene of human clash of
social purpose and aspirations. Instead of impossible
attempts to transcend experience, v/e have the significant
record of the efforts of men to formulate the things of
experience to vvhich they are most deeply and passionately
attached. ...
"When it is acknowledged that under disguise of
dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been
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traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social
ends and from a^ conflict of inherited institutions with
incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen
that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men*s
ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their ovm day.
• . . • That v/hioh may be pretentiously unreal when it is
formulated in metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely
significant when connected with the drama of the struggle
of social beliefs and ideals. Philosophy which surrenders
its somev/hat barren monopoly of dealings with Ultimate and
Absolute Reality will find a compensation in enlightening
the moral forces which move mankind and in contributing to
the aspirations of men to attain to a more ordered and
intelligent happiness." (Op. cit., p. 25-27)
Dewey is not unmindful of the value of poetic atmos-
phere and of religion's expansive horizons:
"We are weak today in ideal matters because
intelligence is divorced from aspiration. The bare
force of circumstance compels us onwards in the daily
detail of our beliefs and acts, but our deeper thoughts
and desires turn backwards. V/hen philosophy shall have
cooperated with the course of events, and made clear and
coherent the meaning of the daily detail, science and
emotion will interpenetrate, practice and imagination
v/ill embrace. Poetry and religious feeling will be the
unforced flowers of life. To further this articulation
and revelation of the meanings of the current course of
events is the task and problem of philosophy in days of
transition." (Op. cit., p. 212-213)
E. Concluding Note on the Metaphysical Evaluation of Ideals
In philosophical speculation, over-analysis is un-
fortunate. It defeats the ends of reflection. For the final
synthesis then becomes so artificial that it fails to re-
capture the primary quality of experience. That v/hich is
really desired (I suppose) in the end is a synoptic viev/ of
experience; but this now can be offered only in terms so
distant that the reality-feeling must be excused from attendance.
I would not set up arbitrary limits . I know that minds
differ widely in their understanding of that which constitutes
genuine and useful analysis. I would not disparage any serious
theory. The trar-scendentalist requires the objective reference of
'ST'
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idealization. He claims that his nature demands the assumption
for the production of the sense of reality. The reply is that
the reality-feeling by itself is not enough; it may attach
itself as an illusory quality to almost any judgment. It must
be justified by logical reasoning, inductive as Yiell as deductive.
Nevertheless, philosophy v/ill recognize this insistent
demand as a datum. Taken by itself, this deme-nd might enjoy
a certain plausible character, to the degree that the need
correctly interprets itself. I!uch of the supposed native need
may be the result of conventional, or habitual, expectation.
If this deme.nd clearly understands itself, and if it could
maintain itself in isolation, it would retain a certain plausib-
ility, and a quality of realness would attach itself to the
belief in question.
The case is hypothetical: this demand can not maintsAn
itself in isolation. There remains the clia 1hng e : does the
belief integrate with the body of knowledge? For many thinkers,
the very difficulty of making the mighty venture of a trans-
cendental faith seems to be enough to force reality into the
conception. It would rather appear that, if the Universe is
so very different from the universe we knov;, then the validity
of th^ypothesis is weakened to the extent of the degree of
that difference. The transcendentalist takes pride in the
feat of believing in a spiritual realm different from the
knovm order of reality. This is not admirable in the eyes of
the empiricist.
The order of conscious life, which the evolutionary
sciences describe, is a specialized form of reality, highly
a.Biii3C9eJb' t^'saJ'sn e-lc®M3-
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complex in comparison Y/ith the rest of the observed universe.
It is developed on a pl8.net Yzhich is a member of a vast system
of energy v/hose nature other sciences, the physical sciences,
are concerned with studying. To all appearances r-ature is "cold
and indifferent." V/here then is there an order of consciousness
other than that of human nature? Mind, consciousness, personality,
is developed in the midst of many stresses and strains. It is
limited, vexed, defeated. When victorious, it succeeds thru
painjful experimentation. Its best attainment is fragmentary;
its insights are partial and provisional. Surely it is
anomalous to make personality the ultimate metaphysical category.
It is more reasonable to suppose tliat personality is a human
category which has nothing to do v/ith a metaphysical determina-
tion of reality.
Borden P. Eovme v;as fond of declaring that the
scientific category of causation v/as meanir^gless unless given
an ultimate personal reading, that without it reason was sent
toiling back along a line of infinite regress, vainly seeking
for a rational stopping-place, for a logical fulcrum by which
reality may be lifted out of stark irrationality. This is ego-
centric assertion, more vigorous than valid. It rests upon the
assumption that thought can have a cozy, comfortable
universe, and a formal rationality, for the s.sking. The
empiricist v^ould rather toil back along the infinite regressus
than to posit an Absolute Mind, Y/hich is nothing but a meta-
physical ghost. Eov;ever, he does not go toiling back; he
remains here. The difficulty is ^.tuitous, for the prob-
lem is misconceived. For an appreciation of truth and value, he
^•Eog., Metaphysics, p. 92, 417, 429.
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requires no Primal Intelligence, or First Cause, of the purest
speculative water. To him, this is ai^ caricature of
real intelligence. (It is v/orth while to note that even the
rationalist can do nothing with the Absolute after he ha,s se-
cured it with so much trouble, and with rather too great a
shov/ of assurance. Ee can only hold the Absolute in a form of
words, oft repeated as an incantation. - This parenthesis
is stated only as a persistent impression; as such it may be
allowed, especially in viev; of the fact that the ratione^list
does not scruple to state his persistent impression of the
empiricist.) .
There is no evidence to support the hypothesis, there
is no logical reasoning to justify the postulate, that con-
scious life as developed on the earth is related m personal
terms to the energy of the universe at large. It is related,
most certainly; but the very qualities that characterize life
on this planet differentiate it from that energy which, to all
appearances and according to all experiment, is manifested in
other forms. The continuity of energy proves nothing beyond
the observed facts. - The empiricist believes that v/e are
logically compelled to rest the case here, and disparages
transcendental attempts to ignore the limits set by the facts
and by logical requirements
.
Certainly it virould be pleasant to believe that the
whole universe of time and of energy is involved in our happi-
ness and well-being for eternity. And our social values v;ould
be romanii/cally complete if the wide v/orld were irjTused with a
loving Spirit, Hope of our hope. Life of our life. If these 8.re
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necessary and wholesone demands, then empiricism contains an
T . „ . . fair
:
element of pessimism. These dreams are wineeKef hut theirs is
a childish which the stern facts of life refuse
the name of ’’natural.” That which is not part of the nature
of things (assuming this to be the reading of the facts) is not
valid for our expectation, a.nd is therefore not wholesome for
mature thought or emotional desire. It would seem to be the
outcome of our persistent egoism, concentering all things in
self and selves.
I think we should insist on the autonomy of the
idealizing process. The ideal is the principle of appreciation
and of gr^^glbh; its meaning is worked out in the course of
developing life. Supernaturals and immortals are vain figments,
lying altogether beyond the limit of our sober reckoning. Let
our thought of extra-experiential reality be confined to new
realms of knowledge and accomplishment, opening up to our ken.
As the principle of ,/^ychic evolution, the ideal is genuine only
as it is realized and then projected in imagination on the basis
of proved, that is to say, experienced, values. ’’Knov/ledge
appears as instrumental, provisional and practical; while faith
becomes the attitude of confidence and expectation in reference
to the further progress of experience. Knowledge, in actual,
vital operation, is accompanied by the glow of interest in the
concrete process and outcome, which is faith; and faith, in its
hope and trust, relies upon knov/ledge and tested experience.
Faith, urj:*elated to such knowledge and experience, becomes
wholly sentimental and fatuous.” (E. S. Ames, ’’The Psychology
of Religious Experience," p. 413, 414)
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Since this type of faith is permissible and praise-
worthy, since philosophy begins and ends in wonder, and because
imaginatively we may inhabit a wide universe, we return to our
definition of religion, v/hich our theory of the idealizing
process validates: Religion is the appreciation of the highest
values, loyalty toward adventurous ideals, both appreciation
and loyalty made stronger by the solemnity underlying, given
amplitude by the attitude of reverent 7/onder toward the
surrounding and inclusive mystery of the Universe.
III. Development and Demonstration of the Thesis by a Critical
Appraisal of One Phase of V/illiam James’s Philosophy of
Religion *
A. Examination of "The Varieties of Religious Experience"
This book owes much of its importance to its author’s
perception of the significance of concrete religious experience.
In the preface he writes of his belief "that a large acquaintance
with particulars often makes us v/iser than the possession of
abstract formulas, however deep." Hence he goes for his material
to personal documents, and makes use of psychological description.
His theory of truth is faulty, owing to his cliampioning
of an extreme pragmatism. In "The Meaning of Truth," he holds
that statements are inherently or statically true (true in them-
selves) only by ooiu?tesy. They may pass for true; but their
truth is too vague for definition, too vague for comprehension,
until reference is made to their functional possibilities. The
last give logical content to the truth-concept . "Truth happens
to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events." (Ch. I.)
Pragmatism confuses the criteria of truth with a theory
See pages 8 and 9, above
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(definition or cha.racterization) of truth. Its criteria are
largely pragmatic. But if they were wholly such, it vfould not
follow that a definition of truth in pragmatic terms could he
drawn from the pragmatic criteria. That which proves the exis-
tence of A is not identical with A. A particular phase of this
confusion is seen in the three (undifferentiated^ses of the
word "truth" in pragmatic discussion: (a) Sometimes truth means
objective facts or incidents. (b) Generally it is made to mean
the verifiable character of our knowledge. (c) Frequently (in
James) the (surreptitiously) assumed conformity, or absolute
agreement, v/ith objective reality is hinted at, or definitely
asserted. Hence the Pragmatist is hard to catch, for he runs
with the hare and hunts with the hounds
.
V/e vritnesB the confusion of verifiability with verity.
It is admitted that the process of verifying (remembered and
imagined, as well as actual) gives much, or most, of the
reality-color which our thought of verity possesses. And the
quality of verifiability does change and progress. This has
nothing necessarily to do with the postulated conformity of
ideas with reality (as a theoretic condition and practically
real situation) . This postulation is a necessary law of the
knowing process, and is sufficiently justified in experience.
In a previous section I have discussed the epistemolog-
ical problem, noting that it is generally admitted now that in
experience we have a valid acquaintance with the actual being
of the universe, but maintaining that we can not define or
fixate this substance of things. I held that we are in function-
al contact with reality, but can not quite capture nor fully
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compreliend it. Truth is our working acquaintance, or tentative
comprehension, of reality, the given erdd order j for knoviring
implies a real dualism. Our judgments are held to he true in
so far as they render a coherent and usable account of our
experience in any particular exigency. In knowing, we do not
tie up reality in packages; but we do realize the functional
contact, and work out the possibilities provided by nature.
The strength of William James, nevertheless, lies in
his reliance on the empirical method. Curiously enough, at
certain critical junctures in his philosophy of religion, he
loses confidence in the empirical procedure, and naively in-
vokes super-experiential, or even supernatural, sanctions v/hich
are inconsistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.
In spite of James’s descriptive interest, he makes
clear the distinction betv;een the ’’existential judgment" and
the "proposition of value," or "spiritual judgment." (The
Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 4) He defends the
. method of intellectual analysis, and of explanation by tracing
the lav; of cause and effect, but warns against the danger of
forgetting that analysis must not do avmy with the unique
character of the individual, and against the peril of assuming
that the genealogy of an experience will of itself account for
the meaning and worth of that experience.
Perhaps he is a little unfair in his reference to those
who "criticize the religious emotions by showing a connection
between them and the sexual life." (P. 10) In the case of the
instances (adversely) cited, it is indeed true that v/e have
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criticizing "the medical materialists" for discrediting
religious experience by exhibiting the dependence of mental
states on physios.! conditions. Nevertheless, there is a real
point here • Of course it is arbitrary to attempt to refute
the actus.l values of religious experience by tracing origins.
But the empiricist would have the right/to hold that the deep-
lying connections with sex impulse, the physiological depend-
ence, and the biological background, m-ake anomalous the reading
of ultimate reality in terms of their qualities. To the
empiricist, the supernatural claims of religion are most
certainly discredited, if not disproved (they are not dis-
proved), by the type of facts cited.
James holds that the value of religion can be
ascertained only by spiritual judgments based upon innnediate
feeling and on experiential relations to the rest of what we
hold as true. (P. 18) "Immediate luminousness , philosophical
reasonableness and moral helpfulness are the only available
criteria." (Ibid.) This would appear to be a pretty sound
basis; but it really does not settle anything. The second
criterion opens up the whole range of philosophic theory
and disparity; the first criterion is subject to various
interpretations and rival claims; and it remains for the last
to be interpreted and applied.
As long as James keeps to a record of seeming mental
content, he is correct in saying that, "It is as if there were
in the human conscicusness a. sense of reality, a feeling of
objective presence." (P. 58) But this feeling has no evidential
value as "a perception of what v/e may call ’something there,’"
(Ibid.
)
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James himself has just previously stated, "This
absolute determinability of our mind by abstractions is one
of the cardinal facts in our human constitution. Polarizing
and magnetizing us as they do, we turn tov/ards them and from
them; we seek them, hold them, tiate them, bless them, just as
if they were so many concrete beings." (P. 57) He adds that
they are real beings in the realm v/hich they inhabit. Yes,
but v/hat is that realm? It is the realm of the imagination,
or of conceptual meanings. These Platonic realities are real,
but subjectively real. They have an objective reality only in
the sense that they have indirect perceptual connections, o.nd
a social and communicable usefulness. (At least this is
reasonable as a minimal statement. It is only a summary, since
I have argued the question in our discussion of mysticism^
.
In my judgment, this would be the logical and scientific
position. James seems to waver between this point of view and
the naive notion that there is a bona fide sense of presence.
(I say "naive" because James does not, as a good psychologist,
even attempt to carry thru a rigid analysis at^this point.).
We have here the key to his curiously vacillating attitude
toward the v/hole problem of the philosophy of religion. He
asserts that an idea is often "exteriorized," and suggests
that this may have a psychological explanation; "but," he says,
"with such vague conjectiores we have no concern at present."
He is interested in the "faculty" by v/hich we have "a sense of
reality more diffused and general than that which our special
senses yield." (P. 63)
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their belief not as conceptions intellectmlly accepted, "but
rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly appre-
hended." (P. 64) (He is referring Bpei&areaily specifically
to religious experience.). This must mean "seemingly apprehended."
Perh-aps the phrase "in the form of" is intended to carry this
meaning. But he has stated, "Our interest lies with the faculty
rather than v/ith its organic seat." (P. 63) In precisely what
sense is this a "faculty"? Is it a genuine faculty of percep-
tion, or a tendency to hallucination? James probably means
to leave the question open at this time; but his position
appears to be a little too cordial in relation to an uncritical
mysticism. (The wise man would not dogmatize, but 4t©- prefers
to consider the simplest possible explanation.) .
"Such is the human ontological imagination, and such
is the convincingness of what it brings to birth." (P. 72)
He states that these feelings of reality v;ill be held as
genuine perceptions of truth, which "no adverse argument" can
expel from belief. Hov/ever, the psychologist and logician
ought not to be satisfied to rest the case there I And it is
not always true. The vn?iter ha-s had mild mystic experiences,
for the explanation of v/hich he accepts "adverse arguments."
On page 73 James opposes a rigid rationalism (in the
sense of a logically demonstrated system of beliefs) to mystical
certainty. This is not a fair statement. We may recognize the
limitations of logic, the significance of the impulsive, the (in
a sense) primal value of the emotional, the rich and varied
contributions of the marginal field, without rating "the dumb
intuitions" above reason, without accepting "the human ontological
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imagination" at its face value. We may a.ppreciate the
peripheral sources of insight (if these are important) and
emotional valuation without stigmatizing rationalism as "the
loquacious level" or as "logic-chopping rationalistic talk."
(P. 73) (Note that I am using the term, rationalism, as James here
uses it: the view opposed to mysticism. I v/ould prefer to call
the un-mystical viev; the truly empirical, or scientific, view.) .
It is frequently true that our impulsive belief "sets
up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized
philosophy is but its shovry translation into formulas." (P. 74)
It does not follow that all "articulate reasons" have a secondary
cogency, or that mysticism enjoys a primary validity.
"Instinct leads, intelligence does but follov/." (Ibid.)
Biologically speaking, instinct precedes, altho there is a
circular reaction in the development of instinct and reason.
I have already defended the position that, v/hile emotion (based
on instinctive tendencies) is superior in its realm, reason is
supreme in its sphere, Virhich is the sphere of the logical judg-
ment. If a person be logically-minded, he will distrust his
impulsive beliefs (altho he will often be unconsciously in-
fluenced by them); reason will often correct impulsive belief
in the realm of religion as elsev/here, will go contrary to it,
will set it aside, will reconstruct it from the bottom up.
Again it appears that James is too hospitable to
"mind-cure metaphysics." It may be a fine suggestion that "the
world can be handled according to many systems of ideas," that
the world may be "so complex as to consist of many interpenetrat-
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has no necessary religious implications. It is making an
unnecessary mystery to refer so casually to this type of
experience as affording a "disparate conception" of the
universe. (P. 123, foot-note) Religious faith (in healing)
and psychological suggestion do not represent disparate
spheres of reality; they are supplementary, or identical,
experiences
.
In his interpretation of the gospel of healthy-
mindedness, James holds that the mind-cure metaphysics
offers a perfectly definite and plausible conception of the
structure of the universe, and that this pluralistic hypothesis
offers the only obvious escape from the paradox of absolute
idealism. (P. 152, 133) According to the latter, the world
appears as "one flawless unit of fact.*' This unit is an
Individual, "and in it the v/orst parts must be as essential
as the best." (P. 131, 132)
Here we see the old fallacy re-appearing: James fails
to recognize the middle position. We are not shut up to a
choice betv/een the ultra-rationalistic solution of absolute
idealism and pluralism. James is so anxious to discredit
Hegelian rationalism and to commend religious mysticism, that
he forgets his own fundamental principles. He is not
sufficiently empirical, and hence is constantly betrayed into
fallacy in his philosophy of religion. As for the problem of
evil, one may give the biological, and a modest ethical
(social), interpretation, and hold to an empirical monism
(in the light of science and experience). This is entirely
satisfactory to the consistent empri empiricist, v/ho does not
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have recourse to a fantastic pluralism. It is enough to
recognize that the universe v/ears both a pluralistic and a
monistic aspect. (James has said this, too, at times.)
By his desire to make a vigorous statement or con-
trast, James is betrayed into making a false dichotomy. He
writes: "Let our* siaffering have an immortal significance, let
Heaven smile upon the earth, and deities pay their visits . •
. , and the days pass by v/ith zest; they stir v/ith prospects,
they thrill with remoter values." Take away all permanent
value, "and the thrill stops short, or turns rather to an
anxious trembling." (P. 141) He ignores the fact that,
betv;een glad, sure (albeit unfounded) confidence and blank,
pathetic despair, lie a natural joy in present values and
even hope, and that man can live effectively and contentedly
on a little hope. Moreover some of the more moving tender-
nesses of religion are noi:irished by the wonder that
is neither buxom faith nor stark despair, with its mono-
ideistic sentimentalism.
Some of James’s wiser words on this matter are in
foot-notes. For instance: "The difference between Greek pessim-
ism and the Oriental and modern variety is that the Greeks had
not made the discovery that the pathetic mood may be idealized,
and figure as a higher form of sensibility." (P . 142)
James's analysis of conversion and of saintliness,
and his appreciation of their character and social value, are
admirable. The logic is sound. Nevertheless, one feels that
he resists with difficulty the temptation to forsake his
declared principle of empiricism. More than once he hovers on
- VX ‘
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the verge of being disloyal to the imimpassioned simplicity
of scientific explanation, for the (to him) dearer delights
of vague mystic speculation.
In the chapter on mysticism he finally yields to the
inner urge, and admits that his dominant devotion (in religion)
is not to the empirical method, but to a preferred interest in
the non-rational, non-empirical order of reality. I have in
mind this statement, for example: "One conclusion .... has
ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal, vj'akin^^
consciousness, rational consciousness as ue call it, is but
one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted
from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms
of consciousness entirely different, . . . definite types of
mentality" v/hich our account of the universe can not afford to
disregard. (P. 388)
This marks a definite (altho unconscious) break with
the empirical procedure. According to the latter method, these
vague, emotional "forms of consciousness" are "different" only
in that they are more purely physiological, not involving so
actively the higher cortical centers, in tliat they are
mysteriously determined by the condition of the internal organs
and of the glands, thru the mediation of the autonomic nervous
system. No doubt they have their field of application, as
James asserts, but not "somewhere" far away, but rather in
the "field" of the physiological, and of course indirectly in
the field of vague mood and of marginal attention.
It is strange that student
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after the admission that he had come to this unshaken impression
partly as a result of observations of the effect of rfitrous oxide
intoxication I "Nitrous oxide .... stimulates the mystical
consciousness in an extraordinary degree." (P. 387) One with
Occam’s razor in his mental grasp v;ould hardly be inclined to
be so generous toward the claims of those "special types" and
"potential forms" of consciousness (P. 388), separated "by the
filmiest of screens," characteristically induced by a drug I
I can not admire such credulous hospitality to v^eird claims
.
Paraphrasing James, I can only say that, "looking back on my
own experience," such claims do not "converge towards a kind of
insight" of metaphysical significance. We do not wish to have
"a premature closing of accounts with reality." (P. 388) No
doubt these forms must be included in our total vrorld viev^; but
that place. is physiological and insignificant.
I suppose tliat Hegelians are pleased with James’s
grudging concession to the probable, slight truth of the
hegelian philosophy, (Ibid.) But
we have an unnecessary lapse into vague speculation. No doubt
"the opposites of the world" seem to be "melted into unity;"
but it is because, in this near-physiological, emotional
experience, cognitive discriminations are lost sight of. Why
indulge in gratuitous fantasies?
f* I,
' Jam*es becomes more and more He quotes
approvingly R. M. Bucks’s myth of the experienced "cosmic
consciousness," and the Hindu yoga practices. In the latter,
the yogi "overcomes the obscurations of his lower nature, ...
and comes face to face with facts." (P. 398, 400) James should
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rather say, '’overcomes the real facts of experience, and comes
face to face v/ith obscurations."
But he is in the mood to disparage analytic explanation.
"To pass a spiritual judgment upon these states, vie must not
content ourselves with superficial medical talk, but inquire
into their fruits for life." (P. 413) Is medical talk super-
ficial? Perhaps the mystical arguments are superficial. More-
over, do the fruits for life prov^iag anything concerning the
validity of the mystical elements within the valuational
experience? No; idealistic fantasies may have beneficial effects,
but this does not imply a noetic quality. Hallucinations may
have practical consequences, and illusions may clothe them^^^es
with ideal qualities. James admits this contention on page 415.
Nevertheless, altho he admits that the outsider has
the right to be critical of mysticism, he asserts definitely
that "mystical states, v/hen well developed, usually are, and
have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the
individuals to whom they come." (P. 422) They are authorita-
tive as a matter of fact; but that "they have a right to be
absolutely authoritative" is absurdly false, if my reasoning
is correct. Only the reason has the right to be authoritative
in matters of belief, as far as the final decision is concerned.
"Mystical states break down the authority of the ....
understanding," in its exclusive claims. "They show it to be
only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility
of other orders of truth, in which .... we may freely con-
tinue to have faith." (P. 423) If the intelligence is function-
ing, its authority is not broken down. The foregoing illustrates
/:
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James’s failiore to recognize that one may enjoy the valuational
experience with a mystical tinge, and may continue to be
intelligent, giving due credit to the beauty and enthusiasm
of the one aspect of life, and to the critical appraisal offered
by the other. We may insist that there is only one kind of
consciousness (altho with different degrees of awareness), and
that there is only one order of truth (or reality), albeit of
infinite variety.
Of course this criticism of James, altho not unfair,
is somewhat misleading. For, if he is at times too hospitable
to the notion of "another order" of consciousness, and of
reality, he straightvmy makes up for the lapse by becoming
critical, and rigorous in his logical demands. We may admit
that the higher mystical states "tell of the supremacy of the
ideal, » and in a sense the supremacy "of vastness," if not "of
union, of safety, and of rest." (P. 428)
In the chapter on Philosophy, James is in more exacting
exaetiy temper, naturally enough. He hints that mysticism is
too private and too various to claim much warrant of veracity.
(P. 430) I could repeat with James: "I doubt if dispassionate
intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner
unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical
emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious
philosophies." (P. 431)
It has been the task of philosophy to "redeem religion
is
from unvrholesome privacy." (P. 432) The question i-n, how shall
this task be accomplished? James rightly seeks to discredit
that intellectualism in religion which "assumes to construct
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religious objects -out of the resources of logical reason alone."
(P. 433) "Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary func-
tion, imable to warrant faith’s veracity. ... In all sad
sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demon-
strate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the de-
liverances of direct religious experience is absolutely
hopeless." (P. 455)
Quoting a long passage from John Caird, James holds
thaLCaird has not transformed private faith into public
certainty by coercive reasoning. Unquestionably the religious
(that is, mystic) rapture is real as an emotional experience.
Is it possible to transcend the direct experience of the
individual by an eloquent description? James answers; "I be-
lieve that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has
simply reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more
generalized vocabulary." (P. 453)
Hence it is nothing short of amazing to find James
asserting (on page 465) that the entire series of his lectures
has proved the truth that religion "everj^’v/here and at all its
stages" is the consciousness of an intercourse with higher
pov;ers, and that if prayer (as the sense that "something is trans-
acting" with the higher powers) be illusory then the whole of
religion is "rooted in delusion altogether." (P. 465) "The
genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up vri.th the
question whether the prayerful consciousness be or be not
deceitful." (P. 466)
According to our thesis, this is a false statement of
the case. It places religion in a fatal predicament, at least
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prayer
for the increasing number of men for v;hom is not
a transacting of business with higher po¥;ers. We have held
that religious idealism does not depend for its validity upon
this precarious and primitive defence
.
James contends that the impersonality of the scientific
attitude is shallov/, but as soon as we deal with personal phe-
nomena we have realities in the completest sense of the term.
(P. 498) This is true, if experience is to be given a subjec-
tive reading. But experience has an objective aspect or
reference; and it may be that the universe at large is not
personal. In that case, the impersonality of science would
be correct. Certainly science seems to justify its explanations,
at least as far as they apply to the mechanistic order of nature.
The projection of "private phenomena" into the objective order
of the universe may give us mere "symbols of reality," vrhich
do not even possess the demonstrability of the despised
scientific "symbols of reality." V/hen the philosopher makes
such a projection, perhaps "he has simply reaffirmed the
individual's experience in a more generalized vocabulary," a
charge v/hich James himself brings against Caird's naive
idealism. (P. 453) It may be that the only shallowness we
have here is in James’s slurring reference to the "deanthropo-
morphization of the imagination" called for by science I
By a curious inversion of evaluation, James argues for
the conventional objectivity of religion by stressing the prior
significance of "private phenomena," and then proceeds to
define one of the major tenets of the religious consciousness
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universe from which it draws its chief significance.” (485)
"That unsharable feeling,” ”the pinch of his individual destiny,”
may make a man’s private experience peculiarly real to him; but
unevittc^.
surely it requires a violent (and exceedingly •¥»43jte‘) assumption
to make this quality of experience the means of reinstating an
animistic view of the universe over the protests of science.
"The axis of reality runs solely thru the egotistic places.”
(P. 499) So it does as far as thoughts, feelings and volitions
are concerned. To assert that it does for the great universe
is to beg the question flagrantly.
In a foot-note (page 501) James holds that science
is moving, or may be moving, toward a "legitimation of occult-
ist phenomena under newly found scientist titles,” and cites
the admission of "the time-honored phenomenon of diabolical
possession” under "the name of hystero-demonopathy .” This is
almost unbelievable misrepresentation. It is obviously not
the legitimation of occultism. On the contrary, it is the
bringing of so-called occult phenomena under
laws of science. This is no indication that
view of science may "one day appear as having been a temporarily
useful eccentricity.” On the contrary, this and every other
advance of science justifies the impersonal method of interpret-
ing the wider universe, at least as far as scientific descrip-
tion is concerned. (James is not concerned with "vitalism;”
however we have discussed that question in a former section.) .
V/e may admit the importance to valuation of "the
recesses of feeling;” but it is a gross mis statement that.
"the darker, blinder strata of character are the only places
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in the world in which we oatch real fact in the making." (P. 501)
We may recognize the danger of over-intellection, and yet hold
that Jam.es ’s charge is false: "The intellect shows everywhere
its shallowing effect." (P . 502) V/e have maintained that
intellect is required to overcome the shallowness of mere
emotion; until reason has operated on "the recesses of feeling,"
they can make no genuine ideal contribution.
On pages 505-507, James is back on the experiential
basis, stating that religious feeling is an excitement of the
cheerful, expansive order, which freshens the vital powers*
This emotion overcomes temperamental melancholy, and imparts
enchantment to common objects. The faith-state may be mere
vague enthusiasm. Ee quotes Leuba approvingly to the effect
that God is not Imown, but is used; questions concerning^ God
are irrelevant; the end of religion is not God, but a richer,
more satisfying life. (We might amend this by suggesting that
it is commonly, rather, a more secure, bright and comforted
life.) ‘ Of course the more ambitious and intellectual religious
consciousness seeks to define and justify that life more
elaborately. He quotes W. Bender approvingly to the effect
that religion centers, not in God, but in Han; religion is that
activity carrying his essential vital purposes thru 'against the
adverse pressure of the world." (P. 505-507)
Why should James forsake this point of view, and "make
inquiry into the intellectual content itself," which he has been
steadily discrediting? Once more he abandons the clea^r and con-
vincing empirical method for metaphysical speculation.
(P. 507) Now he declares that religion has a uniform deliverance:
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it consists of an uneasiness and its solution. The solution
is the sense that we are saved from the wrongness hy making
proper connection with the higher poviers. This driaatie dramatic
form is common, but is unnecessary* This phase is a derived
form, a conventional construct. The more psychological and
fundamental viev/ James himself has stated: The germ of religion
is "this readiness for great things," the "sense of the exceed-
ingness of the possible over the real." (P. 506, foot-note)
And why should he insist that the religious person
becomes conscious that his higher part is "continuous with
a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe
outside of him"? (P. 508) This belief is derived and second-
ary, if (as James has held): Trust and faith "have their source
in that onrush of our sanguine impulses, and in that sense of
the exceedingness of the possible over the real." (P. 506)
James saves his choice suggestion to the end, namely
that in the "sub-conscious self" we have the mediating term
(long soiaght for) between the self and the MORE. (P. 511)
In this 7/ay he thinks we may preserve a contact with science
v/hich theology lacks. This is a poor makeshift of a sugges-
tion, and this concluding section becomes the weakest portion
of a great work.
We ought to be exceedingly skeptical concerning this
alleged "self", conscious and yet not conscious. If there were
such a thing, it would be a poor substitute for the rich,
developing idealizing process which we have studied. But what
do we have in these phenomena more than the results of un-
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This tour de fore© is even less satisfactory than the
theologian’s forced march; for it makes capital out of vague-
ness. If one were to venture on a belief in the ’’more,” it
would be more praiseworthy to take the valiant, straightforward
path of theology, than to make this gesture of pacifying science.
James seems to stultify his position ?:h©n he admits that ”it is
on© of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious
region to take on objective appearances.” (P, ©ew 512)
To be sure, James repeatedly reconsiders; but this
recurrent skepticism does not remove the necessity of my
criticism. He states that religious visions, raptures and
other openings neutralize one another, so tha,t if w© follow
any one of them v/e ’’build out our religion in the way most
congruous with our personal susceptibilities.” (P. 514) Then
he straightway asserts that ’’over-beliefs in various directions
are absolutely indispensable.” (P. 515) (1)
I do not agree that "the most interesting and valuable
things about a man are usually his over-beliefs.” (Ibid.)
They may be interesting; they may h8.v© their value. But they
are usually stupid, over v/eening and deceiving. If they are
decidedly ’’over,” they are superstitious or magical. If they
really are interesting and valuable, it is because they are
imaginative extensions of a^pproved and vindicated ideals. It is
the latter that are truly interesting and valuable, as this
paper has tried to shov/. James beautifully says that ’’v;e be-
long in the most intimate sense wherever our ides^ls belong,”
and yet plunges them ’’into an altogether/^tJmension of existence”
from that of the real idealizing process which w© h^v© examined.
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To identify the realm of impulses and emotions with
the supernatura.1 seems to m-e utterly uncalled for; it results
in corXusion and lanreality. There v;ould seem to he even less
reason to identify the physiological (and related) processes
v;ith the Eternal Mystery (in a unique fe.shion, as James does)
than so to identify the alert, conscious, apprecia^tive and
striving processes of the mind. To he sure, we can not (fully)
"articulately account for" our ideal impulses. Their roots lie
in the instinctive regions, as do the roots of all our concepts,
hahits, valuations, volitions. But the significance of ideali-
zation is to he found, not in their obscure rootage, hut rather
in their forward launching virility and upv/ard reaching
power. They become mieaningful only as they take conceptual and
imaginative form.
But James contrasts the inarticulate, "unseen region"
with the visible, em-pirics.l v/orld, to the decided disparagement
of the latter. This so-called unseen v/orld, e.s a matter of
fact, is just as visible (that is, sensible or sensed) as is
the realm of clear experience. The inarticulate, physiologice-1
world is knovm thru and by the bodily senses; it is sensed in
a more crude, elemental and animal-like fashion than is the
world of appreciations. Even the external world is perceived
by the organs of special sense, whose offerings are far more
readily and intelligibly taken up and cognized by the rational
processes, than is the obscure material of the somatic sensa-
tions. If we were to apply an appellation, surely this latter
order v^ould be the "lower," not the "higher."
With astounding naivete, James identifies this impulsive
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ine.rticulateness with God, calling it the higher part of the
universe I (P. 516) One suspects that it is "higher" only
because it is so vague and inexpressible ttiat Janes can refer
to it all sorts of nystic, divine qualities which 8.re too
obviously questionable when assigned to the clear order of
experienced s.nd intelligible ideals. I liave maintained that
ideals do not achieve their true being until they have emerged
from the impulsive region, formless emotionality, and have
become rational appreciations, intelligible appraisals of
experience. Kor is it true that the facts suggest a double
order of reality: the clearly experienced or_der and "s.n al-
together other dimension of existence." (P. 515) It merely
m-eans that what is at first largely impulsive, vaguely felt,
or marginal, becomes rational, ethical and esthetic. (V/hat
aberrations occui’ in the name of religion I)
James asserts that a good hypothesis must be more
than experiential: it must be prolific. This is true; but
is
it must also be reasonable. It is not good if it^prolific of
absurdities. (P. 518)
T7hen he asserts that Religion is not a mere illumina-
tion of facts already given, but is "a postulator of new facts
as well," he has made a statement which calls for careful
definition and determination. In this paper I have tried to
set forth the true conception of novelty in religious experience.
The thesis discredits James’s uncritical assumptions.
James insists that religion adds concrete details to
Nature, and makes good its claim to discover a new order of
being, "a characteristic realm of fact as its very own." (P . 519)
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What are "the more characteristically divine facts,"- apa.rt
from experienced facets? Says Janes: "I knov7 not. But ....
I ina.ke ny personal venture that they exist." (P. 519) He re-
cords that the Tzhole drift of his education persuades him that
there are two worlds of consciOLisness
,
for the most part discrete
but the.t at certain points they are continuous, and that "higher
energies filter in." (Ibid.) In the light of experience,
psychology and logic, this appears to me to be pure myth.
James admits tha.t he can take the sectarian scientist’s
(I would prefer to say, the empirical) attitude; but whenever he
does this, he hears the inward monitor whispering, "Bosh I" And he
adds that humbug is humbug, even tho it bear the scientific name.
I suppose that every one must hear the word "Bosh I" according to
his own sense of hearing. I ma.y say that I am able to adjust
myself sympathetically to James’s curious supernatural dualism.
When I do this, I hear a loud v.'-hisper, "Bosh!" And I v;ould add
that humbug is humhug even tho it assume the name of spirituality
The Postscript presents a sort of challenge. James
divides philosophers into three classes: natiralists , refined
supernaturalists, and crasser, or piecemeal, supernaturalists.
He classifies himself in the last group. I believe the^t he is
in error when he states that the second type bars out ideal
realities from interfering causally in the coLrse of phenomenal
events. Neither this type of philosophy, nor naturalism, would
necessarily "bar out" ideal realities. For idea.ls are experienc-
ed realities which function in experience; they are organic and
integral parts of experience, and hence of the known order of
events. James should not use the \7ord, "interfere;" he makes the
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entire misconception because he has assigned ideal values to the
supernatural sphere. The thesis defended in this paper has
presented the nature and function of the idealizing process
in a wholly different manner. Hy criticism of James should
serve to illustrate 3.nd to demonstrate its value. I have tried
to show the unsatisfactory che^raoter of transcendental idealism.
But even this "universalistic supern^turalism" would be prefer-
able to Jamies ’s theory of the openning of "the subliminal door"
thru which "transmundane energies," divine entities, pass, in
order to produce "immedi3.te effects within the natural world
to which the rest of oun experience belongs." (P. 524) It
is truly astonishing that a reputed empiricist should "admit
miracles and providential leadings," a,nd should "find no
intellectual difficulty in m.ixing the ides.! and the real vrorlds
together by interpolating influences from the ideal region"
among the ce-usal forces of actual experience I (P. 520, 521)
I can see no single line of edi evidence, not one legitimate
requirement, v^hich v;ould call for this sort of hypothesis.
I 3.m convinced, on the contrary, that Janes at this vital point
has completely misconstrued the nature of the idealizin-g process.
E. Critique of "The Will to Believe, and Other Essays"
The peculiar thesis defended in "The Will to Believe"
is fundamentally at fault, altho it contains certs.in valuable
suggestions. The statement that, "The question of having moral
beliefs or not having them is decided by our will," is ambigu-
ous. Of course our volitional nature is the driving force, and
in this sense determines moral attitudes 3.nd urges to moral
decisions. It is equally true, and equally irrelevant, that
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"your pure intellect does not decide." (P. 22, 23) For it
does not follov/ that the uill (our active nature) judges the
merit (and thus decides) in rege.rd to moral issues, or formulates
ethical ideals. Judging and formulating is the exclusive func-
tion of reason. "Will" and intellect must v/orh together,
neither pha-se of our conscious life, considered in abstra,ction,
can determine the nature or the value of moral ideals . This
problem has been discussed in sections C. 4 and C . 5 of Part II,
Hit in this dissertation. If the dyns-mic and the reflective
factors in consciousness do cooperate normally, then we have
neither "Mephistophelian skepticism" on the one hand nor in-
articulate gullibility on the other. James makes a false
opposition in drawing the contrast thus. A correct theory of
the idealizing process would prevent this glaring defect in the
analysis of the problem. (P. 25)
To the distorted question he gives a distorted reply.
Since one fits the other, the discussion secures a superficial
plausibility. The artificial and false opposition is that
between belief and unbelief (tliat is, assumption of objective
reality on the one hand, and rejection of practical value on
the other). In the manner presented, it is not true that
"religion offers itself as a mom.entous option," nor as "a
forced option." (P. 26)
"Where faith in a fact can help create the fact," it
is legitimate to hold that fa,ith. (P. 24, 25) This maty be
true (in a modest and circumspect sense) in regard to promo-
tions, boons, appointments and love-making. Janes is under-
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this prs^gnatic principle has any application v/hatever to the
question of oujr attitude tov/ard the fujidanental structure of
the universe I
This paper ha,s attempted to present religious idealism
as essentially the a-cceptance, with an access of tenderness, of
life’s known and approved values. Religion is the cherishing
of our common ideals with a fervor which carries the attention
beyond the practical moment. It is passionate loyalty to
ideal ventures, loyalty v/hich attains a certain solemnity in
view of life's mystery and possible destiny. Neither enthusiasm,
nor tenderness, nor loyalty, includes or implies a definite
belief in the more conventional claims of religion. To be sure,
our buxom intellect is fond of enlarging upon the declared
objects of religious veneration. It furnishes delightfully
fanciful extensions and imposing speculations. But these are
not the core of religious idealism. Hence I deny that vie are
faced with a momentous choice, as James would lic.ve us believe.
All that James's belief would add would be a heightened degree
of comfort and a precarious confidence; it would not alter the
essentie.1 nature of the idealistic consciousness.
This dubious comfort we can very vrell get along v/ithout.
The empirical idealizing process contains all the exquisite
beauty, the thrilling pathos, the tragedy, the triumph, of
life. The intelligent man ms.y choose to cherish these values,
and to be true to their behests, without venturing to take up
James's options. If one does permit himself, or force himself,
to take up the disingenuous option, he gains nothing but a sense
of fatuity, 8.nd the splendor of the ancient experience is dimmed.
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Secondly, it is not true that we have a "forced option."
V/e not only can, hut must', "escape the issue by remaining skep-
tical and waiting for more light." To do this is not to "lose
the good." To remsAn skeptical may be precisely what the
intelligent thinker must do. James attempts to present his
"option" as a forced one by drawing a precise line between
belief and disbelief. This falsifies the situation in a manner
which it is difficult to forgive. It is entirely possible
to enjoy the essential gift of the religious spirit by cultiv-
ating the reverent appreciation of ideals without venturing to
assert any definite belief concerning the ultimate nature of
the universe. Of course the degree of skepticism may vary
v/idely; there are an indefinite number of positions lying betv/een
positive, naive "belief" and militant or pessimistic disbelief.
He maintains that it is "as if a man should hesitate
indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him;" he loses her
as definitely as tho he decided not to ask her. (P. 26) This
well illustrates the sophistry with which we have to deal.
Marriage is a definite and irrevocable act. But v/e do not have
to marry the universe; in fact, we can not marry it, if we
would, altho the mystic secures the temporary illusion of
such union. We are at perfect liberty to ta,ke any sort of coy
attitude we may choose, or may think fitting or necessary - all
things considered. At this point in life, if at no other, the
individual has complete freedom of imaginative e^djustment. And
the Universe is not harmed by the tentative nature of the
arrangement. If we are to have a conventional ceremony, v/e
may advocate here, if anywhere, the companionate marriage.
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The alleged forced option in religion is reduced to
the vanishing point . One nay pass thj?u life Y;ith full s.pprecia-
tion of its accredited values, with veneration for all out-
reaching ideals of experience, with generous attitude towa^rd
the Surrounding Mystery, and yet renis.in entirely skeptical as
II tf
fs.r as "belief is concerned* By doing so -lae enjoys the
legitimate happiness and blessedness of the religious spirit.
I am aware of the fact tliat this use of the words,
spirit and religion, is offensive to many. But I hope that
I employ the terms in no arbitrary or question-begging manner.
I intend only to redeem them from their ghostly connotation,
and to give them their legitimate significance. Hov.'-ever in-
adequate or even offensive the use may be to many, the fact is
rather clear that an increasing number of thoughtful men and
women are coming to prefer the empirical connotations. I have
folloY/ed the suggestion so v;ell plirased by George T. W. Patrick:
"Spirit is nothing different from mind, but it is mind seen under
the aspect of value. To be spiritual, says Santayana, is to live
in the presence of the ideal. ... Thus religion loses its
mysterious and dogm-atic and oracular character. ... It is
not something the 'truth* of which we have to question and argue
about and seek e_yidences for." (Introduction to Philosophy,"
P. 29, 50)
This viev/ of religion is infinitely to be preferred
to James's childish special pleading. It is a matter of
surprize and discouragement to see how many keen minds (by
reason of over-fondness for deductive processes) fail to com-
prehend the significance of this point of view.' They do not
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it as "shallow," or even as contemptible. James is not free
from this harshness; altho, in his cG.se, one feels that he is
indulging in friendly fencing, or in play-acting to produce a
dramatic effect . One does not discover this palliative in
many writings.
Durant DrsAie, in "Problems of Religion," presents
religion as the persistent and humble process of adjusting
ourselves to the fundamental and irremovable aspects of life,
in contrast to practical activity whero things are adjusted to
ourselves. The necessary adjustment of life to its conditions
is transformed, in the imaginative atmosphere of religion, "from
a mere stunned submission to fortune .... to the peace that
comes from complete self-surrender in the service of the Ideal."
Thus viewed, religion is not "an extra solace tacked on to life,"
(as it often appears in James’s philosophy of religion). The
psychologically necessG,ry adjustment is made "vz-hen v/e have
attained a harmony of our impulses with one another, v/ith the
vj-ills of other people, and with the fortune tliat befalls us."
"This disposition of the heart and will, thru which a man comes
to care for the highest things, and to live in gentleness and
inward calm G.bove the surface aspects and accidents of life,
we call, in its inner nature. Spirituality." ("Problems of
Religion," P. 243, 244)
James insists that we must choose definitely between
our fear that the "religious" hypothesis is error and the hope
that it may be true. Life does not compel us to make this choice,
nor does Logic command. Rather, both prohibit us from hs making
it. The vrise nan may entertain both fear and hope. If the
w
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universe compels this balanced judgment, or an unfavorable
judgment, it is not his fault.
It is easy to cry out against this appraise.! of the
situation* Eov/ever, since the problem at best is so obscure,
since arguments can be brought forward for either side v/ith
equal facility (if not with equal cogency), a skeptical attitude
would appear to be reasonable and inevitable for the critical-
minded individual. Suppose we compel oujrselves to recognize
a "forced option," posit a correspondence of ideals with the
ultimate structure of the world, and "will to believe"? To the
intelligence, the obscure colossus of the Universe still lifts
its imipenetrable vastness. There is no answering Voice. The
actual Bitu8.tion being what it is, what have we added to the
genuine content of our religious experience? In vfhat way liave
we changed the essential nature of the idealizing process? The
truth is that we are in real danger of substracting something.
For T^e hs.ve come near to adding a note of insincerity, because
of special pleading and of self-delusion. The critical reader
has difficulty in believing that James has not done this.
We may well contrast the religious ch8.racter of
Shakespeare * s work with tliat of the more conventional author.
I believe that Shakespeare produces the more genuine religious
attitude in the m-ind and heart of the reader. The conventional
writer offers to conduct us to 8. cleverly illuminated stage,
v/here the puppets dance under observs.tion, and myth, magic or
morals are duly exploited, v:ith the hand of fate or providence
in evidence . But Shakespeare leads us out into the night of
stars, and leaves us there to wait and wonder before nature’s
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.
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vast panorama, the moving spectacle of life, and to contemplate
the silence and the mystery of the over-arching vault of heaven.
Asks Janes, "Dupery for dupery, vdiat proof is there
that dupery thj^u hojl)© is so much v/orse th-an dupery thru fear?"
(P. 27) But T/hy be subjected to either dupery? It is not true
that we are shut up to the choice between "backing the field
against the religious hypothesis" and "backing the religious
hypothesis against the field." (P. 26) Hot to will to believe
is not, I thinly, to be duped; it is not to be irreligious. It is
not to shov/ one's self unintelligent; for it is not a ma.rk of
intelligence to assume a certainty, or a probability, which the
facts do not warrant
.
In contrast with James's insistent declaration of a
forced option, I would present Dewey's dignified statement:
"We need to accept the responsibilities of living
in an age marked by the greatest intellectual^-djustment
history records. There is undoubted loss of joy, of con-
solation, of some types of strength, and of some sources
of inspiration, in the change. There is a manifest in-
crease of uncertainty; there is some paralysis of energy,
and much excessive application of energy in materialistic
directions. Yet nothing is gained by moves vrhich will
increase confusion a,nd obsouritj?-, which tend to an emo-
tional hypocrisy and to a plirasemongering of formulae
which seem to mean one thing and really import the
opposite. Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our
time as best we may, it is the part of men to labor
persistently and patiently for the clarification and
development of the positive creed of life implicit in
democracy and science, a.nd to work for the transforma-
tion of all practical instrumentalities of education till
they are in harmony with these ideas." (John Dewey,
"Religion and Our Schools," a.rticle in the Hibbert Journal,
volume vi., 1907-08)
Paraphrasing his continued statement, we may venture to suggest
that it is better for the philosophers of today to confine
themselves to their obviously urgent task of studying and
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interpreting the idealizing process, than that they should
form (in the name of religion) habits of mind which are at war
with attitudes congruous with scientific method, v/ith the
ideals of democracy and all other emprical valuation.
To reject the possible dupery of belief is not "to
forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the T/innirig
side." (P. 27 ) This is an unfortunate conception. I have
maintained that religion is essentially loyalty to life’s out-
reaching ideals. This is religious experience in empirical
terms. Compared with this mature and valid idealization,
"getting on the v/inning side" in the matter of a dubious
theological belief is a puerile anxiety. Foregoing this
gamble, we may still, in humble spirit and quiet ecstasy,
continue to contemplate the vast and awful llystery that
wraps us ’round. "It is noticeable," v^rites E. S. Ames, "that
with the increasing rationalization and organization of ex-
perience, prayer tends to lose this character of literal,
direct s^ppeal to a definitely imaged Being. It becomes more
and more an aspiration to understand the laws and nature of
reality vfhether in the lenge or in detail, and to work in
harmony v;ith the forces and tendencies of such reality. On
the contemplative, esthetic side, adoration and reverence are
directed to the magnitude, powei) progress and beauty of nature
and of society. ... In this esthetic element, the religious
consciousness is normally at one with other human interests;
and here, as in other respects, religion is differentiated
by the inclusiveness and ideality of the ends which belong to
it." (The Psychology of Religious Experience, P. 301, 302)
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It is not only illogical, bnt probably unethical, to
try to force the issue, as Janes does. This appears in his
argunent thia^t the religious aspect of the universe as personj?.!
nalies even more illogical a veto on our active faith. This is
reasoning in a circle: it is mashing religion ^iustify oun faith,
and our faith justify the claims of religion. (P. 27, 28) Of
coLirse, if ”v/e meet the hypothesis iialf -T/ay 0.s a. natter of
assumed "courtesy," then the natter Y/ill be settled to that
extent. Obviously this is begging the question. To compare
the skeptic to a chuirl among gentlemen is absurdly unfair, the
unfairness being relieved onlY by the suspicion that James is
not to be taken too seriously. The whole question is, is it
reasonable to suppose tha.t v;e are in the presence of a Gentle-
man? The unethical aspect of the affair n^y be intimated, in
part, by noting that one who is familiar 77ith deity may become
somewhat churlish toward his fellows, accusing (by implication
at least) those vxho reject a naive faith of "shutting themselves
up in snarling logicality." (P. 28)
In the light of our discussion, does not the "feeling"
appear childish, and the claim hollow, "th-at by obstinately
believing that there are gods .... we are doing the universe
the deepest service we can"? (P. 28) And yet James says, "I do
not see how this logic can be escaped." (P. 29) James vie^s a
better psychologist than he ws.s a. logician, as vre noted at the
beginning of this section. Y/e have "escaped this logic" by
shovTing that it is merely a plausible solution of a distorted
problem.
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us his philosophy of religion. Going thru his other writings,
I find little additior_al that is significant. For our purpose
it T/ill suffice to take note of a few passages in the renafn-
ing essays in this volume
.
In the essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" Janes significant-
ly records: "In the deepest heart of all of us there is a corner
in which the ultimate mystery of things v/orks sadly." (P. 32)
Again he says, "Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference,
- a mora.l rnultiverse, as one night call it." (P. 43) Hence it
is good that, in the educated mfnd, the "idol of the spirit of
nature" has been deposed. I'an can make short 7/ork of evil
empirically regarded. It loses "its haunting e.nd perplexing
significance." (P. 46)
Nevertheless, James insists that our religious longings
yield the faith that the v/orld we know is "the mere scaffolding"
of a more eternal world. He seems to be strangely unav^are of
the weakness of the argument from ignorance which he em.ploys
when he reasons tlia.t wonderful, supernatural truth may exist
unknovm to us, because we have not the perception for it. (P
.
57, 58) Of course this formal possibility alv/ays remains. He
attempts to push it farther than this
.
His well-lmown illustration of the mountain-climber’s
leap is pointless; for the cosmic leap is of an entirely differ-
ent sort. (P. 59) "You make one or the other of two possible
universes true by your* trust or mistrust." This is absujrd unless
the very existence of the invisible world depends, at least in
part, upon our response. In this case, the Universe does not
save puny ma,n, but puny ma.n (strong v^ith his veto power) redeems
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tlie V0.cillating cosmos. This serious suggestion James meJies
.
"For such a l>a.lf -v/ild, half-saved universe our ne.ture is
adapted." "God himself may draw .... increase of very being
from our fidelity." (P. 61)
hy sul’ficient comment is tliat the scientific veto to
this v;-eird specule-tion does not appear to be "like mere chatter-
ings of the teeth"! (P. 62) I disagree decidedly with the
assertion that the essence of faith "is to believe that the
as a reality.
possibility exists,"/ (Ibid.) I have held that legitimate
faith is the confidence that that which exists holds certain
possibilities (according to experience and reason) of extension,
of further developm.ent
.
We may hes.rtily agree with his closing admonition: "Be
not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living, and your
belief v/ill help create the fact," the fact of empirical vrorth,
most certainly.
In "The Sentiment of Rationality," James well argues
that philosophical abstractions are valid substitutes for con-
crete realities only v/ith reference to some particular interest
in the conceiver; and tbiat the progressive simplification, due
to "the relief of identification," is but one of many legitimate
purposes. The universe in one aspect is simple, in another it
is indefinitely complex. It is a question just to wliat degree
the universe is "simple." "Enough simplicity remains, however,
and enough eraving urgency in our craving to reach it, to make
the theoretic function one of the most invincible of human
impulses." (P. 70)
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comprehensive classification. The last is increasingly abstract,
"since the basis of every classification is the abstract essence
embedded in the living fact, - the rest of the living fact being
for the time ignored by the classifier. This means that none of
our explanations are complete . They subsume things under heads
wider or more familiar; but the last heads, v/hether of things
or of their connections, are mere abstract genera,, data which
we oust find in things and v^rite down." (P . 67)
With some thinkers, the passion for distinguishing
predominates; and then v/e have a, multiplying acquaintance v;ith
facts. With others, a passion for simple (inclusive) generaliza-
tions; such a one will rejoice in abstract formulas (altho he
will be apt not to perceive the symbolic reference, hence the
strictly empirical meaning, of these formulas). "A ma,n*s
philosophical attitude is determined by the balance in him of
these two cravings." (P . 66) (Of course no respectable system
entirely subordinates one to the other.) However, v/e have at
one extreme the barren union of all things in the ultimate
abstraction of Spinoza’s Substance, and at the other extreme the
equally barren fragmentariness of Hume. One's own satisfactory
philosophy will be some sort of "compromise between s.n abstract
monotony and a concrete heterogeneity." (P . 67)
William Jam-es is at his best in this admirable presenta-
tion, the significance of vdiich is rarely appreciated by phil
osophers. He is correct in admitting that the metaphysical
impulse is imperious, and also in maintaining that the rival
(of perceptual knowing) on the
one hand, a,nd of abstract simplification on the other, create a
. V
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real dilenma for the thinker. (P. 66) (He should say: a real
problem for the thinl^er, and a real dilemma for the ultra-
rationalist,) Hence metaphysical speculation (of the super-
experiential sort) is doomed to be unsatisfactory. If we take
literal refuge in abstract simplicity in order to escape the
"empirical sand-heap v/orld," then - in so far 8.s we really escape
the multiplicities - oux speculations become barren of real
meaning, hence infertile for genuine ide3.liza.tion.
As usual, James fails to \7ork out the implications of
the sound empirical method for the idealizing process. In the
light of our theory of the representative significance, and
functional nature, of ideals, the problem is solved. There is
no dilemma for the em.pirical idealist, altho important questions
of interpretation continue to arise. James alv/ays stops short
of the most fruitful development of his thesis, a presentation
of which I have attempted to make in this dissertation.
The correct statement v/ould be, thiat the speculations
(above referred to) remain in barren and confused abstractness
3.S far as their literal, or alleged demonstrable, reference to
ultimate reality is concerned. It is important to note that,
v;hen touched with emotion, these rationalizations possess an
eloquent (altho vague) sym.bolic reference, o.nd therefore have
genuine (altho troubled) value for the one v/ho comes under
the m.agic spell of their incantation. (I have discussed this
problem rather fully, and sympathetically - in spite of this
facetious reference, in section II. C. 2, pages 98-101.).
On one occasion I listened to e. theologian as he
unfolded his doctrine. I attended to his reasoning, but believed
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that his ahstractions viere utterly lacking in cogency; they
signified nothing of truth. Suddenly his voice broke; he V7as
choked with emotion. These abstract pbirases held for the
lecturer vital significance. Immediately the responsive hearer,
by e. process of imaginative courtesy or of sympathetic recon-
struction, perm.itted in memory the arid utterances to assume
spiritual meaning.
The lecturer, of counse, v/ould not have been satisfied
v;ith this tardy assignment of significance. His ovm ree^son had
been won by the nice distinctions; his thought was captivated by
the formal logic. Nevertheless, one listener found it necessary'’
to believe that the real source of meaning to the theologian
T;as not the rational processes involved, but rather the emotional
coloring that transformed the abstract phraseology into a living
sym-bolism. The genuine r^eaning v;as wholly empirical; it lay in
the idealizing process itself, unrecognized.
This is the explanation of the persmsiveness of the
Platonic idealism. Eis angelic forms are pure phantoms as far
as logical validity is concerned. They are as fantastic as
the Pythagorean "numbers" from v/hich he derived them. But they
possess poetic meaning and large symbolic value. They picture
forth, dramatically and impressively, the valuational aspect
of experience. They reproduce its epic sv/eep. Again^ they
appeal to the persistent romatntic quality in the human imagina-
tion, and give to the idealizing process a picturesque appeal
and picturable quality.
It is convenient and necessary to distinguish end to
name abstract essences. These becom.e useful modes of classifica-
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tion; they are neither valid nor real in any other sense.
Universals neither exist, nor "subsist” (whatever that may
mean). They afford convenient ways of referring to the facts,
of ma-nipulat ing the values, of experience. It is strange that
man should have had the cleverness to form generalizations, but
often has not had the vj-it to recognize their strictly empirical
character 3.s functional concepts. Man has been victimized by
his logical engines. In philosophy he has been a follower of
phantoms, a persistent pursuer of will-o * -the-wisps
.
(This
statement is for illustrative purposes. I mahe no attempt to
refute in detail the contrary position. It is a waste of time
to attempt to refute the scholastic realist, remaining aloft in
his shining tower of abstractions . The instrumental view of
cognition and idealization is to be recommended only by the
tote.l weight of its presentationi)
The chief charge against speculative rationalism is
that it is (as offered in intellectiaal theory) barren in mean-
ing and sterile in value. (I have said that much adventitious
m.eaning is im-ported into it, by sympathetic or poetic suggestion,
from experience,). To call theology’s suprem.e universal, the
ultra-abstraction, "oonci^te," is a mere flourish, and changes
nothing. Many are the philosophic fallacies which te.ke the ee-sy
form of hypostatization! Absolute Existence, in the dress of
ultimate abstractions, remains nothing. "Hegel, by trying to
show that nonentity and concrete being are linked together by
a series of identities of a synthetic kind, binds everything
conceivable into a imity, with no outlying notion to disturb
the free rotary circulation of the mind within its bounds." (P.72)
,
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On© who enjoys this type of rotary motion will probably attain
to a satisfying sense of reality. To the empiricist, this
"sentiment of rationality” is illusory.
However, James offers another super-experientie-l plead-
ing for a forced "faith," illogically conceived. Arguing from
the necessary "ingredient of expectancy," (p. 77) he holds that
the ors^ving to have this "expectancy defined" (p. 82) may be
legitimately satisfied by "faith." This faith is con-
ceived not as a tentative hypothesis, not as hope, but rather
as a "pressing against" ultimate reality, and as definitely
defining the future "congruously with our spontaneous powers."
(P. 82)
This viols.tes theenpirical principle flagre^ntly.
Granted ths.t "man needs a rule for his will, and will invent
on© if one be not given him," (p. 88) it does not follow that
"the particular m.ood called seriousness" (p. 86) may be com-
mended by critical philosophy only by a foray of faith such
as James calls for. James is seriously at fault, and perhaps
disingenuous, in shutting us up (by implication at least) to a
choice between naive faith as he defines it and "a philosophy
\7hich utterly denies all fundamental ground for seriousness,
for effort, for hope, which says the natujre of things is
radically alien to human nature." (P. 89)
James defines faith thus: "Faith means belief in some-
thing concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible;"
that is, faith is accepting as true that which is doubtful. In
urgent huma.n relations, this conception might be permissible:
/
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for granted; v/e have many forced options. Applied to religious
experience, the conception is dubious; for here there are no
super-experiential facts forthcoming, and supernatunal claims
present no forced option, as V7e have seen. I V70uld maintain
that faith, in the legitimate sense, is the iroaginative exten-
sion of an experience-construct beyond the given facts in the
direction, and of a sort, suggested by the facts themselves.
It may even be hope that tliat forv/hich we yearn may be true
eternally
.
Jamas ’s restatement is better: "Faith is the readiness
to act in a, cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified
to us in advance." (P. 90) This is to re-assert the fundamental
axiom of idealization, that values are intrinsically "worthy,
that ideals are to be preferred, enjoyed and promoted. The
ideal cause claims our devotion; and there is reasonable expecta-
tion (inductively justified and deductively applied) that the
out-v7orhing of this cause holds still larger possibilities of
value. E. S. AmesJ^as v/ell said that it is the uaartioulated
view which mahes faith the occasion of mysteries. I quote
from "The Psychology of Religious Experience"
:
"Religion and science both involve the whole
mental life,- emotion, imagination, reason and action.
Science, religion, art, and other interests are dis-
tinguished simply by emphasis upon different aspects of
hum.an purposive action. . . o VJherever there is an ideal
of any kind, there is faith. . . . For faith is just tha.t
interest, confidence and vivid envisagement v/hich make the
ends soi:ight so vital and appealing. . . . Faith is normally
dynamic and practical whether in religion or elsewhere. It
is just a conventional term for the propulsive, forward
striving effort of human nature. It is at its best v;hen,
under the control of the highest intelligence, it fulfills
in practical v;ays v/ith energy and power the noblest ideals
of the race. . . . Faith becomes the attitude of confidence
and expectation in reference to the further progress of
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experience, . . . Fa,ith, in its hope and trust, relies
upon knowledge and tested experience. Faith, unrelated
to such knowledge and experience, becomes wholly
sentimental and fatuous. (P. 296-300, 413, 414)
This builds on the ideo-motor theory of the na,ture of ideas,
Y^hich this paper has taken for granted thruout . The idea is
the incipient stage, or rehearsal, of the act.
In a characteristic touj? de force James violates
his own psychologies.! principles and his empirical philosophy,
and defends a super-fs.ith as the only alternative to mental
nullity. (P. 93) Witness the astounding sts.tement: "He vrho
commands himself not to be credulous of God, ... of immortality,
may again and again be indistinguishable from, him who dogms.tically
denies them;” and again he uses the mountain precipice illustra-
tion. (P. 109) Even if the assertion is literally correct
(modified by, "again and again”), it states too m.uch, and the
implications are unfair.
"The ultims.te philosophy," vrrites James, "must not
divide heresy from orthodoxy by too sharp a line." (P. 110)
This is v/hat he himself has done repeatedly. Put the true James
speaks out v^hen he decle.res that men will v/illingly forego
certainty in universal matters if only they may be allowed to
run the risk of beautiful dree.m and daring hope.
IV. Summary of Fundamental Propositions
I h-ave undertaken this inquiry with the conviction,
grov/ing- stronger thru a period of twenty years, that one most
important (if not the chief) single requisite of contemporary
philosophy is a self-conscious and adequate theory of the
idealizing process in experience. Axiology has made significant
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progress in bringing idealization to the stage of self-
consciousness, and in defining and investigating the field
of valuationa.1 phenomena. Nevertheless, I have believed that
the entire problem night be fruitfully approached from the
angle, and with the purpose, of this dissertation. I have
attempted to maize an analytical and interpretative study of
ideals, with the view of tracing their implications for the
genuine nature, and the validity, of the religious consciousness,
with its more inclusive ideal attitudes.
I have held that religion is not a depa^rtnent among
other departments, not a unit experience correlative with other,
and special, idealistic interests, such as art, morality, science
but th-at religion is a highly complex form of experience in v/hich
the special idealizations culminate, as the most inclusive
sentiment, the most expansive attitude, tov/ard the universe
contemplated in reverent imagina^tion.
This qua.lity gives religious experience a specific
character, and a certain simplicity v/ithin its complexity.
This does not generate a sacredness which ca.n impose upon
the miore concrete idealizations. I ha.ve held that every type of
ideal exists in its ov/n right, possesses its ovm technique, and
is independent of pretended religious dictation or assumed
authority. Hence I have sought to make patient analysis and
synoptic interpretation of the actual processes of idealization,
and - in the ampler assignment of meaning - to be loyal to the
empirical principle, which scientific method and logical theory
unite in commending for the evaluation of the religious ex-
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too common expedient of be^ptizing a difficulty^^^ a wide gesture
of explanation. I ba^ve permitted the justification of the
thesis to be the total weight of its presentation as a true
account of experience.
Any claim to originality which this paper may justly
make lies in the development of significant phases of a method
of inquiry (within the well-developed, general axiological
field); and it may be that I have secured a fev; results of
value for an appraisal of religious experience, and for a better
understanding of the ideals of our contemporary life . Lacking
a self-conscious and systematic theory of the idealizing process,
even leaders in empirical thought have fallen into unfortunate
errors in their philosophy of religion. My criticisms of the
writings of William Janes and of Jolm Dewey nay have indicated
the timeliness and necessity of this particular type of inquiry.
Altho the resulting conception of religion is rather widely
held today, it nay assume new shades of meaning from, the method,
and the results, of this study. In my own thinking it has
seemed to be an illuminating thesis, the possibilities of which
I have not discovered fully and systemiatically developed else-
\7here
.
The ideal, as embodied in the increment of growth in
conscious experience, is a construction in imagination of a
phase of experience v/hose meanings are not fully realized.
Ideals, being complex ideas, are configurations of mental images,
in constant process of modification; they are symbols, pro-
visional formulations, which have emerged in the complicated a.nd
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environment (pliysical and human); and therefore they can not
signify a static or absolute order of beir^, nor refer to a
reality other than that natural order known in growing ex-
perience •
"Values" are not self -conte^ined entities, to be
manipulated in the interests of a formal value -view of the
universe. "Value" is a convenient tern to indicate that
experience has a valuational aspect; but valuations are thoroly
organic, and interpenetrate v/ith the whole of conscious life.
Careful study of the child's learning shows that the
principle of idealization is operative. The ideal is partially
designated as an idea v;hich functions in experience as its
organizing factor, in the interest of progressive understanding,
appreciation and achievement. It is a synthesis of selected
aspects of experience, mediating richer interpretations. The
new pattern-meanings emerging from the wealth of nev; relations,
discovered and created by thought, provides an empirical
accoimting for novelty. It is impossible to condense the
psychology of the idealizing process, the outline of which
required the whole of section II. B., nor to trace its fruition
in conscious provision of the unattained beyond. This was done
in the detailed study of "conceptual thought, meanings and
idealization."
Hot being discrete things, nor separable spiritual
essences, ideals may be considered "objective" only in so far
as they have oonts.cts and connections with our perceptua.1,
objective world. Since ideals are merely extra-experiential
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values), they can furnish no certain information concerninxg the
ultimate structure of reality. The major portion of the religious
consciousness includes the ascertair^able values in an enlarging
experience, ima.ginativo and social in character. Because ideals
are functions of psychic evolution, they minister to the relig-
ious sentiment, whose appreciations and loyalties are quickened
by awe in the presence of life’s ultimate Mystery. This is tie
genesis of reverence, altho with the swift enlargement of the
emotions it may readily assume the proportions of worship,
m.ingled feeling of exaltation and attitude of submission,
tov7ard the Universe, personified in imagination.
Development of the theory of ideals of reflection, of
ideals of esthetic appreciation, and of ethical ideals, serves
to buttress the main thesis. The elusive quality of all idealiz-
ation helps to explain the persistent cosmic significance
>
poetic and si:iggestive nature
attached to valuation. Becs.use of the wi64£u3.«®ee«/of
the idealizing process, the imagination is continually led to
contemplate vast and m.isty horizons of magic meaning. The
perspective of limitless distance is an aid to humility of
8.ttitude, and a.dds a note of solemnity. Nevertheless, the
mature m.ind knows that the enlightened imagination inhabits
the empirical realm. Poetic thought requires spatial freedom,
but is not deceived by expansive imagery.
Mysticism opens no secret door. The mystic experience
merely causes familiar values to glow with a brighter light, or
discovers values in hitherto unnoticed relations . These ides.l
estimates are necessarily the precipitates of the more common-
place judgments of daily experience.
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Ideals of thought and ideals of beaut are not
derived or dependent forms; they have their ovjn intrinsic
meaning. Nevertheless, both the esthetic ideal and the
reflective ideal acknowledge their inner reference to the
volitional na.ture . Ethical idealism is pervasive and determin-
ing, seeking the conservation and increase of character values.
The moral consciousness is not a dictator, however, and must
not disparage nor invade other legitimate fields of idealiza-
tion.
The strength of Willie.n James lies in his exposition
of the empirical m-ethod. Curiously enough? at certain critical
junctures in his philosophy of religion, he loses confidence
in the empirical procedure, and naively invokes super-
experiential, or even crassly supernatural, sanctions which
are inconsistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.
In his juster thought there is much to coirmiend our
thesis that the weaving ideal-patterns facilitate the individual's
adjustment to the world of culture, and to the wider panorama of
cosmic forces. For our human evaluations are made against the
background of the stars; our little earthly drama seems to be
a troubled interlude in their vast and tranquil epic. However,
religion, as applied philosophy, dynamic idealism, is life’s
supreme Adventure. It is the Great Quest, undertaken in
expansive mood and with heroic courage. Sharing the common
life of human experience and of nature, imaginative-
ly conceived, we thnow ourselves forward in the direction of
hope, and along the pathway of a llurin-g' ideals
.
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V. statement of Conclusions
We may draw the following conclusions:
(1) Our approach to a theory of idealization is based
on an interest in the actual experienced nature of the idealiz-
ing process. Since ideals are phases of experience, 't2iey should
be ex8.mined in their natural functioning. This interest is
justified in tliat it is strictly and whole-heartedly consonant
with the results of the sciences, and with the requirements of
inductive logic; it asserts the place and value of deduction,
but recognizes frankly the instrumental character of thinking
and the limitations of knov/ledge
.
(2) Inadequacy of Rationalistic Approach.
a. Hegel’s Method in Eis ’’Philosophy of History.” In
his cosmopolitan interpretations, when he forgets the mechanical
working of the dialectic, Hegel is largely and impressively
true. He has many empirical interests. Moreover he insists
that v/e must not introduce a priori inventions, but must pro-
ceed inductively. If he does not always do this, we should
give Hegel full credit for recognizing the necessity of this
logical procedure.
However, in tracing the links in the dialectic of
transition, the empirical has no adequate place. Hegel is clear-
ly far more interested in the dialectic than he is in the rich
pattern of facts. Since the view-point is formal and unreal,
actualities are distorted. The fimdaraental difficulty is that
Hegel is concerned primarily with metaphysical speculation, not
with the determination of the experienced nature of idealization.
b. Sorley’s Assumptions in Eis "Moral Values and the
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Idea of God." Sorley postpones the interpretation of reality
in favor of a primary theory of moral values. This is sound
method. Moreover, the author clearly discriminates between the
two aspects of reality; the realm of causation and the moral
order, or realm of ends. He insists - and rightly - that the
laws determining value are not of the same order as the laws
determining the causal or other connections of things and
persons. Again, v/ith clear perception, he states that the value
which lie ascribe to material thJ.ngs is never value in the strict
sense, but only a means to value.
How, then, can he assert so confidently that it is
legitimate to assume the objectivity of knowledge and conse-
quently at the same time the objectivity of morality? The
argument becomes quite unconvincing, and the logic much too
formal, when he asserts (P. 499) that "the grounds for denying
the objectivity of morality are equally grounds for denying the
objectivity of knowledge." The deduction is the more strange
since Sorley himself has insisted ttiat there is a lack of con-
gruity bety/een the natural order and the moral order. (P. 501)
(3) The Descriptive-Normative Method. The descriptive
method is scientific; it explains in terms of process examined,
analyzed and synthesized. The normative method is philosophic-
al; it interprets experience thru an evaluation involving a v^ide
perspective of meaning. The dissertation proposed to make an
analytical and functional study of the idealizing process. Its
very nature compels an "empirical" treatment v/hich departs from
one conventional (or historical) notion of tliat term. I have
not restricted myself to a piarely descriptive study, but have
asserted the philosophical, interpretative character of the
in'
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underts,king . Ideals a.re factual and normative in their own
nature. Good logical procedure v/ill take account of both
aspects of idealization. V/e must begin with description, and
then pass on to more inclusive, imaginative interpretations.
(4) Ideal Experience as Individual-Social. The
exposition justifies the assumption that experience is re-
stricted to individual centers which, however, have developed,
and continue to develop, in a social environment. Social life
affords rich material for idealization, but the idealizing
process is alv/ays a function of the individual's subjective
experience
.
(5) The Idealizing Process. Being transcendent
meaning, the ideal is essentially intangible and elusive; but
it is none the less the principle of all psychic evolution.
The idealizing process is a vits-l, organic, emergent experience
in which appreciations are crystallized and novel pattern-
meanings are formulated thru imaginative projections, which
make possible fresh valuations and genuine development. The
ideal is emotionalized concept which functions in experience
as the organizing factor, in the interest of progressive achieve-
ment. V/hen this experience becomes clarified and directed, the
ideal (conscious prevision of the imattained) achieves its true
nature
.
(6) Novelty in Idealization. We have been particularly
concerned with creative consciousness, with ideals in the making.
I have shown that the idealizing process integrates with the
whole of psychic life,' but is itself a construction in imagina-
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ing, tested and enjoyed, and novel meaning. By novelty is meant
not merely unfamiliar, unexpected or different experience, but
rather experience v/-hich has nev7 values, made possible by the
wealth of nev/ relations discovered and created by thought.
The ideal weaves nev; value patterns.
( 7 ) Ideals and the Culture of Our Day. Our theory
enables us to throw into proper perspective, and to evaluate,
ideals of reflective thought, of esthetic appreciation, and of
moral striving. Every one of the three types of ideal has its
peculiar qualities and special claims, and also its just re-
lations to the others. It is the urgent business of philosophy
to adjust the frequently competing and conflicting claims of our
contemporary cultural ideals.
Ideals of reflection have rich and manifold expressions
in science and philosophy; and yet these ideal formulations do
not yield absolute metaphysical insight, but rather enjoy
symbolic meaning referring to the qualities of experience.
Divorced from the spirit and power of esthetic appreciation,
the thought of the age will become stereotyped, infertile; its
morality will grow suspicious, puritanic. On the other hand,
reflective morality may serve to keep art from degenerating into
the trivial or merely sensuous, and may provide it with deeper
purpose and understanding.
(8) The Function of Philosophy in Perspective. Science
and philosophy have made many blunders; each has hindered the
other. Thru dramatic clashes, and by v^holesome cooperation, each
has helped the other to a better understanding of its function
and method. By steady pressure, philosophy has brought science
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to a social interest, thus making it more friendly to idealism;
v/hile science has slov/ly v/eaned philosophy av/ay from its sterile
abstractions. This evolution has impressive proportions for one
v/ho finds religious value in the progressive emancipation of the
mind. The task of philosophy will be to interpret the ideal
possibilities of human life.
(9) Primacy of Volition in Valuation. From the point
of view of the function of thought (illumination), idealization
is reflection. From the point of viev/ of the function of senti-
ment, idealization is appreciation. But valuation is primarily
volitional-ethical in the sense that will (volition) characterizes
the whole personality as active and striving. The reflective
ideal and the esthetic ideal acknov/ledge their inner dependence
upon the wholesome satisfaction of the will. Ethical idealism
is pervasive and determining, seeking the increase of character
values. The moral consciousness is not a dictator, hov;ever, and
must not disparage nor invade other legit ima^te fields of
idealization.
(10) Religious Idealism. Our philosophy of ideals
validates the religious attitude, if conceived in the spirit of
simplicity and hiomility. This attitude is based on an imagina-
tive postulate, not subject to demonstration. The major portion
of value experience has to do with the ascertainable worth of
ideals in an enlarging medium, reflective and social in charac-
ter. When these ideals become sufficiently intense, and are
intelligently conceived so as to involve something of our total
attitude toward life, and imaginatively held so as to include
an attitude toward the ultim^e mystery of the universe, with its
:
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unknov/n (yet possible) potentiality for life and destiny, then
they assume a genuine religious quality.
On account of the dynamic, novel and creative charac-
ter of ideals (mediating fresh insight and erj?iched experience),
a generously empirical theory of idealization integrates natural-
ly with a normative evaluation supporting the religious senti-
ment with its tentative mood of reverence. Since ideals are
life in the making, since they are essentially elusive and
symbolic, their wider imaginative reference - in a universe of
mystery - may be rated as natural and poetically acceptable.
(11) The Idealizing Process and Mysticism. At its
best, mysticism has intensified loyalty to the more intangible
worths of experience. If this be a sort of knowledge, mysticism
may be said to add to our comprehension of the ideal meanings of
t
human experience. But there is no evidence ttiat the mystic
rapture adds one iota of information concerning the ultimate
structure of the universe. There is a twofold source of the
novelty claimed for the mystic experience. The meditation or
rapture may clarify and intensify familiar meanings, or may
discover values in new relations and interpretations.
(12) Appraisal of William James’s Philosophy of
Religion. The strength of James lies in his brilliant and
forceful exposition of the empirical method. Curiously enough,
at certain critical junctures in his philosophy of religion,
he loses confidence in the empirical procedure, and invokes super-
experiential, and even supernatural, sanctions which are incon-
sistent with his main view-point and declared loyalty.
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merit of his thesis; failing to work out the implications of a
sound empirical method for the idealizing process, he is in-
volved in unnecessary dilemmas and difficulties. But the true
V/illiam James speaks out when he declares th-at men will
willingly forego certainty in universal matters if only they
may he allowed to run the risk of beautiful dream and daring
hope. Eis genuine thesis is the assertion of the fundamental
axiom of idealization, that values are intrinsically worthy,
that ideals are to be preferred, enjoyed and promoted.
(13) Tv/o Practical Deductions. Bearing in mind the
provisional character of thinking, the representative and
suggestive aspect of language, and the symbolic nature of all
ideal formulations, vie should be sympathetic in our social
relationships, and willing to make practical adjustments in
the communicating and sharing of ideals
.
The critical and interpretative investigation^ of
the idealizing process is one of the most fundamental and
significant undertakings of the present time in the field of
philosophy. It is basic to many of the most important
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For convenierxce, and not with the idea of a rigid
grouping, I have cla,ssified the references under seven heads.
Books and articles to v/hich reference's has been made
are ne.rked thus : *•'-
;
those tliat liave been quoted are marked
thus : .
A. Psychology
'""’Ames, E. S. - The Psychology of Religious Experience,
IT.Y., 1910, Houghton Mifflin Co.
Allport, F. H. - Social Psychology, Boston, 1924, ditto.
''•Ealdv/in, J. LI. - Socie.l and Ethical Interpretations,
N.Y., 1897, Macmillan Co.
’'Baldwin, J. M. - Theory of Mental Development, 1900, ditto.
*"Coe, G. A. - Psychology of Religion, 1916, U. of Chicago Pr
.
'"'Darwin, Chas . - Expression of Emotions in Animals and Man,
Appleton.
^•'Davies, A. E. - Genesis of Ideals, article in Journal of
Phil., Psy., and Sc. Methods, Aug., 1906.
Freud, S. - The Interpreta^tion of Dreams, N.Y., Macmillan,
1913.
James, William - The Principles of Psychology, N.Y. ,Holt, 1890
.




J. R. - Memory: A Triphase Objective-Action, article
in Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 624-639.
“•King, Irving - The Development of Religion, N.Y., L-acmillan, ’10
.
“'"Leuba, J. H. - Invisible Presences, article in the Atlantic
Monthly, January, 1927, p. 71.
McDougall, W. - Outline of Psychology, N.Y., Scribner, 1923.
McDougall, V/. - Social Psychology, Boston, Luce, 1914.
'“’••Hiller, Irving E. - The Psychology of Thinking, N.Y., Mac-
Millan, 1915.
M-arett, R.R. - Psychology and Folk-Lore, K.Y., Macmillan, 1920
Moore, J. S. - The Foundations of Psychology, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1921.
Korsworthy, N. and Whitley, Mary - The Psychology of Child-
hood, IT.Y., Macmillan, 1923. 1911.
Ladd and V/oodworth - Physiological Psychology, IT.Y., Scribner’s/
’•Pratt, J. B. - The Psychology of Religious Belief, K.Y.,
Macmillan, 1907. 1900.
Starbuck, E. D. - The Psychology of Religion, IT.Y., Scribner,/
'"'Ribot, Psychology of the Emotions, N.Y., Scribner’s, 1900. 1920.
Te-nsley, A. G. - The New Psychology, London, Allen and Unwin,/
“•••Woodv/orth, R. S. - Psychology, N.Y., Holt, 1921.
Durldieim, E - The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
London, Allen and Unwin.
•"•-•Everett
,
Chas. C. - Psychological Elements of Religious Faith,
N. Y., Macmillan, 1902.
Hocking, ¥/. E. - Human Nature e.nd Its Remaking, Yale Univ-
ersity Press, 1924.
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Ewer, E. C. - Veridical Aspects of Mystical Experience,
article in American Journal of Theology, 1909, p. 575.
Pratt, J. E. “ The Religious Consciousness, R.Y., Mac-
millan, 1920 .
Y/ard, James - Psychological Principles, Cambridge, Univer-
sity Press, 1920.
Warren, E. C. - Human Psychology, E. Mifflin, 1919.





Baldvrin, J. Ivl. - Thought and Things (thjree volumes), London,
Macmillan, 1908, 1911.
Eosanquet, Bernard - Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge,
(Volumes I., II.), second edition, Oxford at the
Clarendon Press, 1911.
Boodin, J. E. - Truth and Reality, E.Y., Macmillan, 1911.
5'-Bovme, Borden P. - Theory of Thought and Knowledge, N.Y.,
Am-erican Book Co., 1897.
Columbia Associates in Philosophy, Introduction to Reflec-
tive Thinking, Boston, H. Mifflin, 1925.




Johji - How Y/e Think, Heath Co, 1910.
‘“"“Dewey, John - Creative Intelligence, N.Y., Holt, 1917.
•“"“•James, William - The Meaning of Truth, IT.Y., Longmans Green
Co., 1909.
Lodge, R. C. - Modern Logic, Minneapolis, Perine
,
1920.
•“"“’McClure, M. T. - An Introduction to the Logic of Reflection,
H.Y., Henry Holt, 1925.
Ogden, Charles - The Meaning of Meaning, IJ.Y., Harcourt
Brace Co., 1923. 1911.
Pearson, K. - The Grammar of Science, London, A. & C. Black,/
•“•Peirce, C. S. - Chance, Love and Logic, K.Y., Harcourt, 1923.
•“•Russell, B. - Scientific Method in Philosophy, Open Court, 1912.
•“"“Santayana, G. - The Life of Reason, N.Y., Scribner’s, 1906.
James, William - Principles of Psychology (Volume II
Chapter on "Ree.soning , " Eenu’y Holt, 1905.
C . Ethics
Eowne, E. P. - Principles of Ethics, R.Y., Am.. Book Co., 1892.
•“"“Conn, E. W. - Social Heredity and Social Evolution, H.Y.,
Abin-gdon Press, 1914.
•“"“Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, N.Y., Holt, 1922.
Dewey and Tufts, J. H. - Ethics, N.Y., Holt, 1909.
-::“!:-Drake
,
Durant - Problems of Conduct, Boston, E. Miff lin, 1921
.
verett, W. G. - Moral Values, N.Y., Holt, 1918.





Martineau, J. - Types of Ethics-l Theory, 1885.
Seth, J. - Ethical Principles, N.Y., Scribner’s.
*:5-Eobhouse, L. T. - Morals in Evolution, N.Y., Holt, 1915.
Royce, Josiah - Philosophy of Loyalty, N.Y., Macmillan, 1908.





Arthiir - The Basis of Morality, tr . by
A» B. Bullock, London, Macmillan, 1915.
•-’"“•Smith, Adam - Theory of Moral Sentiments, N.Y., Macmillan.
Sutherland, A. - The Origin and G:^\p^h of the Moral Instinct,
IT.y., Longmans, 1898.
Taeusch, Carl F. - Professional and Business Ethics, K.Y.,
Holt, 1927.
'•’•Urban, W. M., Valuation, London, Allen and Unv7in, 1909.
Westerme.rck, E. - The Origin and Development of the Moral
Ideas (two volumes), London, Macmillan, 1906, 1908.
V/right, H. W. - Self-Realization, 11.Y., Holt, 1913.
Carr, E. V/. - Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics,
H.Y., Macmillan, 1927.
Holt, E. B. - The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics,
H.Y., Holt, 1915.
Marlatt, Earl - V/hat Is a Person, Boston, Boston University
Bulletin, May 25, 1925.
'•KBromfield, Louis - A Good Wome-n (a novel), F. A. Stokes
,
1927 ) .
(Phillpotts, Eden - Children of the Mist, London, Methuen, 1900 ),
(Hardy, Thoma.s - The Return of the native (a novel), London).
D. Esthetics
Bosanquet, B. - A History of Aesthetic^ London, Macmill8.n,1917
.
Bosanquet, B. - Three Lectures on Aestnetic;, ditto, 1915.
Carritt, E. F. - The Theory of Beauty, London, 1914.
'•'"“•Flaccus, Louis W. - The Spirit and Substance of Art, II .Y.,
F. S. Crofts, 1926.
Gordon, Kate - Esthetics, K.Y., Holt, 1909.
Kant, I. - Kritik der Urteilskraft , 1790; English translation
by J. H. Bernard, 1892.
Hegel, G. W. F. - Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art,
translated by E. Bosanquet, 1886.
Schopenhauer, Arthi;ir - The World as Will and Idea.
Shelley, P. B. - A Defense of Poetry, 1821.
‘•'"-••Plato - Phaecv<^s ; Symposi'um.
•“"•••Parker, D. H. - The Principles of Aesthetics, Boston,
Silver, Burdett and Co., 1920.
Miirray, Gilbert - Four Stages of Greek Religion, N.Y.,
Columbia University Press, 1912.
^•"••'Santayana, G. - The Sense of Beauty, H .Y
. ,
Scribner’s, 1896.
Santayana, G. - Tliree Philosophical Poets, Harvard University
Press, 1910.
Tolstoy, L. - What Is Art? (English translation, 1899)
Schiller, F. - Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,
1795-1795.
Ruskin, J. - Lectures on Art, 1900.
Marshall, H. R. - The Beautiful, London, Macmillan, 1924.
Langfeld, H. S. - The Aesthetic Attitude, H.Y., Hare ourt , 1920
.
Ellis, Havelock - The Ds.nce of Life.
•“"“•Short, E. H. - The House of God, A History of Religious
Architect'ure and Symbolism, H.Yo, Macmillan, 1926.
(Reviewed by E. R.Lewis, in ’’Social Science" quarterly,
•“*“ Winfield, Kansas, Nov. 1927, p. 84).
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E, Eictory of Thought, and Philosophy of Civilization
'“Plato, Phaedrus, Synposium; Francis Bacon, Novum Organun;
Augustine, City of God; Descartes, Discourse on Method;
Spinoza, Ethics; Locke, An Essay Concerning Eune.n
• Understanding; Eume, Treatise Upon Eunan Nature;
Leibnitz, Monadology; Kant, Critique of Pune Rea.son;
Critique of Practical Reason; Eegel, Philosophy of
Eistory; Conte, Cours de philosophie positive;
J. S. Mill, Utilitarien.isn.
“^^•Dewey, John - Reconstruction in Philosophy, K.Y., Bolt, 1920.
2*-^'*DeT/ey, John - Religion and Our Schools, article in Eibbert
Journal, Vol. vi., 1907-1908.
^c-Perry, R. E. - Philosophy of the Recent Past, N.Y.,
Scribner’s, 1926.
Chapnan, J. C. an^ Counts, G. S. - Principles of Education,
Boston, E. Mifflin, 1924.
Lewis, E. R. - The Profile of Reality, article in "Social
Science" quarterly, Winfield, Kansas, Nov. 1925, p. 57.
'“'“'Randall, J. E. - The Making of the Modern Mind, Boston,
E. Mifflin, 1926.
Storck, John - Man and Civilization, An Inquiry into the
Eases of Contemporary Life, N.Y., Earcourt, 1927.
Y/hite, A. D. - Eistory of the Y/arfare of Science with
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Shotv/ell, J. T. - The Religious Revolution of Today.
Eucken, R. - Main Currents of Modern Thought.
Dewey, John - Democracy a.nd Education, N.Y., Macmillan, 1916
.
Dunant, VJill - Philosophy s.nd the Social Problem, NoY.,
Macmillan, 1917
.
Santayana, G. - Y/inds of Doctrine, N.Y., Scribner’s, 1914.
F . Metaphysics
•5‘'Bergeon, E. - Creative Evolution, N.Y., Eolt, 1913.






E. P. - Metaphysics, N.Y., American Book Co., 1898.




Erightma,n, E. S. - An Introduction to Philosophy, N.Y.,
* Eolt, 1925.
Calkins, M. W. - The Persistent Problems of Philosophy
(Fifth Ed.) N.Y., Macmdllan, 1925. 1925.
Dewey, John - Experience and Nature, Chicago, Open Court,/
•“''“Dewey, Jolm - Reconstruction in Philosophy, N.Y., Eolt, 1920.
'“Driesch, Eans - Science a,nd Philosophy of the Organism,
Aberdeen University, 1908, 1909.
^
1912.
Eolt, E. B., and others - The Nev/ Realism, N.Y., Macmillan,/
'“•'“'James, W. - Pragmatism, N.Y., Longmans, 1907.
'“James, VJ. - Some Problems of Philosophy, N.Y., Longmans.
James, V/. - A Pluralistic Universe, ditto, 1909.
'“Leighton, J. A. - Man/ and the Cosmos, N.Y”., Appleton, 1922.
'“'Lotze, E. - Metaphysics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1887.
'“'Morgan, C. L. - Emergent Evolution, N.Y., Eolt, 1923.




oOtto, M. C. - Things and Ideals, N.Y., Holt, 1924.
Perry, R. E. - Present Philosophical Tendencies, N.Y.,
Longmans, 1916. 1904.
Royce, J. - The World and the Individual, H.Y., Macmillan,/
••"•'Royce
,
J. - The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, IT.Y., H. Mifflin,
1892.
‘-Russell, B. - Problems of Philosophy, K.Y., Holt. 1925.
Santayana, G. - Scepticism and Animal Faith, II.Y., Scribner’s,/
Sheldon, W. E. - The Strife of Systems and Productive Duo.lity,
Harvard Univ. Press, 1918.
'-'Taylor, A. E. - Elements of Metaphysics, London, Methuen, 1909
.
'-Vaihinger, Hans - The Philosophy of "As If" (English trans-
lation), 1924. (Philosophie der Als Ob, 1911)
‘-Von Ehrenfels, C. - System der Werttheorie, 1897.
Ward, James, llaturalism and Agnosticism, London, A. & C.
Black, 1906.
G. Philosophy of Religion; Religious Literature
Alexander, S. - Space, Time and Deity, London, Macmillan, 1920
Bennett, C. A. - A Philosophical Study of Mysticism, Yale
Univ. Press, 1925.
Eowne, E. P. - Theism, H.Y., American Book Co., 1902. 1925.
‘-Erightman, E. S. - Religious Values, IT.Y., Abingdon Press,/
^•'Caird, John - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,
Glasgow, Maclehose and Sons, 1904.
‘-‘"'Drake, Durant - Problems of Religion, K.Y., H. Mifflin, 1916.
‘-‘-'Eucken, R. - Meaniig and Value of Life, N.Y., Macmillan, 1909
.
Hegel, G.FoW. - Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
London, 1895. ‘-'Ph^nomenologie des Geistes, 1807.
^'^-’Eocking, W. E. - Meaning of God in Human Experience,
Yale Univ. Press, 1924.
Knudson, A. C. - Present Tendencies in Religious Thought,
N.Y., Abingdon Press, 1924. 1906.
MoTaggart, J.M.E. - Some Dogmas of Religion, London, Arnold,/
Martineau, J. - A Study of Religion, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1888.
‘-'Mill, J. S. - Ttiree Essays on Religion, N.Y., Holt, 1874.
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